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I. INTRODUCTION

Although assisted reproductive technologies (ARTs) raise a host of
important ethical, legal, and social issues, much of the recent debate has
focused on their connection with human cloning. Before the newest wave
of attention, ARTs attracted critical scrutiny because of concerns about
transactions involving reproductive services and tissues (such as surrogacy
arrangements and compensation for egg donors);' peculiar challenges that
they posed in defining parenthood,2 especially as that issue relates to the
rights of custody and inheritance;3 the control over frozen embryos;4 the
prospect for posthumous conception;5 and the spectre of trait selection in
offspring.6 The possibility of human cloning, which depends on the
techniques of ART but in pursuit of asexual reproduction, has triggered the
latest round of debates.7

1. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal Frameworkfor
SurrogateMotherhood,81 VA. L. REV. 2343 (1995); Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the
Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107; Anne Reichman Schiff,
Solomonic Decisionsin EggDonation: Unscramblingthe ConundrumofLegalMaternity,80 IOWA
L. REv. 265 (1995).
2. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, An Emerging Consensus: Reproductive Technology and the
Law, 23 VT. L. REv. 225 (1998); Larry I. Palmer, Who Are the Parents of Biotechnological
Children?, 35 JURIMETRIcs J. 17 (1994); Richard F. Storrow, Parenthoodby Pure Intention:
Assisted Reproductionand the FunctionalApproach to Parentage,53 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (2002).
3. See, e.g., James E. Bailey, An Analytical FrameworkforResolving the Issues Raised by
the InteractionBetween Reproductive Technology andthe Law of Inheritance,47 DEPAuL L. REV.
743 (1998); Kathleen R. Guzman, Property,Progeny, Body Part:Assisted Reproduction and the
Transfer of Wealth, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 193 (1997); Anne Reichman Schiff, Frustrated
Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J. 524 (1994); Helene S.
Shapo, Matters of Life and Death: Inheritance Consequences of Reproductive Technologies, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1091 (1997).
4. See, e.g., Carl H. Coleman, ProcreativeLiberty and Contemporaneous Choice: An
InalienableRights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 55 (1999); Judith F.
Daar, Frozen Embryo DisputesRevisited: A Trilogy ofProcreation-AvoidanceApproaches,29 J.L.
MED. & ETHICS 197 (2001); John A. Robertson, Precommitment Strategiesfor Disposition of
FrozenEmbryos, 50 EMORY L.J. 989 (2001).
5. See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Freezing the Heir Apparent: A Dialogue on Postmortem
Conception, Parental Responsibility, and Inheritance, 33 Hous. L. REV. 967 (1996); John A.
Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction,69 IND. L.J. 1027 (1994); Anne Reichman Schiff, Arising
from the Dead: Challenges of Posthumous Procreation,75 N.C. L. REV. 901 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Peter H. Huang, Herd Behavior in Designer Genes, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
639 (1999); Owen D. Jones, Reproductive Autonomy and Evolutionary Biology: A Regulatory
FrameworkforTrait-Selection Technologies, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 187 (1993); John A. Robertson,
Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics,76 B.U. L. REV. 421 (1996); Vicki G. Norton,
Comment, UnnaturalSelection: NontherapeuticPreimplantationGenetic Screeningand Proposed
Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581 (1994).
7. See, e.g., LORI B. ANDREWS, THE CLONE AGE: ADVENTURES IN THE NEW WORLD OF
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One could criticize some of the existing academic commentary as
engaging in little more than bioethical parlor games.' Truth can be stranger
than fiction, of course, and occasionally the hypotheticals under discussion
come to life, garnering headlines and perhaps concluding in litigation.9
Unfortunately, some of the more fundamental questions about the safety
of different techniques and how best to control those risks have received
less scrutiny.' ° In fact, the controversy over human cloning has perhaps
prematurely left unanswered lingering but hardly inconsequential questions
about the now relatively lower-tech ARTs."

REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY (1999); Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom ofRepugnance: Why We Should
Ban the Cloning ofHumans, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 679 (1998); Lawrence Wu, Note, FamilyPlanning

Through Human Cloning: Is There a FundamentalRight?, 98 COLuM. L. REV. 1461 (1998);
Symposium, Human Cloning: Legal,Social,andMoralPerspectivesforthe Twenty-First Century,
27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 473 (1999); see alsoManuel Roig-Franzia & Rick Weiss, Religious Sect Says
It Cloned Human: Claim Draws Criticismfrom White House, Skepticism from Experts, WASH.
POST, Dec. 28, 2002, at A3.
8. See Carl Djerassi, Sex in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction, 285 SCIENCE 53, 54
(1999); Gina Kolata, For Some Infertility Experts, Human Cloning Is a Dream, N.Y. TIMES, June
7, 1997, § 1, at 8 (recognizing that some of "the ideas may seem wild and fanciful"). For instance,
scientists recently announced success in culturing immature testicular tissue across species, which
led some ethicists to imagine bizarre human applications. See Rick Weiss, FutureofAt-RiskSpecies
May Ride on Backs ofMice: OtherAnimals'Sperm Produced in Rodents, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,
2002, at A l ("It could mean that a boy who didn't survive childhood-or even a male fetus that was
never born-could someday be a father."); see also Machelle M. Seibel, Letter, Cadaveric Ovary
Donation,330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 796 (1994); Gina Kolata, FetalOvary TransplantIs Envisioned,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1994, at A16.
9. For instance, some divorce cases have raised questions about the parentage of a child born
through surrogacy. See, e.g., In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998) (support
obligation); Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998) (custody); see also R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d
790 (Mass. 1998) (refusing to enforce a surrogacy contract). Another set of cases have involved
disputes over the disposition of frozen embryos after divorce. See A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051
(Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707 (N.J. 2001); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998);
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (Wash. 2002); see
also York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (dispute with a fertility clinic).
10. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protectingthe Unconceived: Nonexistence, Avoidability, and
Reproductive Technology, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 487, 491 (1989) ("Although artificial reproduction
receives the most interdisciplinary attention, more straightforward infertility treatments... could
likewise risk the well-being of future children. For example, the current generation of fertility drugs
has increased the numbers of multiple births, thus placing the children at an increased risk of
premature birth."). Remarkably, some scholars have taken the position that potential safety concerns
such as injuries to the offspring of ARTs do not justify state intervention because those children
should prefer life with congenital harms over nonexistence. See id. at 492-510, 547-48 (critiquing
this position); see also infra notes 230-50 and accompanying text.
11. See Elizabeth Price Foley, The ConstitutionalImplicationsofHuman Cloning,42 ARIZ.
L. REv. 647, 723-26 (2000) (arguing that a prohibition against reproductive cloning prompted by
concerns about possible physical risks to mothers and children would violate the Constitution in

part because equally speculative initial concerns about risks associated with in vitro fertilization did
not prompt any similar response); see also Gina Kolata, On Cloning Humans, "Never" Turns

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/1

4

Noah: Assisted Reproductinve Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulat
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

This Article suggests that the time has come to reconsider the use of
fertility drugs. Part II discusses the different types of ARTs, the
characteristics of the fertility industry, and the latest research about some
of the risks associated with these technologies, especially the hazards
linked to multifetal pregnancies. Part III critically assesses arguments made
by commentators about the power of medical malpractice law to curb any
abuses in this industry, concluding that serious though not insurmountable
obstacles stand in the way of plaintiffs and, therefore, make the threat of
tort liability inadequate as a deterrent to the overly aggressive use of ARTs.
Part IV evaluates federal regulatory alternatives and concludes that the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) should consider restricting the use
of fertility drugs or withdrawing them from the marketplace. Although
such a drastic move would not prevent the continued use of advanced
ARTs, over which the agency probably has limited jurisdiction in any
event, it would dramatically reduce the risks associated with multifetal
pregnancies, and it should not run afoul of constitutional protections of
procreative liberty.
II.
BACKGROUND
Assisted reproductive technologies come in many forms and have
gained fairly rapid acceptance in spite of the fact that most infertility
patients must pay the costs out of pocket and that many of these treatments
have arrived on the scene with little or no rigorous testing of their safety
and effectiveness. Researchers have long recognized that some fertility
treatments increased the odds of a multifetal pregnancy, which poses
significant risks to maternal and fetal health,12 and newer studies have

Swiftly into "Why Not," N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at Al (noting the rapid willingness by some to
embrace the latest advances).
12. As a recent report from the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
explained:
The ratio of triplet and higher-order multiple births for all age groups increased
from 29 [births per 100,000] in 1971 to 37 in 1980; this trend began after the
[FDA] approved two ovulation-inducing drugs, one in 1967 and another in 1970.
Following the introduction of ART approximately in 1980, the ratio more than
quadrupled to 174 in 1997.... The contribution of ART to the overall triplet and
higher-order multiple birth ratio was [approximately 40%,]... and approximately
40% [of such births] were attributable to ovulation inducing drugs without ART.
CDC, ContributionofAssisted Reproductive Technology andOvulation-InducingDrugsto Triplet
and Higher-Order Multiple Births-UnitedStates, 1980-1997, 49 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLY. REP. 535, 536 (2000) [hereinafter CDC Report]; see also id. at 535 ("Because preterm and
[low birthweight] infants often require costly neonatal care and long-term developmental follow-up,
the continuing increase in triplet and higher-order multiple births causes concern among health-care
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identified other safety concerns such as birth defects associated with
particular ARTs. Notwithstanding a growing appreciation of such risks,
however, doctors and patients seem unable or unwilling to take steps
necessary to curb the overuse of ARTs or to reduce the likelihood of
multiple births.
A. The State-of-the-ART
ART now encompasses several distinct methods, though they often are
used in combination. 3 Artificial insemination (Al), also referred to as
intrauterine insemination (IUI), has the longest history and requires the
least technological sophistication: the procedure introduces sperm
(spermatozoa)--from either the husband or a donor-into the woman's
uterus. 4 Gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), which delivers the sperm
and harvested eggs (ova or oocytes) directly into the woman's fallopian
tube, represents a more complicated method of insemination requiring the
use of a laparoscope through an abdominal incision.'" Some definitions of
ART include only those techniques that involve the handling of oocytes or
embryos outside of the body, 6 which would encompass GIFT but not Al.
In vitro fertilization (IVF), first accomplished a quarter of a century
ago,' 7 represents the paradigmatic form of ART. Basically, the procedure

providers and policymakers.").
13. See Lori B. Andrews& Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 623,
624-25, 631-32 (1991); William P. Hummel & L. Michael Kettel, Assisted Reproductive
Technology: The State of the ART, 29 ANNALS MED. 207 (1997); Earl P. Steinberg et al., Profiling
Assisted Reproductive Technology: Outcomes andQuality ofInfertilityManagement,69 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 617, 618-19 (1998).
14. See Nancy C. Allen et al., IntrauterineInsemination:A CriticalReview, 44 FERTILITY&
STERILITY 569 (1985); see alsoGaia Bernstein, The Socio-LegalAcceptanceofNew Technologies:
A Close Look at Artificial Insemination, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1035, 1048-59 (2002) (describing the
origins of Al). See generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ARTIFICIAL

INSEMINATION: PRACTICE INTHE UNITED STATES, OTA-13P-BP-48 (1988).
15. See Ricardo H. Asch et al., PreliminaryExperienceswith Gamete IntrafallopianTransfer
(GIFT), 45 FERTILITY& STERILITY 366, 369-70 (1986); Stephen L. Corson et al., EarlyExperience
with the GIFTProcedure,31 J. REPROD. MED. 219, 223 (1986).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 263a-7(l) (2000); Am. Fertility Soc'y, Revised Minimum Standardsfor
In Vitro Fertilization,Gamete IntrafallopianTransfer, and RelatedProcedures, 53 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 225, 225 (1990) ("For the purposes of these standards, all treatments which include the
laboratory handling ofhuman oocyte and/or embryos are termed advanced reproductive technology
(ART) procedures."); CDC, 2000 Assisted Reproductive Technology Success Rates: National
Summary and Fertility Clinic Reports 465 (2002), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/
drh/ARTOO/PDF's/ART2000.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 2002) ("All treatments or procedures that
involve surgically removing eggs from a woman's ovaries and combining the eggs with sperm to
help a woman become pregnant."). Other commentators use a broader definition. See, e.g.,
Robertson, supra note 4, at 991 n.3.
17. See John D. Biggers, In Vitro FertilizationandEmbryo Transfer in Human Beings, 304
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involves harvesting oocytes from the patient, mixing them with sperm in
a petri dish containing a culture medium in order to achieve extracorporeal
fertilization, and then transferring one or more embryos back into the
patient. 8 Several permutations are, however, possible:19 the sperm and/or
eggs may come from donors,2° the embryos may be transferred into a
woman shortly after fertilization or cryopreserved (frozen) for possible
future use,2 ' they may be transferred back into the woman who supplied the

NEW ENG. J.MED. 336, 336-37 (1981); Nicola Perone, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo
Transfer-A HistoricalPerspective,39 J.
REPROD. MED. 695,697-98 (1994); see also 44 Fed. Reg.
35,033 (1979) (evaluating some of the ethical questions prompted by this breakthrough); Hans 0.
Tiefel, Human In Vitro Fertilization:A Conservative View, 247 JAMA 3235 (1982).
18. See generallyGEOFFREY SHER ET AL., IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: THE A.R.T. OF MAKING

BABIES (revised ed. 1998); Peter F. Donderwinkel et al., Treatment ofPatientswith Long-standing
Unexplained Subfertility with In Vitro Fertilization, 73 FERTILITY & STERILITY 334 (2000).
Technically, IVF involves the transfer of "pre-embryos," which do not become embryos until
approximately two weeks after conception and fetuses six weeks after that point (initially, the
fertilized egg is called a zygote). See Patricia A. Martin & Martin L. Lagod, The Human
Preembryo, the Progenitors,and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status Rights, and
Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH. L.J. 257, 263-66 (1990). A new federal rule evidently would
collapse these distinctions and treat conception as the point where public insurance coverage for
a child could begin. See 67 Fed. Reg. 61,956, 61,974 (2002); see also Rick Weiss, New Statusfor
Embryos in Research, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2002, at AI (noting that the Bush administration now
views embryos as human subjects entitled to the special protections accorded to those who enroll
in clinical trials).
19. See Alexander Morgan Capron, Alternative Birth Technologies: Legal Challenges, 20
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 679, 680-86 & tbl. I(1987); Machelle M. Seibel, A New Era in Reproductive
Technology: In Vitro Fertilization,Gamete IntrafallopianTransfer, and Donated Gametes and
Embryos, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 828 (1988).
20. See Richard J.Paulson et al., Pregnancyin the Sixth Decade ofLife: ObstetricOutcomes
in Women ofAdvanced Reproductive Age, 288 JAMA 2320, 2320 (2002); Mark V. Sauer &
Richard J.Paulson, Understandingthe Current Status of Oocyte Donation in the United States:
What's Really Going on out There?, 58 FERTILITY & STERILITY 16, 18 (1992); see also Maria
Bustillo et al., Nonsurgical Ovum Transfer as a Treatment in Infertile Women: Preliminary
Experience, 251 JAMA 1171 (1984) (discussing the use of surrogate embryo transfer); Kutluk
Oktay et al., Cryopreservationof Immature Human Oocytes and Ovarian Tissue: An Emerging
Technology?, 69 FERTILITY& STERILITY 1,6 (1998); Gina Kolata, Successful BirthsReported with
FrozenHuman Eggs, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1997, at Al. See generallyFAMILY BUILDING THROUGH
EGG AND SPERM DONATION: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES (Machelle M. Seibel & Susan
L. Crockin eds., 1996). Alternatively, women may receive embryos donated by other couples that
underwent IVF and produced more than they needed. See John A. Robertson, Ethicaland Legal
Issues in Human Embryo Donation,64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 885, 885-88 (1995); Gina Kolata,
ClinicsSelling Embryos Madefor "Adoption," N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1997, § 1, at 1.
21. See Edward F. Fugger, ClinicalStatus ofHuman Embryo Cryopreservationin the United
States of America, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 986 (1989); Bradley J.Van Voorhis et al., The
Efficacy and Cost Effectiveness of Embryo CryopreservationCompared with Other Assisted
Reproductive Techniques, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 647, 649-50 (1995); X.J. Wang et al., The
Contribution of Embryo Cryopreservation to In-Vitro Fertilization/GameteIntra-Fallopian
Transfer: 8 Years Experience, 9 HUM. REPROD. 103, 108-09 (1994).
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eggs or into an unrelated surrogate, 2 and they may be transferred into the
at an earlier stage ofembryonic development,
woman's uterus or, typically
3
21
into her fallopian tubes.
During IVF, the process of fertilization normally entails the mixing
together of harvested eggs and sperm, but, in some instances, additional
manipulation of the gametes might be deemed necessary. For example,
intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which has been used for the last
decade to treat cases of male-factor infertility, involves the direct injection
of a sperm into a harvested egg.24 A still more dramatic manipulation of
gametes occurs during in vitro ovum nuclear transplantation (IVONT),
which requires removing the nucleus from a donor egg and replacing it
with the nucleus taken from one of the patient's harvested eggs before
fertilizing this hybrid egg with sperm. 5
Drugs that induce ovulation by first stimulating the follicles and then
releasing the mature ova provide the cornerstone for all forms of ART.26

22. See Richard P. Marrs et al., The Use of Surrogate Gestational Carriers for Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 168 AM. J.OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 1858, 1861 (1993); Mark V. Sauer
et al., Simultaneous Establishment of Pregnancies in Two Ovarian Failure Patients Using One
Oocyte Donor, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1072 (1989); Wulf H. Utian et al., Preliminary
Experience with In Vitro Fertilization-Surrogate Gestational Pregnancy, 52 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 633 (1989).

23. See Paul Devroey et al., Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer as a Successful Treatmentfor
Unexplained Infertility, 52 FERTILITY & STERILITY 246 (1989); Margo R. Fluker et al., A
Prospective Randomized Comparison of Zygote Intrafallopian Transfer and In Vitro
Fertilization-Embryo Transferfor Nontubal Factor Infertility, 60 FERTILITY & STERILITY 515
(1993); G.W. Patton, Jr. et al., Transvaginal Embryo Transfer During the Zygote Intrafallopian
Tube Transfer Procedure, 171 AM. J.OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 359, 359 (1994).
24. See Offer Harari et al., Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection: A Major Advance in the
Management of Severe Male Subfertility, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 360, 361, 367-68 (1995);
Christopher J. De Jonge & Jessica Pierce, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection-What Kind of
Reproduction Is Being Assisted?, 10 HUM. REPROD. 2518,2518 (1995); Gianpiero Palermo et al.,
PregnanciesAfter IntracytoplasmicInjection ofSingle Spermatozoon into an Oocyte, 340 LANCET
17 (1992); see also Jeffrey Boldt, Micromanipulation in Human Reproductive Technology, 50
FERTILITY & STERILITY 213 (1988); Jacques Cohen et al., Implantation Enhancement by Selective
Assisted Hatching Using Zona Drilling ofHuman Embryos with Poor Prognosis, 7 HUM. REPROD.
685,685 (1992); Michael J. Tucker, Micromanipulative and ConventionalInsemination Strategies
for Assisted Reproductive Technology, 172 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 773 (1995).
25. See John A. Robertson, Oocyte Cytoplasm Transfers and the Ethics of Germ-Line
Intervention, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 211, 212-13 (1998) (explaining that these techniques may be
used to prevent mitochondrial disease in offspring or to overcome infertility associated with aging
eggs); Donald S. Rubinstein et al., Germ-Line Therapy to Cure Mitochondrial Disease: Protocol
and Ethics ofIn Vitro Ovum Nuclear Transplantation, 4 CAMBRIDGEQ. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 316,
321-22 (1995); Denise Grady, Doctors Using Hybrid Egg to Tackle Infertility in Older Women,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1998, at A16.
26. See AM. MED. ASS'N, DRUG EVALUATIONS 1161 (1995); John A. Collins & Edward G.
Hughes, Pharmacological Interventionsfor the Induction ofOvulation, 50 DRUGS 480,481 (1995);
Symposium, Frontiers in Ovulation Induction, 172 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 725 (1995).
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Such drugs may increase the odds of success with Al, 2 7 or they may be
administered in preparation for IVF.2" The FDA has approved the use of
the following pharmaceutical products for the treatment of infertility:
clomiphene citrate (sold under the brand names Clomid ®and Serophene'),
human menopausal gonadotropins (hMG), also known as menotropins
(sold under the brand names Pergonal ® and Humegon), urofollitropin
(sold under the brand names Fertinex ® and Metrodin), and human
chorionic gonadotropin (hCG) (sold under the brand names Pregnyl ® and
30
A.P.L.1). 29 These drugs first began to reach the market in the mid-i 960s,
and cheaper generic versions now exist for some of them.3 ' More recently,

27. See Aydin Arici et al., Evaluation of Clomiphene Citrate and Human Chorionic
Gonadotropin Treatment: A Prospective, Randomized, Crossover Study During Intrauterine
Insemination Cycles, 61 FERTILITY & STERILITY 314, 316-18 (1994); William C. Dodson & A.F.
Haney, Controlled Ovarian Hyperstimulation and Intrauterine Insemination for Treatment of
Infertility, 55 FERTILITY & STERILITY 457, 465 (1991); Edward G. Hughes, The Effectiveness of
Ovulation Induction and Intrauterine Insemination in the Treatment of Persistent Infertility: A
Meta-Analysis, 12 HuM. REPROD. 1865, 1870 (1997); Per-Olof Karlstr6m et al., A Prospective
Randomized Trial ofArtificial Insemination Versus Intercourse in Cycles Stimulated with Human
Menopausal Gonadotropin or Clomiphene Citrate, 59 FERTILITY& STERILITY 554,557-58 (1993).
28. See Salim Daya et al., Follicle-Stimulating Hormone Versus Human Menopausal
Gonadotropin for In Vitro Fertilization Cycles: A Meta-Analysis, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 347,
352-53 (1995); Jenifer C. Jennings et al., In Vitro Fertilisation: A Review of Drug Therapy and
Clinical Management, 52 DRUGS 313, 318 (1996); Gad Lavy et al., Ovarian Stimulation for In
Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, Human Menopausal Gonadotropin Versus Pure Human
Follicle Stimulating Hormone: A Randomized Prospective Study, 50 FERTILITY & STERILITY 74,
76 (1988); loannis E. Messinis, Drugs Used in In Vitro Fertilisation Procedures, 38 DRUGS 148
(1989); John A. Robertson, Decisional Authority over Embryos and Control of lVF Technology,
28 JURMETRICS J. 285, 287 (1988) ("A central feature of the IVF approach is stimulation of the
ovaries to produce multiple eggs.... [Sjuperovulation enables several embryos to be transferred
to the uterus .. "); Ronald C. Strickler et al., Controlled Ovarian Hyperstimulation Regimens in
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 172 AM. J.OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 766 (1995).
29. See Tamar Nordenberg, Overcoming Infertility, FDA CONSUMER, Jan.-Feb. 1997,
available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1997/197_fert.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2002)
(adding that chorionic gonadotropin "is normally administered after administration ofmenotropins
or urofollitropin"); see also id. ("Other drugs, used under very limited circumstances, include
Parlodel (bromocriptine mesylate), for women with elevated levels of a hormone called prolactin,
and a hormone pump that releases gonadotropins necessary for ovulation."). Bioengineered versions
of the older naturally-derived hormonal agents will soon follow. See Zeev Shoham & Vaclav Insler,
Recombinant Technique and Gonadotropins Production: New Era in Reproductive Medicine, 66
FERTILITY & STERILITY 187, 193-97 (1996).
30. See Mathias Gysler et al., A Decade's Experience with an Individualized Clomiphene
Treatment Regimen Including Its Effect on the Postcoital Test, 37 FERTILITY & STERILITY 161, 161
(1982) (noting that Clomid has been used since 1962); Charles R. Thompson & Laura M. Hansen,
Pergonal (Menotropins): A Summary of Clinical Experience in the Induction of Ovulation and
Pregnancy, 21 FERTILITY & STERILITY 844 (1970); Diane K. Wysowski, Use ofFertility Drugs in
the United States, 1973 Through 1991, 60 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1096, 1096 (1993).
31. See Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting a challenge
to the agency's approval of Repronex, a generic menotropins product); id. at 1316 (noting that the
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fertility specialists have used gonadotropin-releasing hormone (GnRH)
products,32 and the FDA has approved GnRH agonists such as ganirelix
(sold under the brand name Antagon). 33
B. FertileGroundfor a New Industry
Couples may experience infertility-generally defined as an inability
to conceive after trying for at least one full year-for any number of
reasons,34 but increasingly it seems that this simply results from waiting
too long before starting to try.35 Infertility represents a natural consequence
of aging, 6 and demographers have noted a trend of deferred childbearing."

FDA approved Pergonal in 1969). Intermittent supply shortages have arisen with some fertility
drugs in the past. See Nordenberg, supra note 29; see also Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation s
Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming Mar. 2003).
32. See Marco Filicori, Gonadoiropin-ReleasingHormone Agonists: A Guide to Use and
Selection, 48 DRUGS 41, 46-48 (1994); Edward G. Hughes et al., The Routine Use of
Gonadotropin-Releasing Hormone Agonists Prior to In Vitro Fertilization and Gamete
Intrafallopian Transfer: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 58 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 888, 894 (1992); Charles Kingsland et al., The Routine Use of Gonadotropin-Releasing
Hormone Agonists for All Patients Undergoing In Vitro Fertilization. Is There Any Medical
Advantage? A Prospective Randomized Study, 57 FERTILITY & STERILITY 804, 806-08 (1992).
33. See http://www.fda.gov/cder/foi/nda/99/21057_Antagon.htm (last visited Aug. 12,2002).
Fertility specialists sometimes also use other pharmaceutical products to suppress pituitary
hormones in preparation for ovarian stimulation, including Lupron* (leuprolide acetate), which the
FDA has approved only as a chemotherapy agent, but which some fertility specialists use "offlabel" at very low doses for this purpose. See Stephen L. Corson et al., Leuprolide AcetatePreparedIn Vitro Fertilization-GameteIntrafallopianTransferCycles: Efficacy Versus Controls
and Cost Analysis, 57 FERTILITY & STERILITY 601 (1992); David R. Meldrum et al., Routine
Pituitary Suppression with Leuprolide Before Ovarian Stimulation for Oocyte Retrieval, 51
FERTILITY & STERILITY 455 (1989); Ian S. Tummon et al., Randomized, Prospective Comparison
of Luteal Leuprolide Acetate and Gonadotropins Versus Clomiphene Citrate and Gonadotropins
in 408 First Cycles of In Vitro Fertilization,58 FERTILITY & STERILITY 563 (1992); see also Roy
Homburg et al., Cotreatment with Human Growth Hormone and Gonadotropins for Induction of
Ovulation: A Controlled ClinicalTrial, 53 FERTILITY & STERILITY 254, 258-59 (1990).
34. See MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1991 (17th ed. 1999); CDC,
Infertility-UnitedStates, 1982, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 197 (1985); Marilyn
B. Hirsch & William D. Mosher, Characteristics ofinfertile Women in the United States and Their
Use ofInfertility Services, 47 FERTILITY & STERILITY 618, 618-19 (1987).
35. See Victoria Stagg Elliott, The Baby Talk, AM. MED. NEWS, Oct. 21, 2002, at 31; Rick
Weiss, Infertility Campaign Can't Get Ad Space, WASH. POST, Aug. 28,2002, at A2 (listing "four
major causes of infertility: cigarette smoking, unhealthy body weight, sexually transmitted diseases
and advancing age," adding that "[m]illions of Americans find out too late that they are infertile");
see also Maura Anne Ryan, The New Reproductive Technologies: Defying God's Dominion?, 20
J. MED. & PHIL. 419, 433-35 (1995).
36. See Boukje M. van Noord-Zaadstra et al., Delaying Childbearing: Effect of Age on
Fecundity and Outcome ofPregnancy, 302 BRIT. MED. J. 1361, 1363-64 (1991); Dale W. Stovall
et al., The Effect ofAge on Female Fecundity, 77 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 33, 35-36 (1991). Indeed,
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Conversely, couples attempting to have a child may not wait long enough
before seeking out medical treatment, and some physicians may cater to
such impatience by providing fertility treatments prematurely. 38 Finally,
individuals may seek out ARTs for reasons other than infertility, including
efforts to avoid passing along genetic diseases or the desire of homosexual
couples to have children.39
In recent years, ARTs have become an increasingly popular medical
intervention. 0 In 1998, U.S. fertility clinics initiated more than 80,000
treatment cycles, which resulted in more than 20,000 deliveries, and more

researchers recently announced that women's fertility declined earlier than previously assumed. See
Carl T. Hall, Study Speeds up Biological Clocks: Fertility Rates Dip After Women Hit 27, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 30, 2002, at Al; see also Mark Henderson & Patrick Barkham, Biological Clock
Strikes for Men Too-at Age 35, LONDON TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at 1.
37. See T.J. Mathews & Brady E. Hamilton, Mean Age of Mother. 1970-2000, 51 NAT'L
VITAL STATS. REP. 1, 4 (Dec. 11, 2002) (reporting that the mean age of mothers at first birth

increased 3.5 years over the past three decades, and concluding that "there has been a real change
in the reproductive behavior of women in the United States"); Elizabeth Hervey Stephen,
Projectionsoflmpaired FecundityAmong Women in the UnitedStates:1995 to 2020,66 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 205, 206 (1996); Nurith C. Aizenman, Smaller Suburban Babies: Study Shows an
Increase in Low Birth Weights, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2002, at BI ("Among the most dramatic

[developments] has been the advancing age at which women are having children. The percentage
of women between 35 and 39 who gave birth increased by nearly 40 percent over the last decade
to 4.04 percent in 2000.").
38. See Lori B. Andrews, Reproductive Technology Comes ofAge, 21 WHITTIERL. REV. 375,

383 (1999) ("[S]ome doctors give fertility drugs to women who have been trying to have a child
for just three months ....
"); Richard E. Blackwell et al., Are We Exploiting the Infertile Couple?,
48 FERTILITY& STERILITY 735,737 (1987); Mark Henderson, HastyDoctors PutCouples Through
IVF Too Soon, LONDON TIMES, July 4, 2002, at 3 (describing new research finding that more than
ninety percent of otherwise healthy couples who fail to conceive within one year successfully
conceived without medical assistance when they continued trying for an additional year); see also
George J. Annas, Human Cloning:A Choice oran Echo?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 248,260 (1998)
("[Wihen IVF was first introduced into the United States in 1981, it was to be used only to solve
infertility problems that are otherwise unsolvable (e.g., blocked fallopian tubes). Now, however,
idiopathic infertility is a sufficient indication."); id. at 258 ("Both the genetics and bioethics
communities have consistently underestimated the power of market forces and commercialism to
shape the demand for and uses of new reproductive technologies.").
39. See Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH
CARE L. 147, 147-50 (2000); Alan H. Handyside et al., Birth of a Normal Girl After In Vitro

Fertilization and Preimplantation Diagnostic Testingfor Cystic Fibrosis, 327 NEW ENG. J.MED.
905, 905 (1992); Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 313-15.

40. See 66 Fed. Reg. 1508, 1543 (2001) ("According to the 1995 National Survey of Family
Growth (NSFG), 15.4 percent of American women 15 to 44 years of age, approximately 9.3 million
women, have reported receiving infertility services. Approximately 600,000 women report receiving
ART's, defined in NSFG to include artificial insemination and IVF services."); see also Lynne S.
Wilcox & William D. Mosher, Use of Infertility Services in the United States, 82 OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. 122 (1993) (discussing older NSFG data).
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than one-third ofthose pregnancies resulted in multiple births." ART also
has become a big business.42 Almost 400 fertility clinics currently operate
in the United States.43 Some of these are free-standing entrepreneurial
facilities, while other clinics are housed within larger health care
institutions. Much like other fee-for-service operations such as elective
cosmetic surgery, hospitals may establish fertility clinics as lucrative profit
centers. 4
I. Conception and Deception
As happens in other competitive and largely unregulated industries,
questions quickly arose about the accuracy of promotional claims made by
fertility clinics, particularly with regard to inflated success rates.45 In the

late 1980s, Congress became concerned about misleading advertisements
in this industry.46 With passage of the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and
Certification Act of 1992, 4' Congress directed the Centers for Disease

41. See AssistedReproductive Technology in the UnitedStates: 1998 Results Generatedfrom
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine/Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology
Registry, 77 FERTILITY & STERILITY 18, 19 (2002) ("Of all [20,24 1 ] deliveries, 12,647 (62.5%)
were singleton, 6,365 (31.4%) were twins, 1,166 (5.8%) were triplets, and 63 (0.3%) were
deliveries of higher order than triplets.").
42. See Andrews, supra note 38, at 382 ("[I]nfertility services have been transformed from
a small medical specialty to a four-billion dollar annual industry. Couples seeking IVF now spend
$44,000 to $200,0000 to achieve a single pregnancy."); Gina Kolata, Fertility Inc.: Clinics Race
to Lure Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at FI.
43. See CDC, Use ofAssisted Reproductive Technology-United States, 1996 and 1998, 51
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 97, 97 (2002) ("During 1996-1998, the number of ART
clinics increased nationally from 330 to 390 (18%), of which... 360 (92%) reported data in
1998.").
44. See Gina Kolata, In Vitro Fertilization Goes Commercial, 221 SCIENCE 1160 (1983); Lisa
A. Rinehart, Infertility: The Market, the Law, and the Impact, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 77, 78, 90-91
(1994); Trip Gabriel, High-Tech Pregnancies Test Hope's Limit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1996, § I,
at 1.
45. See Michael R. Soules, The In Vitro Fertilization Pregnancy Rate: Let's Be Honest with
One Another, 43 FERTILITY & STERILITY 511 (1985).
46. See Chris Anne Raymond, In Vitro Fertilization Faces "R&R ": (More) Research and
Regulation, 260 JAMA 1191 (1988). See generally HOUSE COMM. ON GoV'T OPERATIONS,
INFERTILITY IN AMERICA: WHY IS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IGNORING A MAJOR HEALTH
PROBLEM?, H.R. REP. No. 101-389 (1989); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT,

INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL CHOICES, OTA-BA-358 (1988); Consumer Protection Issues
Involving In Vitro Fertilization Clinics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business
Opportunities and Energy of the House Comm. on Small Business, 101 st Cong. (1989); Consumer
Protection Issues Involving In Vitro Fertilization Clinics: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Regulation and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business, 100th Cong.

(1988).
47. Pub. L. No. 102-493,106 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-l to -7
(2000)); see also Lynne D. Lawrence & Zev Rosenwaks, Implications ofthe Fertility Clinic Success
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Control and Prevention (CDC) to collect and publish information in a
standardized format. The statute did not, however, create any mechanism
for reporting adverse events encountered during fertility treatments.4"
Separately, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has undertaken
investigations into promotional claims made by IVF providers.49
States also have failed to offer much direct regulation of fertility
clinics. A few states enacted legislation that affected the field,5" and, in at
least one instance, patients have made use of general consumer protection
statutes to seek redress."1 Some commentators have recommended that

Rate and CertificationAct of 1992, 59 FERTILITY & STERILITY 288 (1993) (providing an account
of the role played by professional groups in the drafting and implementation of this legislation);
Susan F. Meikle et al., Surveillance ofAssisted Reproductive Technology in the United States: An
Update, 15 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT INHEALTH CARE I, 13 (1999) ("Congress took.., the
unprecedented step of mandating reporting of the outcomes of a medical technology."); infra notes
189-92 and accompanying text (discussing the implementation of this statute).
48. See Lori B. Andrews, Human Cloning: Assessing the Ethical and Legal Quandaries,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 13, 1998, at B4 (Unlike Australia, for example, "the United States
does not require clinics to report when children created as a result of reproductive technologies are
born with abnormalities."); Jonathan Bor, Study Ties In-Vitro Fertilizationto Genetic Disorder,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 16, 2002, at 7A ("There is no central registry to track birth defects among babies
conceived through [ARTs] .... ); cf CDC Report, supra note 12, at 537 ("Although the impact
of ART on overall triplet and higher-order multiple births can be estimated using SART data, no
reporting system has information on the use of ovulation-inducing drugs not associated with
ART."). Butcf 65 Fed. Reg. 53,310,53,313 (2000) (CDC notice calling on fertility clinics to report
adverse birth outcomes and maternal complications). In contrast, such requirements apply to
medical technologies subject to the FDA's jurisdiction. See Barbara A. Noah, Adverse Drug
Reactions: HarnessingExperientialDatato Promote Patient Welfare, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 449,
466-83 (2000). When ARTs undergo clinical trials in institutions that receive federal funding, the
investigators would have to satisfy adverse event reporting and other obligations. See 45 C.F.R. §§
46.1 03(b)(5), 46.11 I(a)(6), 46.113 (2002); see also id. § 46.201 -.207 (specifying additional human
subject protections applicable to IVF research).
49. See 61 Fed. Reg. 16,793 (1996) (announcing consent decree with one clinic); Michael
A. Katz, Federal Trade Commission Staff Concerns with Assisted Reproductive Technology
Advertising, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY 10 (1995); Robert Pear, FertilityClinics Face Crackdown,
N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1992, at A15.
50. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (West 2000) (requiring adherence to guidelines for IVF
issued by professional organizations); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13, 168-B:31 (2001)
(authorizing the issuance of regulations governing IVF, and adopting professional guidelines in the
interim); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (West 2000) (requiring periodic reports from IVF
clinics); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2971.1 (Michie 2002) (requiring written informed consent before
the use of ARTs, including the administration of fertility drugs, though apparently to counteract the
problem of misleading claims of success rather than to provide full information about risks and
alternatives). Some statutes requiring insurance coverage insist that fertility clinics adhere to
professional guidelines. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137(d), 23-86-118(d) (Michie 1999 &
Supp. 2001); HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 43 1: 10A-I 16.5(6), 432:1-604(6) (1993); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 215, § 5/356m(b)(1 )(C) (West 2000); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-81 0(c)(5) (2002); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17:48-6x(a) (West 2001); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 3.51-6, § 3A(e)(5) (Vernon 2001).
51. See Karlin v. IVF Am., Inc., 712 N.E.2d 662, 664-65, 667-68 (N.Y. 1999).
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states become more involved in supervising certain commercial aspects of
the fertility industry, 2 but it generally
has escaped the sustained attention
3
of federal and state officials.5
2. Paying for Those Bundles of Joy
Babies conceived through the use of ARTs do not come cheaply. IVF
costs approximately $10,000 per cycle, and it takes an average of four
cycles to achieve a successful pregnancy. 4 For the most part, patients pay
these charges in full. Health insurers generally refuse to cover fertility
treatments." Although some courts have interpreted ambiguous coverage
provisions in favor of infertile patients,56 and more than a dozen state

52. See Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 35, 50 (2000) ("There is a compelling need to ensure that couples who enter into

assisted reproduction have sufficient information to know what they are getting into."); Keith Alan
Byers, Infertility and In Vitro Fertilization:A Growing Needfor Consumer-OrientedRegulation
of the In Vitro FertilizationIndustry, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 265, 299-313 (1997) (calling for state
regulation designed to address concerns about misleading advertising, inadequate training,
transmissible diseases, mix-ups, and fraud); Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer
Protection, 109 HARV. L. REv. 2092, 2107-09 (1996) (recommending that states require fertility

clinics to provide prospective clients with accurate disclosures of both their success rates and the
frequency of multifetal pregnancies).
53. See ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY FROM
LABORATORIES TO LEGISLATURES 93-100, 111-16, 139-42 (1989) (applauding the government's
benign neglect as "incrementalism"); Rebecca Dresser, Regulating Assisted Reproduction,

HASTINGS CTR.

REP.,

Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 26; Weldon E. Havins & James J.Dalessio, The Ever-

Widening Gap Between the Science ofArtificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws Which
Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL L. REv. 825, 843-47 (1999). But cf David Adamson,
Regulation ofAssisted Reproductive Technologies in the UnitedStates, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY

932, 938 (2002) (arguing that, in the aggregate, these piecemeal efforts--coupled with professional
self-regulation-result in fairly comprehensive supervision of ARTs).
54. See David S. Guzick, Editorial, Should Insurance Coverage for In Vitro FertilizationBe
Mandated?, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 686, 687 (2002); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 1508, 1543 (2001)

("The estimated patient cost per [IVF] cycle ranges from $8,000 to $10,000.").
55. See Dennis A. Hidlebaugh et al., Cost ofAssistedReproductive Technologiesfora Health
Maintenance Organization,42 J. REPROD. MED. 570, 573 (1997) (IVF "is not a standard benefit

in the majority of health insurance programs except in afew states that have state-mandated laws.");
Lisa M. Kerr, Note, Can Money Buy Happiness? An Examinationof the Coverage of Infertility

Services Under HMO Contracts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 599, 606, 617-21 (1999); Milt
Freudenheim, Aetna Is Reducing Fertility Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 1998, at Al.

56. See Egert v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 900 F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (7th Cir. 1990);
Reilly v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 846 F.2d 416,423-24 (7th Cir. 1988); Witcraft
v. Sundstrand Health & Disability Group Benefit Plan, 420 N.W.2d 785, 789-90 (Iowa 1988); see
also Gail D. Cox, Insurers Being Forced to Pay for Fertility Right, NAT'L L.J., Apr. I, 1988, at
14. But see Kinzie v. Physician's Liab. Ins. Co., 750 P.2d 1140, 1141-42 (Okla. Ct. App. 1987).
See generally Edward L. Raymond, Jr., Annotation, Coverage ofArtificial Insemination Procedures
or Other Infertility Treatments by Health, Sickness, or HospitalizationInsurance, 80 A.L.R.4th

1059 (1990 & Supp. 2002).
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legislatures have enacted statutes requiring insurers to cover or at least
offer to cover certain fertility treatments,5 7 most patients still must pay out
of pocket. Some commentators have suggested that the failure to cover
fertility treatments may run afoul of disability statutes or constitutional
rights,5" but courts have not yet mandated coverage on these grounds. 9
As explained in Part II.D of this Article, the lack of insurance coverage
may influence the choices made even by patients who can afford to pay for
the treatments themselves. Lack of coverage also means that health
insurers generally play no role in influencing the types of fertility services
offered by clinics or in constraining the fees charged to patients.
Noncoverage does, however, limit the overall utilization of these
services.'

C. Assessing Safety After the Fact
Unlike other medical technologies, ARTs arrive on the scene with little
or no rigorous testing of their safety and effectiveness. 6' Although the

57. See Nat'l Conf. St. Legislatures, Insurance Coveragefor Infertility Therapy (Oct. 2002),
availableat http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/infert.htm (last visited Nov. 23, 2002); Melissa
R. O'Rourke, Comment, The Status ofInfertility TreatmentsandInsuranceCoverage:Some Hopes
and Frustrations,37 S.D. L. REV. 343, 365-72 (1992).
58. See D'Andra Millsap, Sex, Lies, and Health Insurance: Employer-Provided Health
InsuranceCoverage ofAbortion andInfertility Services and the ADA, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 51, 7475, 79-84 (1996); Erin Lynn Connolly, Note, ConstitutionalIssues Raisedby States'Exclusionof
FertilityDrugsfrom MedicaidCoverage in Light of Mandated Coverage of Viagra, 54 VAND. L.
REV. 451,462-68,472-80 (2001); Thomas D. Flanigan, Note, Assisted Reproductive Technologies
and Insurance Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 777 (2000).
59. See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 677-81 (8th Cir. 1996); Saks v.
Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318,324-29 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). But cf Erickson v. Bartell Drug
Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271-77 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding that the exclusion of
contraceptives from a private health insurance plan that covered other prescription drugs constituted
unlawful sex discrimination).
60. See Peter J. Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J.
HEALTH POL. PoL'Y & L. 1215, 1220 (1997) (forecasting increased utilization of ART if states
mandate insurance coverage); see also infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing research
finding increased utilization under laws that mandate coverage); cf John A. Collins et al., An
Estimate of the Cost of ln Vitro FertilizationServices in the United States in 1995, 64 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 538, 543-44 (1995) (arguing that,if insurers decided to cover ARTs, they could limit
expected increases in utilization by applying clinical criteria to guide reimbursement decisions).
61. See M. Yusoff Dawood, In Vitro Fertilization,Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and
Superovulationwith IntrauterineInsemination: Efficacy andPotentialHealthHazards on Babies
Delivered, 174 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 1208, 1208 (1996); E. Kristine Steele et al., Science
Versus ClinicalAdventurismin TreatmentofAzoospermia, 353 LANCET 516, 517 (1999); E.R. te
Velde et al., Concerns About Assisted Reproduction,351 LANCET 1524, 1525 (1998); Rick Weiss,
Fertility Innovation or Exploitation? Regulatory Void Allows for Trial-and Error-Without
PatientDisclosureRules, WASH. POsT, Feb. 9, 1998, at AI; see also Annas, supra note 38, at 263
("Control of IVF research was defacto ceded to the medical profession ... when the Reagan and
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techniques had emerged from use in animals, questions persisted about
safety to offspring.62 The lack of evidence in humans did not, however,
discourage the fairly rapid adoption of ARTs. The government plays
essentially no role in reviewing new medical procedures-as opposed to
new products-in advance of their use in patients, leaving the task of
scrutinizing the safety and effectiveness of innovative techniques for
biomedical researchers and professional self-regulation, perhaps with tort
litigation serving as a backstop. 3
As a result, patient demand coupled with the lack of any evidence
suggesting intrinsic hazards associated with these procedures led to the
increasing use of ARTs to treat infertility." As experience accumulates,
researchers can try to assess these technologies after they have come into

Bush administrations refused to provide federal funding for embryo and IVF-related research ....
This prompted fertility specialists to 'skip' the research phase altogetherand move IVF immediately
into clinical practice."); ISLAT Working Group, ART into Science: Regulation of Fertility
Techniques, 281 SCIENCE 651, 651 (1998) ("[Tjhe United States has taken a laissez-faire approach
toward ART.").
62. For instance, some scientists linked IVF with rare overgrowth disorders in animals. See
Henry J. Leese et al., Human Assisted Conception: A Cautionary Tale. Lessons from Domestic
Animals, 13 HUM. REPROD. 184 (Supp. 4, 1998); Kevin D. Sinclair et al., In-Utero Overgrowth in
Ruminants Following Embryo Culture: Lessons from Mice and a Warning to Men, 15 HUM.
REPROD. 68 (Supp. 5, 2000). For certain techniques, however, animal models can offer little
meaningful guidance. See Gerald Schatten et al., CellandMolecular Biological Challenges ofICSl:
ART Before Science?, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 29, 33-34 (1998).
63. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy Between Standard and
Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 391-93 (2002); Note, The Open-Ended
Investigation: A Methodfor Regulation ofNew Medical Services, 91 YALEL.J. 550,550-56 (1982);
see also infra Pt. III (explaining the limitations of tort litigation in connection with ARTs). In
addition, the inability to secure effective patent protection for innovative medical procedures
reduces some of the incentives to undertake extensive research in advance of commercialization.
See Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion ofKnowledge in the
Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 447-48 (2002) [hereinafter Noah, Medicine's
Epistemology]; see also George J. Annas, Surrogate Embryo Transfer: The Perils ofPatenting,
HASTINGS CTR. REP., June 1984, at 25, 26 (criticizing an early effort by one group of fertility
specialists to patent an embryo transfer procedure).
64. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 13, at 647; see also id. at 639 ("[W]ho has the
burden of proof-must opponents of the procedures prove that there are actual harms before the
procedures are restricted, or must those in favor of allowing the procedures prove that no serious
harms are possible?"); id. ("If the value placed on having children is high and there is no
convincing evidence of an accentuated risk, then the burden should be on opponents to prove
specific harms."); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the State's Burden of Proof in
Regulating Noncoital Reproduction, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 18, 18-19 (1988) (arguing that
constitutional protections for procreative choices place a high burden of proof on the government).
But cf Peters, supra note 10, at 535, 539-40 (arguing that the burden of proof should rest with
those who would use novel reproductive technologies); Marsden Wagner, IVF: Out-of-Date
Evidence, or Not, 348 LANCET 1394, 1394 (1996) ("The field of new reproductive techniques is
an excellent example of the dangers inherent in having practice overtaking the evidence.").
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widespread clinical use.6 5 For instance, just last year epidemiologists
discovered that ARTs caused an increased risk of major birth defects as
well as low birth weight even in the absence of multiple gestation or
prematurity."
1. The Trouble with Triplets
As a number of researchers have documented, fertility drugs and IVF
increase the incidence of multiple births.67 Such pregnancies pose a variety
of significant health risks to both mothers and children. 68 For instance,
prematurity and low birth weight can result in long-term developmental
harms in offspring.69 Before recent advances in neonatology, "preemies"

65. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 13, at 637-39 (describing the methodological
challenges facing outcomes research in this field); Jean Cohen, Editorial, The Efficiency and
Efficacy ofIVF and GIFT, 6 HuM. REPROD. 613 (1991); Paula Corabian & David Hailey, The
Efficacy and Adverse Effects of ln Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer, 15 INT'L J. TECH.
ASSESSMENT INHEALTH CARE 66, 80-81 (1999); Edward G. Hughes, Meta-Analysis and the
CriticalAppraisal oflnfertility Literature, 57 FERTILITY& STERILITY 275 (1992); Allan Templeton
et al., Factors That Affect Outcome ofln-Vitro Fertilisation Treatment, 348 LANCET 1402, 1405-06

(1996).
66. See Allen A. Mitchell, Editorial, Infertility Treatment-More Risks and Challenges, 346
NEW ENG. J. MED. 769, 769 (2002) ("The use of assisted reproductive technology appears roughly
to double the risk of having a term singleton with low birth weight or a child with a major birth
defect. However, [because the absolute risk remains low,] the majority of couples who require
assistance with reproduction will not be affected.
); see also infra notes 82-89 and

accompanying text (discussing the latest research).
67. See, e.g., CDC Report, supra note 12, at 535-36; L. Keith & J.J. Oleszczuk, latrogenic
Multiple Birth, Multiple Pregnancy andAssistedReproductive Technologies, 64 INT'LJ.GYNECOL.
& OBSTET. 11 (1999); Anthony R. Scialli, The Reproductive Toxicity of Ovulation Induction, 45
FERTILITY & STERILITY 315, 317, 320 (1986) (reporting that 8-13% of pregnancies induced with
clomiphene citrate, and 11-42% induced with hMG,result in multiples births); Lynne S. Wilcox
et al., Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Estimates of Their Contribution to Multiple Births and
Newborn Hospital Days in the United States, 65 FERTILITY & STERILITY 361, 366 (1996). See
generally IATROGENIC MULTIPLE PREGNANCY: CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS (Isaac Blickstein & Louis
G. Keith eds., 2001).
68. See Tamara L. Callahan et al., The Economic Impact ofMultiple-GestationPregnancies
and the Contribution of Assisted-Reproduction Techniques to Their Incidence, 331 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 244, 247 (1994) ("[M]ultiple-gestation pregnancies result in substantially increased hospital
charges for both mothers and neonates, producing a dramatic increase in total medical costs as

compared with the costs of singleton pregnancies."); Donna L. Hoyert et al., Annual Summary of
Vital Statistics: 2000, 108 PEDIATRICS 1241, 1246 (2001) ("Multiple births, regardless of how

conceived, tend to be high-risk births. About half of all twins and the great majority of triplets are
born preterm or [low birth weight]."); Muhieddine A.-F. Seoud et al., Outcome of Twin, Triplet,
and Quadruplet In Vitro Fertilization Pregnancies: The Norfolk Experience, 57 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 825 (1992); Christopher P. Tallo et al., Maternal and Neonatal Morbidity Associated
with In Vitro Fertilization, 127 J. PEDIATRICS 794, 799 (1995).
69. See Adnan T. Bhutta et al., Cognitive and Behavioral Outcomes ofSchool-Aged Children
Who Were Born Preterm: A Meta-Analysis, 288 JAMA 728,735-36 (2002); Maureen Hack et al.,
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often failed to survive.7 ° Nowadays, after lengthy and costly stays in
neonatal intensive care units (NICUs), many premature infants leave the
hospital only to face significant physical and cognitive disabilities.7 One
recent study by Swedish researchers reported an increase in the rate of
neurological disorders such as cerebral palsy in children conceived through
IVF, but it attributed this effect almost entirely to the consequences of
multiple gestational pregnancies and premature birth associated with the
use of this procedure.72
Multifetal pregnancies pose numerous maternal risks as well, including
gestational diabetes and preeclampsia.73 In addition, ART procedures raise
a variety of other safety concerns for the mother,74 ranging from acute and

Outcomes in Young Adulthood for Very-Low-Birth-Weight Infants, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 149,
155-56 (2002) (finding persistent academic difficulties associated with prematurity, but also noting
reductions in the rates of risky behaviors); AnnJohnson et al., FunctionalAbilities at Age 4 Years
ofChildrenBorn Before 29 Weeks of Gestation, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 1715, 1717 (1993); Saroj Saigal
et al., School Difficulties at Adolescence in a Regional Cohort of Children Who Were Extremely
Low Birth Weight, 105 PEDIATRICS 325, 329-30 (2000); Nicholas S. Wood et al., Neurologic and
Developmental Disability After Extremely Preterm Birth, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 378, 382-84
(2000); Shankar Vedantam, Study Reassesses Risk in Pre-Term Births, WASH. POST, Jan. 15,2002,
at A3 (describing research that found mild developmental delays in children born only a few weeks
prematurely); Ron Winslow, Trouble Plagues Preemies Who Are Saved, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,
1994, at BI.
70. See Kwang-sun Lee et al., Outcome of Very Low Birth Weight Infants in Industrialized
Countries: 1947-1987, 141 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1188, 1191 (1995); Douglas K. Richardson et
al., Declining Severity Adjusted Mortality: Evidence of Improving Neonatal Intensive Care, 102
PEDIATRICS 893, 896-98 (1998); John C. Sinclair et al., Evaluation of Neonatal-Intensive-Care
Programs, 305 NEW ENG. J. MED. 489, 489 (1981) ("The aggressive treatment of extremely
premature babies has pushed the limit of human viability downward to unprecedented levels."). See
generally U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEONATAL INTENSIVE CARE FOR Low
BIRTHWEIGHT INFANTS: COSTS AND EFFECTIVENESS, OTA-HCS-38 (1987).

71. See Marilee C. Allen et at., The Limit of Viability-Neonatal Outcome of Infants Born
at 22 to 25 Weeks' Gestation, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1597, 1597 (1993); F. Sessions Cole,
Editorial, Extremely Preterm Birth-Defining the Limits ofHope, 343 NEW ENG. J.MED. 429,429
(2000); see also infra note 99 (discussing the costs of extended NICU stays). For this reason,
obstetricians enthusiastically greeted recent news that administration of a form of progesterone
throughout pregnancy may prevent premature labor and delivery in high-risk patients. See Denise
Grady, Hormone Cuts Risk of Premature Birth, Researchers Report, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2003, at
Al.
72. See B. Str6mberg et al., Neurological Sequelae in Children Born After In-Vitro
Fertilisation: A Population-Based Study, 359 LANCET 461,464 (2002); see also Isaac Blickstein
& Ariel Weissman, Letter, Estimating the Risk of Cerebral Palsy After Assisted Conceptions, 341
NEW ENG, J. MED. 1313, 1314 (1999); Simone E. Buitendijk, Children After In Vitro Fertilization:
An Overview of the Literature, 15 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 52 (1999).
73. See generally VIRGINIA J. BALDWIN, PATHOLOGY OF MULTIPLE PREGNANCY (1994).

74. See Joseph G. Schenker & Yossef Ezra, Complications of Assisted Reproductive
Techniques, 61 FERTILITY & STERILITY 411 (1994); Julia Shelley et al., Long-Term Effects on
Women ofAssisted Reproduction, 15 INT'L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 36 (1999).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/1

18

Noah: Assisted Reproductinve Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulat
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

chronic side effects associated with the use of fertility drugs," including
a suspected increased risk of ovarian cancer,76 to complications involved
in the harvesting procedure,' and higher rates of ectopic pregnancies.7" In
short, although uncertainties remain about the frequency of these adverse
effects, ARTs are hardly innocuous medical interventions, and little doubt
remains about their contribution to (or the negative consequences of)
multifetal pregnancies.
2. Delivering More Bad News
Apart from the consequences of prematurity and low birth weight after
multifetal pregnancy, initial studies reached equivocal conclusions about
the suspected link between particular ARTs and birth defects.79 Some
researchers came to reassuring conclusions, failing to find any association
with congenital abnormalities, but they used relatively small populations

75. See Seth G. Derman & Eli Y. Adashi, Adverse Effects of Fertility Drugs, I I DRUG
(1994); Daniel Navot et al., Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome in Novel
Reproductive Technologies: Prevention and Treatment, 58 FERTILITY & STERILITY 249 (1992);
Geoffrey Sher et al., Eliminating the Risk of Life-Endangering Complications Following
Overstimulation with Menotropin Fertility Agents: A Report on Women Undergoing In Vitro
Fertilizationand Embryo Transfer, 81 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 1009 (1993); Blair H. Smith & Ian
D. Cooke, Editorial, Ovarian Hyperstimulation:Actual and TheoreticalRisks, 302 BRIT. MED. J.
127 (1991); Dolores Kong, The Painful Quest for Fertility: Costs, Effects of Treatments
Questioned: What Price Pregnancy?,BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 4, 1996, at A l ("In the quarter century
since the first such drug came into use, more than 60 deaths, 370 hospitalizations and 50 disabilities
linked to their use in fertility treatment have been reported .... FDA also has received thousands
of reports of less severe reactions, ranging from neurological symptoms to skin problems.").
76. See S. Fishel & P. Jackson, FollicularStimulationfor High Tech Pregnancies:Are We
PlayingIt Safe?, 299 BRIT. MED. J. 309 (1989); Mary Anne Rossing et al., Ovarian Tumors in a
Cohort of Infertile Women, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 771, 775-76 (1994); Robert Spirtas et al.,
FertilityDrugs and OvarianCancer:Red Alert or Red Herring?,59 FERTILITY & STERILITY 291
(1993). But see Gad Potashnik et al., FertilityDrugsand the Risk of Breastand Ovarian Cancers:
Results of a Long-Term Follow-up Study, 71 FERTILITY & STERILITY 853, 857-58 (1999); Alison
Venn et al., Breast and OvarianCancerIncidence After Infertility and In Vitro Fertilisation,346
SAFETY 408

LANCET

995, 999 (1995).

77. See Dov Dicker et al., Severe Abdominal Complications After Transvaginal
UltrasonographicallyGuidedRetrievalof Oocytesfor In Vitro FertilizationandEmbryo Transfer,
59 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1313 (1993); Marsden G. Wagner & Patricia A. St. Clair, Are In- Vitro
Fertilisationand Embryo Transfer of Benefit to All?, LANCET, Oct. 28, 1989, at 1027, 1028.
78. See Samuel F. Marcus et al., The Prediction of Ectopic Pregnancy After In- Vitro
FertilizationandEmbryo Transfer, 10 HuM. REPROD. 2165, 2165 (1995) (noting that 4.5% of IVF
pregnancies are ectopic).
79. See, e.g., Zeev Shoham et al., Early Miscarriage and Fetal Malformations After
Inductionof Ovulation(by Clomiphene Citrateand/orHumanMenotropins),In Vitro Fertilization,
and Gamete IntrafallopianTransfer, 55 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1, 9 (1991); H.B. Westergaard et
al., DanishNationalIn- Vitro FertilizationRegistry 1994 and 1995: A ControlledStudy of Births,
Malformationsand Cytogenetic Findings, 14 HUM. REPROD. 1896, 1899-901 (1999).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2003

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 55, Iss. 2 [2003], Art. 1
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55

and inconsistent diagnostic criteria. 0 Conversely, studies finding such an
association did not control for confounding factors such as maternal age,
multiple gestation, and prematurity."'
The largest epidemiological study undertaken to date, which controlled
for these variables and compared outcomes after IVF and ICSI with natural
conception, concluded that "infants conceived with assisted reproductive
technology were more than twice as likely as naturally conceived infants
to have major birth defects."82 The authors of the study speculated about
the possible explanations for the observed increase in birth defects: "the
underlying cause of [the couple's] infertility; the medications used to
induce ovulation or to maintain the pregnancy in the early stages; and
factors associated with the procedures themselves, such as the freezing and
thawing of embryos, the potential for polyspermic fertilization, and the
delayed fertilization of the oocyte."' 3 Other researchers have suggested a
link with the increasing use ofICSI in the course of IVF procedures during
the last decade."

80. See M.M. Hawkins & C.L.R. Barratt, Letter, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, 286
SCIENCE 51 (1999); Jennifer J. Kurinczuk & Carol Bower, Birth Defects in Infants Conceived by
Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection: An Alternative Interpretation, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1260 (1997);
Allen A. Mitchell, Editorial, Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection: Offering Hope for a Term
Pregnancy and a Healthy Child?, 315 BRIT. MED. J. 1245 (1997); Kerryn Saunders et al., Growth
and Physical Outcome ofChildren Conceived by In Vitro Fertilization, 97 PEDIATRICS 688,691-92
(1996); Andrd Van Steirteghem, Editorial, Outcome ofAssistedReproductive Technology, 338NEW
ENG. J.MED. 194, 195 (1998).
81. See Andrews & Douglass, supra note 13, at 649-52; Gianpiero D. Palermo et al.,
Evolution of Pregnancies and Initial Follow-up of Newborns Delivered After Intracytoplasmic
Sperm Injection, 276 JAMA 1893, 1896-97 (1996); see also Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89
F.3d 594, 596-98 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the exclusion of unreliable testimony from the
plaintiff's expert seeking to link the fertility drug Clomid to a particular birth defect).
82. Mich~le Hansen et al., The Risk of Major Birth Defects After Intracytoplasmic Sperm
Injection and In Vitro Fertilization, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 725, 729 (2002) (adding that the
increased risk remained significant "after adjustment for maternal age"); see also id. ("The risk of
birth defects was similar among infants conceived with in vitro fertilization and those conceived
with intracytoplasmic sperm injection.").
83. Id. at 730 (mentioning "the advanced age of infertile couples" as another possible factor,
but adding that "older maternal age and low parity did not appear to explain our results"); see also
Michael R. DeBaun et al., Association of In Vitro Fertilization with Beckwith-Wiedemann
Syndrome and Epigenetic Alterations ofLIT I and H 19, 72 AM. J.HUM. GENETIcs 156 (2003).
84. See M.M. Hawkins et al., Letter, Male Infertility and lncreasedRiskofDiseases in Future
Generations, 354 LANCET 1906 (1999); U.-B. Wennerholm et al., Incidence of Congenital
Malformations in Children Born After ICSI, 15 HuM. REPROD. 944,947-48 (2000); Gina Kolata,
New Questions About Popular Fertilization Technique, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1999, at F 10. But see
M. Bonduelle et al., Prospective Follow-up Study of 423 Children Born After Intracytoplasmic
Sperm Injection, I I HUM. REPROD. 1558, 1562-63 (1996); Jennifer R. Bowen et al., Medical and
Developmental Outcome at I Yearfor Children Conceived by Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection,
351 LANCET 1529, 1532-33 (1998).
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Separately, these researchers discovered that, even after excluding

multiple gestation pregnancies, low birth weight was significantly more
common in both of the ART groups.85 In another study published in the
same issue of the New EnglandJournalofMedicine, a team of researchers
from the CDC found that singleton infants conceived with ART and who
reached full term were more than twice as likely as -their naturally
conceived counterparts to have a low birth weight.8 6 Because they had
accounted for maternal age and several other possible confounding
variables, the authors "suggest[ed] that the increased risk of low birth
weight in singleton infants born at term who were conceived with [ART]
may be directly related to such treatments for fertility."8"
If one adds to this the far higher rate of multiple births associated with
ARTs, and the closely associated occurrence of lower birth weights, the
CDC researchers "estimate[d] that more than 3 percent of the low-birthweight infants and more than 4 percent of the very-low-birth-weight
infants born in 1997 were conceived with [ART]-six times the
proportions that would be expected on the basis of the frequency of these
procedures." 8 The authors suggested a number of possible explanations
for their findings with regard to low birth weight among singletons who
reached full-term, including intrauterine growth restrictions resulting from
the concomitant administration of gonadotropins to support an ART
pregnancy. 9 Thus, although clearer risk information has emerged during
85. See Hansen et al., supra note 82, at 727; see also Marc Dhont et al., Perinatal Outcome
of Pregnancies After Assisted Reproduction: A Case-Control Study, 181 AM. J. OBSTET. &
GYNECOL. 688,693-94 (1999) (finding a higher rate of premature delivery of singletons after IVF).
But see Benjamin E. Reubinoff et al., Is the Obstetric Outcome of In Vitro Fertilized Singleton
Gestations Different from Natural Ones? A Controlled Study, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1077,
1082-83 (1997) (finding no difference).
86. See Laura A. Schieve et al., Low and Very Low Birth Weight in Infants Conceived with
Use ofAssisted Reproductive Technology, 346 NEw ENG. J. MED. 731, 733-34, 736 tbl.4 (2002)
(reporting a risk ratio of 2.6).
87. Id. at 735; see also id. at 734-35 ("[T]here was an increased risk even in analyses in
which the sample was restricted to infants from pregnancies that had not originated as multiple
gestations, infants conceived with gametes from apparently fertile persons, and infants from
pregnancies carried by women who were unlikely to have an underlying ... disease.").
88. Id. at 736 ("These higher-than-expected proportions are largely explained by the
increased rate of multiple births."); see also id. ("More than 40 percent of the triplets and higherorder multiples in the general population were conceived with assisted reproductive technology,
and the risk of low birth weight was greater than 90 percent among such infants .... ).
89. See id. at 735 (also mentioning structural abnormalities in the placenta, pregnancyinduced hypertension, or simply a higher rate of elective cesarean sections conducted shortly before
the onset of labor and delivery); see also Ester Maman et al., Obstetric Outcome of Singleton
Pregnancies Conceived by In Vitro Fertilization and Ovulation Induction Compared with Those
Conceived Spontaneously, 70 FERTILITY & STERILITY 240, 244 (1998); Frangois Olivennes et al.,
The Increased Risk of Complication Observed In Singleton Pregnancies Resulting from In- Vitro
Fertilization (IVF) Does Not Seem to Be Related to the IVF Method Itself, 8 HuM. REPROD. 1297,
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the last decade about these technologies, many important questions remain
unanswered.
D. Minimizing the Hazards: Theory andPractice
In at least one respect, the method used in ART has a direct link to the
associated risks. The administration of drugs to induce ovulation or the
transfer of numerous embryos after IVF predictably leads to multiple
gestational pregnancies. Health care professionals can minimize these risks
of the procedures, but a variety of pressures may conspire against their
success.90

1. Limiting the Number of Embryos Transferred
In the use of IVF, a strong correlation exists between the number of
embryos transferred and the rate of multiple gestational pregnancies. 9 ' In
order to protect against the associated health risks, some researchers have
recommended that physicians transfer only a single embryo.92 Others have

1300 (1993) (suggesting that ovarian stimulation, whether or not followed by IVF, may account for
such results). Other studies have found similar differences between ART-induced twins and
spontaneous twins. See Yair Daniel et al., Analysis of 104 Twin PregnanciesConceived with
Assisted Reproductive Technologies and 193 Spontaneously Conceived Twin Pregnancies, 74
FERTILITY & STERILITY 683 (2000). But see Frangois Olivennes et al., PerinatalOutcome of Twin
Pregnancies Obtained After In Vitro Fertilization: Comparison with Twin Pregnancies Obtained
Spontaneously or After Ovarian Stimulation, 66 FERTILITY & STERILITY 105, 108-09 (1996)
(finding no differences); Jun Zhang et al., Multifetal Pregnancy in Older Women and Perinatal
Outcome, 78 FERTILITY & STERILITY 562, 565 (2002) (suggesting that ART-induced multiples fare
slightly better than other multiples).
90. See Siladitya Bhattacharya & Allan Templeton, Editorial, In Treating Infertility, Are
Multiple PregnanciesUnavoidable?, 343 NEW ENG. J.MED. 58, 59 (2000) ("[AI radical change
in focus for both providers and consumers of infertility services is required. The clinical emphasis
will need to shift from the rate of pregnancy per cycle to the cumulative rate of live births per
woman."); Rick Weiss, Multiple FearsAbout IVFBirths, WASH. POST, Feb. 12,2002, at F l ("But
until they can offer better assurance of success with a single embryo, doctors said, neither they nor
their patients will be comfortable with single embryo transfers."); see also CDC Report, supra note
12, at 537-38 ("Given the increased morbidity and mortality associated with multifetal pregnancies,
efforts are needed to monitor patients receiving ovulation-inducing drugs and to limit the number
of embryos transferred for patients receiving ART.").
91. See Peter M. Martin & H. Gilbert Welch, Probabilitiesfor Singleton and Multiple
PregnanciesAfter In Vitro Fertilization,70 FERTILITY & STERILITY 478 (1998); Laura A. Schieve
et al., Live-Birth Rates and Multiple-Birth Risk Using In Vitro Fertilization,282 JAMA 1832,
1836-37 (1999); Thor 0. Svendsen et al., The Incidence of Multiple Gestations After In Vitro
Fertilization Is Dependent on the Number ofEmbryos Transferred and MaternalAge, 65 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 561, 564 (1996); D.E. Walters, The Statistical Implication of the "Number of
Replacements" in Embryo Transfer, I I HUM. REPROD. 10 (1996).
92. See T. Coetsier & M. Dhont, Avoiding Multiple Pregnanciesin In- Vitro Fertilization:
Who's Afraid of Single Embryo Transfer?, 13 HuM. REPROD. 2663 (1998); Jan Gerris et al.,
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urged transferring just two embryos.9 Several countries prohibit the
transfer of more than three embryos. 94
However, some practitioners oppose such restrictions because other
factors, especially patient age, adversely affect both the pregnancy success
rate and the risk of multiple gestational pregnancy." Furthermore, with
estimates that less than one out of five transferred embryos successfully
implant,96 patients and clinics anxious to improve the odds of a successful

Prevention of Twin Pregnancy After In- Vitro Fertilization or Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection
Based on Strict Embryo Criteria: A Prospective Randomized Clinical Trial, 14 HUM. REPROD.
2581, 2583-86 (1999); Stramberg et al., supranote 72, at 464 ("iT]he practical clinical conclusion
must be that only one in-vitro fertilised embryo should be transferred in most instances."). Even
with the transfer of a single embryo, however, ARTs appear to increase the rate of spontaneous
twinning. See Katharine D. Wenstrom et al., IncreasedRisk ofMonochorionic TwinningAssociated
with Assisted Reproduction, 60 FERTILITY & STERILITY 510 (1993).
93. See F. Devreker et al., Comparison of Two Elective Transfer Policies of Two Embryos
to Reduce Multiple Pregnancies Without Impairing Pregnancy Rates, 14 HuM. REPROD. 83, 87-89
(1999); Nicholas M. Fisk & Geoffrey Trew, Two's Company, Three's a Crowd for Embryo
Transfer, 354 LANCET 1572 (1999); Brian Lieberman, An Embryo Too Many?, 13 HUM. REPROD.
2664, 2666 (1998); Ozkan Ozturk & Allan Templeton, Letter, In- Vitro Fertilisation and Risk of
Multiple Pregnancy, 359 LANCET 232 (2002); Jan Roest et al., A Triplet Pregnancy After In Vitro
Fertilization Is a Procedure-Related Complication That Should Be Prevented by Replacement of
Two Embryos Only, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY 290,294 (1997); C. Staessen et al., Avoidance of
Triplet Pregnancies by Elective Transfer of Two Good Quality Embryos, 8 HUM. REPROD. 1650,
1652 (1993); Murat Ta.demir et al., Two Instead of Three Embryo Transfer in In-Vitro
Fertilization, 10 HUM. REPROD. 2155, 2157-58 (1995); Allan Templeton & Joan K. Morris,
Reducing the Risk ofMultiple Births by Transfer of Two Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization, 339
NEW ENG. J. MED. 573, 576-77 (1998).
94. See Christopher J. De Jonge & Don P. Wolf, Editorial, Embryo Number for Transfer
ShouldBe Regulated, 68 FERTILITY& STERILITY 784,784-85 (1997); Howard W. Jones, Jr., Twins
or More, 63 FERTILITY & STERILITY 701, 701 (1995); German Embryo Protection Act, 6 HUNI.
REPROD. 605 (1991) (prohibiting the placement of "more than three embryos in one woman during
a single cycle"). The U.K. recently lowered the recommended number from three to two. See B.A.
Lieberman et al., Letter, Presentation ofln-Vitro Fertilisation Results, 357 LANCET 397 (2001).
95. See Foad Azem et al., Transfer of Six or More Embryos Improves Success Rates in
Patients with Repeated In Vitro Fertilization Failures, 63 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1043, 1045-46
(1995); Ian Craft & Talha al-Shawaf, Letter, Limiting the Number of Oocytes and Embryos
Transferred in GIFT and IVF, 303 BRIT. MED. J. 185 (1991); Roelof J. van Kooij et al., AgeDependent Decrease in Embryo Implantation Rate After In Vitro Fertilization, 66 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 769, 774 (1996); Eric A. Widra et al., Achieving Multiple-Order Embryo Transfer
Identifies Women over 40 Years ofAge with Improved In Vitro Fertilization Outcome, 65 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 103, 107 (1996).
96. See Leeanda Wilton et al., Birth 0/a Healthy Infant After Preimplantation Confirmation
of Euploidy by Comparative Genomic Hybridization, 345 NEw ENG. J.MED. 1537, 1537 (2001)
("The implantation rate, defined as the ratio of the number of fetal hearts detected to the number
of cleavage-stage embryos transferred, is at best approximately 15 to 20 percent, even in
experienced centers."); see also D.H. Edgar et al., A Quantitative Analysis of the Impact of
Cryopreservation on the Implantation Potential of Human Early Cleavage Stage Embryos, 15
HUM. REPROD. 175, 178 (2000) (noting that cryopreservation further reduces success by 30%). The
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pregnancy will err on the high side.9" As a result, according to researchers

from the CDC, "in the United States it is not uncommon to transfer 4, 5,
or even 6 embryos."98
Fertility clinics do not absorb the additional expenses incurred with
multifetal pregnancies, which can be substantial, 9 while they would lose
business if their pregnancy success rates declined significantly.' 00 The
advent ofmoney-back guarantees only exacerbates the incentives ofclinics
to ensure success by transferring multiple embryos.' 0 ' Moreover, patients
may discount these longer-term costs in favor of reducing the immediate
out-of-pocket expenses and other costs associated with having to undergo
repeated IVF procedures. 2 Indeed, one recent study found that more
issue of reported success rates has attracted significant attention from commentators and regulators.
See Joseph D. Schulman, What's Your Success Rate? Dr.X Comes to America, 11 HuM. REPROD.
697(1996); Lynne S. Wilcox et al., DefiningandInterpretingPregnancySuccessRatesfor In Vitro
Fertilization,60 FERTILITY & STERILITY 18 (1993); supra Pt. II.B.I.
97. See John A. Collins, Editorial, Reproductive Technology--The Price of Progress,331
NEW ENO. J. MED. 270, 271 (1994) ("[T]he procedures are so costly that there is pressure to
maximize success, and sadly, this response generates more adverse effects and further costs.");
David R. Meldrum & David K. Gardner, Editorial, Two-Embryo Transfer-The Future Looks
Bright, 339 NEW ENG. J. MED. 624, 624 (1998) ("Unfortunately, pressures from couples and
programs to maximize results make these goals difficult to achieve in practice."); Michael R.
Soules, Now That We Have PaintedOurselves in a Corner,66 FERTILITY & STERILITY 693, 695
(1996).
98. Schieve et al., supra note 91, at 1837.
99. See Callahan et al., supra note 68, at 247; Jane E. Allen, Puzzling Rise in Early Births,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2003, § 6, at I ("The hospital bill for a premature infant averaged $58,000 in
Children born prematurely
2000, contrasted with $4,300 for a routine birth of a full-term baby ....
also require more medical care, social services and remedial education during their lives.");
Antoinette Martin, Multiple Births:A Wake-up Call,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1996, at Cl ("Multiples
are much more prone to premature birth, a situation that can produce a whopping first-year healthcare tab-more than $1 billion for all low-birth-weight multiples, 35 percent of it borne by
Medicare and Medicaid.").
100. See Kenneth Faber, IVF in the US: Multiple Gestation,Economic Competition,and the
Necessity of Excess, 12 HUM. REPROD. 1614, 1615 (1997); John Leo, A New Medical Skill:
Counting,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 8, 1997, at 20.
101. See Kolata, supranote 42, at Fl; Ann Wozencraft, Spending It: It s a Baby, or It's Your
Money Back, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1996, § 3, at I ("[C]ritics worry that money-back offers could
lead doctors to take risks to increase the chances that their patients will become pregnant so a rebate
can be avoided."). But cf John A. Robertson & Theodore J. Schneyer, ProfessionalSelf-Regulation
andShared-RiskProgramsforInVitro Fertilization,25 J.L. MED. & ETHIcS 283 (1997) (defending
money-back guarantees); id. at 289 ("[A]lthough shared-risk providers have financial incentives
to prescribe more drugs or to transfer more embryos than may be best for patients, [fee for service]
providers have comparable incentives.").
102. See Guzick, supra note 54, at 687; Shari Roan, How Many Babies Is Too Many?: The
Surge in Multiple Births-and the Fact that at Least Half of the Infants Suffer Serious Health
Problems-FuelDebateover CrackingDown on the "Wild West" Eraoflnfertility Treatment, L.A.
TIMES, May 14, 1996, at Al; Rick Weiss, What's the Matterwith Multiple Births?, WASH. POST,
Dec. 1, 1998, at Z10; see also Jay S. Schinfeld et al., Ethical Considerationsin the Management
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embryos are transferred-leading to more multifetal pregnancies-in states
that do not mandate insurance coverage compared to those that do.' °3 If
fertility clinics and patients fully internalized these longer-term costs, they
probably would decide to transfer fewer embryos.'
In the future, physicians will achieve higher implantation yields by
culturing embryos for a couple of extra days (to the blastocyst stage) before
transfer, °5 and they may use improved preimplantation genetic diagnostic
methods to screen out embryos that are unlikely to implant because of
chromosomal abnormalities." 6 Such techniques would reduce the need to

ofinfertility, 31 J. REPROD. MED. 1038, 1039 (1986) ("Couples tend not to listen to information
on potential complications [such as drug-induced multifetal pregnancies] when they become intent
on gaining fertility."); Ellen A. Waldman, Disputing over Embryos: Of Contracts and Consents,
32 ARIz. ST. L.J. 897,923-25 (2000) (doubting that informed consent is attainable in this context);
id. at 923 ("The power ofwishful thinking obscures rational deliberation. Infertile women will often
opt for any treatment option presented, regardless of the physical, -psychological, or financial
price."); Judy Peres, Giving Birth to Controversy, CHI. TRIB., July 21, 1998, at I ("There is nearconsensus that the informed-consent process could be improved, and that the warnings on multiple
pregnancy aren't always heard or understood.").
103. See Tarun Jain et al., Insurance Coverage and Outcomes of In Vitro Fertilization, 347
NEW ENG. J.MED. 661,664-66 (2002) (adding that more patients sought out fertility treatments in
states with mandated insurance coverage); see also Martha Griffin & William F. Panak, The
Economic Cost of Infertility-Related Services: An Examination of the Massachusetts Infertility
Insurance Mandate, 70 FERTILITY & STERILITY 22, 27-28 (1998) (same). Differential coverage
among fertility treatments may have similar consequences. For instance, California requires
insurance coverage ofmost treatments for infertility but excludes IVF procedures. See CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE ANN. § 1374.55 (West 2000); CAL. INS. CODE ANN. § 10119.6 (West 1993). As
explained in Part I.D.2, fertility specialists may find it more difficult to control the risk of
multifetal pregnancies when using the drugs alone than as an adjunct to IVF.
104. See T. Bergh et al., Deliveries and Children Born After In- Vitro Fertilisation in Sweden
1982-95: A Retrospective Cohort Study, 354 LANCET 1579, 1584 (1999); James M. Goldfarb et al.,
Cost-Effectiveness ofln Vitro Fertilization, 87 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 18, 19-20 (1996); P. WolnerHanssen & H. Rydhstroem, Cost-Effectiveness Analysis ofIn- Vitro Fertilization: Estimated Costs
Per Successful Pregnancy After Transfer of One or Two Embryos, 13 HuM. REPROD. 88, 92-93
(1998). But cf Peter J. Neumann et al., The Cost of a Successful Delivery with In Vitro
Fertilization, 331 NEw ENG. J.MED. 239,240 tbl. I (1994) (using an average out-of-pocket charge
of $8,000 for an initial treatment cycle, and estimating the average cost of complications as only
$1,717 per cycle); id. at 242 (concluding that IVF "costs approximately $67,000 to $114,000 per
successful delivery," adding that surveys have found infertile couples willing to pay a good deal

more than that amount in order to have children).
105. See B.D. Bavister& D.E. Boatman, The Neglected Human Blastocyst Revisited, 12 HUM.
REPROD. 1607 (1997); David K. Gardner et al., Culture and Transfer of Human Blastocysts
Increases Implantation Rates and Reduces the Needfor Multiple Embryo Transfers, 69 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 84, 87 (1998); Del Marek et al., Introduction of Blastocyst Culture and Transfer for
AllPatients in an In Vitro Fertilization Program, 72 FERTILITY& STERILITY 1035, 1038-39 (1999);
David R. Meldrum, Editorial, Blastocyst Transfer: Natural Evolution, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY
216 (1999); Weiss, supra note 102, at ZIO.
106. See Richard J.Tasca & Michael E. McClure, The Emerging Technology andApplication
of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 26 J.L. MED. & ETHics 7, 11 (1998); see also William N.
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transfer numerous embryos in order to ensure a successful pregnancy.' 0 7
Legislation may, however, interfere with such advances-for instance, a
couple of states effectively mandate the eventual transfer of every fertilized
embryo, though some of these embryos may be donated for transfer to
another woman.' 0 '
2. Exercising Restraint in the Use of Fertility Drugs
As compared with IVF, fertility specialists will find it more difficult to
reduce the chances of multiple gestational pregnancies that result from the

use of drugs to induce ovulation because of their greater imprecision. Like
other pharmaceutical agents, higher dosages increase effectiveness but also
increase the risk of adverse effects. ° Normally, efficacy and safety operate
independently of one another, though in some cases a therapeutic failure
itself can present a serious risk to a patient. In the case of fertility drugs,
however, the primary risk inheres in their very effectiveness.
If ultrasound monitoring detects an unusually high number of maturing

follicles after the first round of hormones, physicians might recommend
against the administration of hCG or attempts at insemination,"' but
Bums et al., Survival of Cryopreservation and Thawing with All Blastomeres Intact Identifies
Multicell Embryos with Superior Frozen Embryo Outcome, 72 FERTILITY & STERILITY 527 (1999);
Yunxia Hu et al., Maximizing Pregnancy Rates and Limiting Higher-Order Multiple Conceptions
by Determining the Optimal Number of Embryos to Transfer Based on Quality, 69 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 650, 656 (1998) (focusing on morphological screening at the three-day stage).
107. See Sherman Elias, Editorial, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis by Comparative
Genomic Hybridization, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1569, 1571 (2001) ("Such protocols would also
enable successful pregnancies to be achieved with the transfer of fewer embryos, which would
lower the risks of multiple gestation and attendant complications."); Amin A. Milki et al., TwoBlastocyst Transfer Has Similar Pregnancy Rates and a Decreased Multiple Gestation Rate
Comparedwith Three-Blastocyst Transfer, 72 FERTILITY& STERILITY 225,227-28 (1999); Michael
C.W. Scholtes & Gerard H. Zeilmaker, A Prospective, Randomized Study of Embryo Transfer
Results After 3 or 5 Days of Embryo Culture in In Vitro Fertilization, 65 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1245, 1247 (1996).

108. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:129 (West 2000); N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§ 24-9A-I (D) (Michie

2000) (adding that "no physician may stipulate that a woman must abort in the event the pregnancy
should produce a deformed or handicapped child"). Future federal and state legislation designed
to prevent human cloning research may have similar effects.
109. See W. Gifford-Jones, Multiple Births a Cause for Concern, FINAN. POST, Aug. 8, 1998,
at RI I ("[O]ne of the problems today is doctors have extremely potent drugs at their disposal. The
result is they're overstimulating the ovary to produce too many eggs [as many as 50] for
fertilization.").
110. See Magdalen E. Hull et al., Correlation of Serum Estradiol Levels and Ultrasound
Monitoring to Assess Follicular Maturation, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 42, 45 (1986); Joseph G.
Schenker et al., Multiple Pregnancies FollowingInduction ofOvulation, 35 FERTILITY& STERILITY
105, 118 (1981); Sergio C. Stone et al., Incidence of Multiple Gestations in the Presence of Two
or More Mature Follicles in the Conception Cycle, 48 FERTILITY & STERILITY 503, 504 (1987);
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Eight Is Too Many, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 25, 1999, at II; see also Christian De

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol55/iss2/1

26

Noah: Assisted Reproductinve Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulat
20031

ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES

patients may resist the idea of deferring for another cycle and take their
chances. The question is whether, under these circumstances, physicians
who have fully informed such patients of the risks should proceed. I Even
if physicians have an ethical obligation to refuse to cater to their patients'
unwise choices,' 2 in practice many of them may accede to the demands of
clients seeking fertility treatments that offer the best chances of success
with the lowest upfront expenditure of resources. " 3

Geyter et al., Experience with Transvaginal Ultrasound-Guided Aspiration of Supernumerary
Follicles for the Prevention of Multiple Pregnancies After Ovulation Induction and Intrauterine
Insemination, 65 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1163, 1166-67 (1996) (evaluating another option). But
see William C. Dodson et al., Multiple Pregnancies Conceived with Intrauterine Insemination
During Superovulation: An Evaluation ofClinical Characteristics and Monitored Parameters of
Conception Cycles, 159 Am. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 382, 384-85 (1988) (questioning the value
of monitoring); Donna M. Fedorkow et al., Septuplet Gestation Following the Use of Human
Menopausal Gonadotropin Despite Intensive Monitoring, 49 FERTILITY & STERILITY 364 (1988).
111. See Carl H. Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REv. 17,29-31, 56-67 (2002); id. at 59 (arguing that "the
claim for absolute deference to patients' choices is weaker in the context of ARTs"); see also
Norbert Gleicher et al., The Desire for Multiple Births in Couples with Infertility Problems
Contradicts Present Practice Patterns, 10 HuM. REPROD. 1079, 1083 (1995) ("The medical
profession so far has assumed that the decision to minimize multiple births with infertility therapy
was reflective of patient desires. This study suggests otherwise.").
112. See Allan S. Brett & Laurence B. McCullough, When Patients Request Specific
Interventions: Defining the Limits of the Physician's Obligation, 315 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1347,
1349-51 (1986); Jerry Menikoff, Demanded Medical Care, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1091, 1109 n.45, 1116
(1998) ("[Itwould be highly unusual for a physician to view her power to write a drug prescription
as merely a requirement to make sure that the patient was adequately informed about the drug.");
Steven H. Miles, Informed Demand for "Non-Beneficial" Medical Treatment, 325 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 512, 513-14 (1991); cf Dan W. Brock & Steven A. Wartman, When Competent Patients
Make Irrational Choices, 322 NEW ENG. J.MED. 1595, 1595 (1990) ("[Elven the irrational choices
of a competent patient must be respected if the patient cannot be persuaded to change them.");
David Orentlicher, Denying Treatment to the Noncompliant Patient, 265 JAMA 1579, 1581 (1991)
("Ifa physician could respond to apatient's refusal of some treatment recommendations by denying
treatment altogether, then patients would have little choice in their care.").
113. See Annas, supra note 38, at 263-64 ("Unfortunately, to date the relevant professional
associations have not been able to move beyond the market-consumer model. Current practice is
to provide consumer-patients whatever they want (and can pay for) rather than attempt to develop
a professional model that sets meaningful practice and ethics standards... ."); id.at 272 ("Treating
infertility by using the new reproductive technologies has become amultibillion dollar business that
is itself dominated not by the medical ideology of the best interests of patients and their children,
but by the market ideology of profit maximization under the guise of reproductive liberty.").
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Although physicians might reduce the dosages of fertility drugs," 4
researchers still have not identified optimal treatment protocols," 5 and
studies suggest that this strategy suffers from a lack of precision when
compared to IVF followed by limited embryo transfer."' Earlier recourse
to IVF would give physicians a better opportunity to reduce the risks of
triggering multifetal pregnancies,"' but ovarian stimulation alone remains
the preferred first-line treatment for many types of infertility because of its
relative cost-effectiveness."'

114. See Randle S. Corfman et al., A Novel Ovarian Stimulation Protocol for Use with the
Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 60 FERTILITY & STERILITY 864, 869 (1993); Angelique J.
Goverde et al., Intrauterine Insemination or In Vitro Fertilisation in Idiopathic Subfertility and
Male Subfertility: A Randomised Trial and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 355 LANCET 13, 17 (2000);
Peter Y. Lu et al., Minimal Stimulation Achieves Pregnancy Rates Comparable to Human
Menopausal Gonadotropins in the Treatment ofInfertility, 65 FERTILITY& STERILITY 583,586-87
(1996); Margaret A. Sagle et al., A Comparative, Randomized Study of Low-Dose Human
Menopausal Gonadotropin and Follicle-Stimulating Hormone in Women with Polycystic Ovarian
Syndrome, 55 FERTILITY & STERILITY 56, 59 (1991); Zeev Shoham et al., Polycystic Ovarian
Syndrome: Safety and Effectiveness ofStepwise andLow-Dose Administration ofPurifled FollicleStimulating Hormone, 55 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1051, 1055-56 (1991).
115. See David L. Olive, The Role of Gonadotropins in Ovulation Induction, 172 AM. J.
OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 759, 759, 763-65 (1995); Strickler et al., supra note 28, at 772; Joyce M.
Vargyas et al., The Effect of Different Methods of Ovarian Stimulation for Human In Vitro
Fertilization and Embryo Replacement, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 745, 748 (1984); Rick Lyman,
As Octuplets Remain in Peril, Ethics Questions Are Raised, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 22, 1998, at Al
(adding that many physicians who administer these drugs lack specialized training); see also Larry
Lipshultz & David Adamson, Letter, Multiple-Birth Risk Associated with In Vitro Fertilization:
Revised Guidelines, 282 JAMA 1813, 1814 (1999) (promising that professional associations will
work to issue guidelines governing the use of fertility drugs).
116. See Michael S. Collins & Janet A. Bleyl, Seventy-One Quadruplet Pregnancies:
Management and Outcome, 162 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 1384, 1391 (1990); Malcolm I.

Levene et al., Higher Multiple Births and the Modern Management ofInfertility in Britain, 99 BRIT.
J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 607, 611-12 (1992); Shirley J. Paine et al., Ethical Dilemmas in
Reproductive Medicine, 18 WHITTIER L. REv. 51, 54 (1996) ("[A]s many as 56 eggs can be
retrieved from one woman [after ovarian stimulation], but the average number is about 12.");
Kaylen M. Silverberg et al., Follicular Size at the Time of Human Chorionic Gonadotropin
Administration Predicts Ovulation Outcome in Human Menopausal Gonadotropin-Stimulated
Cycles, 56 FERTILITY & STERILITY 296, 299 (199 1).
117. See Norbert Gleicher et al., Reducing the Risk ofHigh-OrderMultiple Pregnancy After
Ovarian Stimulation with Gonadotropins, 343 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2, 6 (2000) ("In contrast to

ovarian stimulation, in vitro fertilization allows better control over the risk of a high-order multiple
pregnancy."); see also M.G.R. Hull et al., Expectations ofAssisted Conceptionfor Infertility, 304
BRIT. MED. J. 1465, 1468-69 (1992) (finding that ARTs succeed more often than IUI following
superovulation). GIFT also allows somewhat greater precision than drug-induced ovulation alone.
See Alan S. Penzias et al., Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer: Assessment of the Optimal Number of
Oocytes to Transfer, 55 FERTILITY & STERILITY 311 (1991).
118. See Gregory H. Corsan & Ekkehard Kemmann, The Role of Superovulation with
Menotropins in Ovulatory Infertility: A Review, 55 FERTILITY & STERILITY 468, 474 (1991);

Dawood, supra note 61, at 1215-16; William C. Dodson et al., Superovulation with Intrauterine
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3. Selective Reduction in Multifetal Pregnancies
Ultimately, because they either cannot or, for economic reasons, do not
act to minimize the chance that numerous embryos will implant, physicians
may have to recommend "selective reduction" after the fact in order to
avoid the maternal and fetal risks associated with multiple gestational
pregnancies." 9 Some commentators have suggested that the very
availability of this procedure may lead to more irresponsible use of fertility
treatments, 120 but any such effect probably is dwarfed by other pressures

Insemination in the Treatment of Infertility: A Possible Alternative to Gamete Intrafallopian
Transfer and In Vitro Fertilization, 48 FERTILITY & STERILITY 441, 444 (1987) ("The direct cost

of a cycle of IUI with hMG superovulation is approximately one-third the cost of an IVF-ET or
GIFT cycle and avoids invasive oocyte retrieval and extracorporeal fertilization."); David S.Guzick
et al., Efficacy ofSuperovulation and Intrauterine Insemination in the Treatment of Infertility, 340

NEW ENG. J. MED. 177, 182-83 (1999); David S. Guzick et al., Efficacy of Treatment for
Unexplained Infertility, 70 FERTILITY& STERILITY 207,211 (1998); Vishvanath C. Karande et al.,
Prospective Randomized Trial Comparing the Outcome and Cost ofln Vitro Fertilization with That
of a Traditional Treatment Algorithm as First-Line Therapy for Couples with Infertility, 71
FERTILITY& STERILITY 468, 474-75 (1999); C. Matthew Peterson et al., Ovulation Induction with
Gonadotropins and Intrauterine Insemination Compared with In Vitro Fertilization and No
Therapy: A Prospective, Nonrandomized, Cohort Study and Meta-Analysis, 62 FERTILITY &
STERILITY 535, 542-43 (1994); Bradley J. Van Voorhis et al., Cost-Effective Treatment of the
Infertile Couple, 70 FERTILITY & STERILITY 995, 1000 (1998); Sandra Weiner et al., Human
Menopausal Gonadotropins: A Justifiable Therapy in Ovulatory Women with Long-Standing
Idiopathic Infertility, 158 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 111, 114-16 (1988).

119. See Richard L. Berkowitz et al., The Current Status of Multifetal Pregnancy Reduction,
174 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 1265, 1270-71 (1996); Mark 1. Evans et al., Improvement in
Outcomes ofMultifetal Pregnancy Reduction with Increased Experience, 184 AM. J. OBSTET. &

GYNECOL. 97, 102 (2001) ("[R]eduction has become a mainstay of therapy after infertility
treatments."); John C. Hobbins, Editorial, Selective Reduction-A Perinatal Necessity?, 318 NEW
ENG. J.MED. 1062 (1988); Peter W. Howie, Editorial, Selective Reduction in Multiple Pregnancy:
Legal Confusion and Ethical Dilemmas, 297 BRIT. MED. J. 433, 434 (1988); Ronald J. Wapner et
al., Selective Reduction of Multifetal Pregnancies, 335 LANCET 90, 92-93 (1990).
120. See Jeffrey L. Angel et al., Aggressive Perinatal Care for High-Order Multiple
Gestations: Does Good Perinatal Outcome JustifyAggressiveAssisted Reproductive Techniques?,
181 AM. J.OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 253,257 (1999); Nico Bollen et al., Embryo Reduction in Triplet
Pregnancies AfterAssisted Procreation: A Comparative Study, 60 FERTILITY & STERILITY 504,509

(1993) ("The danger of this policy [of increasing the number of embryos transferred] is the
banalization of embryo reduction."); Mark 1.Evans et al., Evolving Patterns oflatrogenic Multifetal
Pregnancy Generation: Implications for Aggressiveness of Infertility Treatments, 172 AM. J.

& GYNECOL. 1750, 1753 (1995) ("[Flor a small group of physicians and centers the use
of ovulation-stimulating medications is very cavalier, with reduction seen as a relatively
unimportant side effect of aggressive infertility therapy."); see also Mary A. Crossley, Choice,
Conscience, and Context, 47 HASTINGs L.J. 1223, 1227 (1996) ('[T]he use of aggressive infertility
treatments entailing hyperovulation followed by insemination or multiple embryo transfer raises
ethical questions because that treatment choice willingly entertains the risk that high order multiple
pregnancy will result.").
OBSTET.
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that either encourage or discourage the aggressive use of ARTs."'
Nonetheless, in connection with disclosing the risks of multifetal
pregnancy before initiating therapy, physicians certainly should reveal the
possible need for selective reduction.' 22 Many patients will, of course,
decline to abide by such advice because they oppose anything akin to
abortion or fear losing the entire pregnancy.' If a physician knows ahead
of time that their patient will reject such advice, the question again is
whether he or she ethically can proceed with treatments that create a risk
of multifetal pregnancy.
In fact, many of the reported instances of high-order multifetal
pregnancies, including recent cases of septuplets and octuplets, arose after
the aggressive use of fertility drugs followed by the patient's refusal to

121. See Judith F. Daar, Selective Reduction of Multiple Pregnancy:Lifeboat Ethics in the
Womb, 25 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 773, 793-95 (1992); id. at 783 ("[I]t appears that physicians and
patients do not view selective reduction as a 'bail out' procedure for overly aggressive fertility
treatment .... "). In her article, Professor Daar argued at length that selective reduction differed
from abortion. See id. at 796-822; id. at 783 ("Physicians practicing in the area of reproductive
technologies must be permitted to offer this life-saving technology to their patients free from
whatever restrictions their state governments may place on abortion."); see also id.at 784 ("[I]n the
end selective reduction must be viewed as the unique scenario that it is-a lifeboat in the womb in
which some must die for the others to live."); id. at 838 (warning, however, that courts should not
compel the procedure in cases where a woman declines to follow medical recommendations); Anna
Schlotzhauer & Bryan A. Liang, The Ethics of Selective Termination Cases: Opening the Doorto
Abortion Extortion,20 J.LEGAL MED. 441, 443-49 (1999) (summarizing the controversy about the
use of the procedure, and explaining that it is considered medically necessary in high-order
multifetal pregnancies); George J.Annas, FertilityClinics HardlyLetter-Perfect,BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 30, 1997, at D I ("[F]etal reduction is like separating Siamese twins when both cannot survive
so that one might live.").
122. See Ronald Chester, Double Trouble: Legal Solutions to the Medical Problems of
UnconsentedSpermHarvestingandDrug-InducedMultiplePregnancies,44 ST. LouisU. L.J. 45 1,
464 (2000) (arguing that doctors should discuss the risk of multifetal pregnancy with patients before
initiating therapy so that they then can "decide how aggressive to be with the drug therapy based
on whether fetal reduction will later be permitted"); Crossley, supra note 120, at 1230 ("More
seems to be at stake here than in a garden variety informed consent case. The failure to inform
infertility patients of the risks... of multiple pregnancy and selective reduction represents a more
serious affront to the patients' dignity as autonomous individuals .. "); id. at 1229 ("[Ajnecdotal
accounts from infertility patients indicate that the first time some couples learn about selective
reduction is when a high order multiple pregnancy has already been diagnosed."); Daar, supranote
121, at 838-43, 842 ("Doctors should not wait until after a multiple pregnancy has occurred to
introduce the option of selective reduction."); id. at 841 ("[Sjome fertility specialists admittedly do
not inform patients about the option of selective reduction before proceeding with treatment.");
Richard M. Zaner et al., Selective Termination in Multiple Pregnancies:EthicalConsiderations,
54 FERTILITY& STERILITY 203,204-05 (1990); Lawrence K. Altman, HealthPanelSeeksSweeping
Changes in FertilityTherapy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1998, at Al.
123. See Roest et al., supra note 93, at 294; Patricia Schreiner-Engel et al., First-Trimester
Multifetal PregnancyReduction:Acute andPersistentPsychologicReactions, 172 AM. J.OBSTET.
& GYNECOL. 541, 545-46 (1995).
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undergo selective reduction." 4 In one earlier case, a woman who had
received Pergonal treatment and declined selective reduction of her
septuplet pregnancy on religious grounds ended up delivering six very
premature infants, three of whom died shortly after birth and the other
three suffered long-term disabilities. The family decided to file a lawsuit
against the fertility doctor and clinic, alleging medical malpractice for
administering too high a dose of the drug and for failing to detect by
ultrasound an excessive number of maturing follicles. 25 Over the doctor's
his liability insurer settled the case for more than $6
vocal objections,
26
million.
III.

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT MALPRACTICE

The academic literature contains little sophisticated discussion of the
potential role of tort law as an effective mechanism for deterring the
irresponsible use of ARTs. Some commentators dismiss it out of hand, 27
while others express great confidence in its potential utility.'28 Both

124. See Arlene Judith Klotzko, Medical Miracle or Medical Mischief.: The Saga of the
McCaughey Septuplets, HASTINGS CTR.REP., May-June 1998, at 5, 6-7; Anuj Gupta, First US.
Septuplets Since 1997 Born in D.C., L.A. TIMES, July 14, 2001, at All; Kim Painter & Larry
Copeland, Eight Babies Fightfor Life and Reignite Ethics Debate, USA TODAY, Dec. 22, 1998,
at IA; Rick Weiss, Iowa Septuplets ffultiply Critics of FertilityTherapy, WASH. POST, Nov. 21,
1997, at Al; see also CDC Report, supra note 12, at 536 (estimating that 40% of high-order
multiples result from the use of fertility drugs without IVF); Evans et al., supra note 120, at 1753
("The principal contributors to quintuplet or greater pregnancies... have been the ovulationstimulating drugs hMG and urofollitropin."); Geoffrey Cowley & Karen Springen, More Is Not
Merrier: When FertilityDrugs Work Too Well, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 26, 1996, at 49 (discussing an
octuplet pregnancy in England after Metrodin treatment).
125. See Marcia Chambers, $3.2 MillionSuit by ParentsofSeptuplets Focusingon Ultrasound
Screening, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1985, at A20.
126. See Nancy Hill-Holtzman, FrustacisSettle Suit over Birth ofSeptuplets, L.A. TIMES, July
11, 1990, at Al; see also Susan Christian, FrustaciFallout: Couples Fear$6-Million Settlement
May Make Potent FertilityDrug Scarce, L.A. TIMES, July 24, 1990, at El; Linus Gregoriadis,
Parents of Quads Win flm over Fertility "Bungle," LONDON TIMES, Nov. 13, 2001, at 12
(describing a similar settlement in England after the use of Metrodin).
127. See, e.g., ISLAT Working Group, supra note 61, at 651 (noting difficulties in proving
causation, satisfying statutes of limitation, and the refusal of most courts to recognize an action for
"wrongful life"). Although these pose important hurdles for plaintiffs, they hardly represent
insurmountable obstacles to recovery.
128. See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper
Tiger?, 34 HouS. L. REv. 609, 657 (1997) (doubting that "we need new laws to motivate fertility

physicians to act in a responsible manner," explaining in part, and without any elaboration, that
existing tort doctrines will suffice); see also id. at 658-64 (adding that industry self-regulation
coupled with market forces driven by more informed and empowered consumers will do far more
good than any additional government regulation); John A. Robertson, Assisted Reproductive
Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911, 919 (1996) ("IVF services are now regulated
like other medical procedures-there is little regulation other than medical licensure, malpractice,
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positions fall wide of the mark. Under existing doctrines, courts would
entertain at least a subset of likely personal injury claims, but serious
obstacles stand in the way of ultimate success for the plaintiffs in these
sorts of cases, and even the occasional
compensatory award will have at
29
best a fairly modest deterrent effect.1
Moreover, for those who vigorously defend the exercise of procreative
liberty against calls for closer regulation and find sufficient protection in
tort liability, some tension underlies their position. In part, tort liability
may become a refuge for those who later regret their reproductive choices,
which may reflect a pursuit of liberty without any concomitant need to
exercise restraint or take responsibility. 3 ° In addition, the threat of tort
liability may operate much like the threat of sanctions for violations of
regulatory edicts, but it does so in a relatively clumsy fashion, with far less
precision or thoughtful consideration of the appropriate reach of such
restrictions on an activity or practice.'

and specialty certification."); id.at 921 ("The current system of malpractice law, medical licensure,
and professional standards, despite its defects, already provides some incentives to assure good,
quality care, and it can easily be modified to provide more."); cf.Chester, supra note 122, at 482
("With neither the government, the medical profession, nor the health insurance industry in a good
position to regulate assisted reproduction issues, we must reluctantly turn to after-the-fact policing
by private lawyers."); Edward A. Marshall, Note, Medical Malpractice in the New Eugenics:
Relying on Innovative Tort Doctrine to Provide Relief When Gene Therapy Fails, 35 GA. L. REV.
1277, 1304-07 (2001).
129. See Michelle M. Mello & Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of Medial Errors: Theory and
Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEx. L. REV. 1595, 1603-21 (2002); Frank A. Sloan et al.,
Tort Liability and Obstetricians' Care Levels, 17 INT'L REV. L. & EcoN. 245, 255-58 (1997); cf.
Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?,
42 UCLA L. REV. 377, 397-405, 437-44 (1994) (explaining that tort law is moderately successful
at reducing malpractice).
130. See Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So. 2d 332, 341-42 (Miss. 1994) (Hawkins, C.J.,
dissenting); cf.Linda C. McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 342-43
n.l I (1996) ("[I]t is useful to focus upon two distinct senses of responsibility: responsibility as
autonomy (self-governance, or entrusting the right-holder to exercise moral responsibility in making
decisions guided by conscience) and responsibility as accountability (being answerable to others
for the manner and consequences of the exercise of one's rights)."). Professor McClain's article
discussed reproductive responsibility in the second sense of the term, criticizing the tenor of public
debates about single, welfare, and/or teenage mothers. See id. at 366-67, 453 ("[C]urrent rhetoric
stresses the need for responsibility as accountability; insufficient attention is given to providing or
respecting the preconditions for responsibility as autonomy."). In contrast, this Article focuses on
responsibility in the private exercise of reproductive autonomy. Cf.Michael H. Shapiro, Illicit
Reasons and Means for Reproduction: On Excessive Choice and Categorical and Technological
Imperatives, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1081 (1996) (responding at length to various, primarily
philosophical, criticisms of ARTs); Bonnie Steinbock & Ron McClamrock, When Is Birth Unfair
to the Child?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 15 (framing the issue in terms of parental
responsibility).
131. See Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1652, 1658 (2001); Lars
Noah, Rewarding Regulatory Compliance: The Pursuit ofSymmetry in Products Liability, 88 GEO.
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Research reveals only a handful of tort actions arising out of fertility
treatments. In addition to the previously mentioned settlement of a
malpractice claim alleging negligence in connection with the use of
Pergonal, 32 courts have issued opinions in just a half dozen or so cases in
this area. Only a few of these cases involved lawsuits against the
manufacturer of a fertility drug. 3 3 A couple of other cases involved tort
claims against fertility doctors, 34 and the remainder arose from alleged
negligence by fertility clinics. 3 Plaintiffs rarely succeeded in these cases.
In Morgan v. Christman,1' a federal district court considered
negligence and informed consent claims arising out of fertility treatment.
Dr. Christman had prescribed Clomid without disclosing the risk of
multifetal pregnancy-in fact, he allegedly had reassured his patient that
the drug carried no such risk. A set of quadruplets were delivered at
twenty-seven weeks of gestation, and the children suffered from a variety

L.J. 2147, 2153-55, 2159-60 (2000).
132. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
133. See Lust v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 89 F.3d 594, 596-98 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming the
exclusion of unreliable testimony from the plaintiff's expert seeking to link the fertility drug Clomid
to a particular birth defect); see also Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co., 7 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741
(E.D. Va. 1998) (dismissing a couple's negligent infliction of emotional distress claim against
sellers of contaminated human albumin after undergoing IVF at a fertility clinic that used this
product). Drug manufacturers may face liability resulting from both intended uses and foreseeable
misuses of their products. See Lars Noah, Constraintson the Off-Label Uses of PrescriptionDrug
Products, 16 J. PRODS. & TOXiCS LIAB. 139, 159-62 (1994).
134. See Morgan v. Christman, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12179 (D. Kan. 1990); Carmichael v.
Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 388, 391-93 (Ct. App. 1971) (declining to impose strict liability on a
physician when his patient suffered a pulmonary embolism after using the drug Enovid, which the
physician had prescribed to treat endometriosis).
135. See Johnson v. Superior Court, 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864 (Ct. App. 2000) (resolving a
discovery dispute in tort litigation against a clinic for using sperm from a donor with a family
history of serious kidney disease); Doolan v. IVF Am. (MA), Inc., 2000 Mass. Super. LEXIS 581,
at * 8- 2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000) (rejecting a tort claim brought on behalf ofa child born with cystic
fibrosis against a fertility clinic for negligence in genetic screening of IVF embryos before
implantation because it amounted to a claim for wrongful life not recognized in Massachusetts); see
also Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261,268-72 (6th Cir. 1992) (concluding that an attorney who acted
as a surrogacy broker owed the surrogate mother a heightened duty of care to ensure full testing of
the sperm donor for sexually transmitted diseases); Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., Inc., 700
A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that a surrogacy business had a special relationship
with the parties and, therefore, owed a duty to protect the resulting child from foreseeable risks);
Hamicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 71-72 (Utah 1998) (rejecting a negligent
infliction of emotional distress claim in an IVF sperm mix-up case); Fred Norton, Note, Assisted
Reproduction and the Frustrationof Genetic Affinity: Interest, Injury, and Damages,74 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 793, 818-43 (1999) (arguing for liability in such cases); Dorothy M. Robins, Comment,
When the Gleam in Your Eye Becomes a Glare:CappedDamages in FertilityMalpracticeActions,
26 U.S.F. L. REv. 717, 719-26, 741 (1992) (summarizing different possible grounds for such
lawsuits, and predicting that they will increase in the future).
136. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12179 (D. Kan. 1990).
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of disabilities. In response to lawsuits filed on behalf of the children, the
defendant argued that their allegations of malpractice amounted to
wrongful life claims that the Kansas courts did not recognize as actionable.
The federal court, however, distinguished the latter as arising from a
physician's failure to diagnose or disclose fetal deformities, and it
concluded that these children's claims instead alleged that the physician
had caused, though prior to their conception, a multifetal pregnancy and
their resulting impairments.' 37 After the court denied the motion for
summary judgment, Dr. Christman reportedly settled the case for $2.1
million.'
Because of the limited decisional law squarely on point, a brief review
of the relevant doctrine will help to illuminate the potential utility and
shortcomings of tort liability as a mechanism for regulating the fertility
industry. In order to structure the discussion that follows, consider a
hypothetical case. Jim and Wanda McNally visited a fertility clinic,
Bundles of Joy, Inc. (BOJ). The clinic aggressively advertised its services
in the local media, claiming the highest pregnancy rates in the Midwest,
and it offered eligible patients a special money-back guarantee. Dr. Nancy
Guthrie, a fertility specialist employed by BOJ, suggested several options
to the McNallys when they first consulted with her.
The couple opted for ovarian stimulation using Pergonal followed by
the administration of hCG and then artificial insemination using Jim's
sperm. Upon discovering, through the use of an ultrasound scanner, that
Wanda had a dozen follicles maturing, Dr. Guthrie explained the dangers
associated with a multifetal pregnancy and recommended discontinuation
of the cycle (i.e., not administering hCG and/or not performing the
artificial insemination procedure, opting instead to wait and try again
several weeks later). Impatient after years of failing to become pregnant,
the McNallys rejected this recommendation. Dr. Guthrie then explained the
option of selective reduction in the event that several embryos implanted
in her uterus, but Wanda objected vehemently to that idea, explaining that,
as a devout Catholic, she could never undergo a procedure resembling an
abortion. Dr. Guthrie then proposed a third alternative: harvesting all ofthe
maturing eggs and fertilizing them externally (through IVF) but then
transferring only two or three viable embryos. Although the Vatican also
frowns upon the use of IVF, 39 the McNallys objected only on financial

137. See id. at *6-8; see also id. at *6 n.1 ("[W]e aren't convinced from the record that Mrs.
Morgan would not have given birth to any children absent the administration of [C]lomid by
defendant. Defendant has failed to establish that in lieu of the multiple pregnancy, Mrs. Morgan
would not have given birth to at least one child.").
138. See DRUGS IN LITIGATION: DAMAGE AWARDS INVOLVING PRESCRIPTION AND
NONPRESCRIPTION DRUGS

C-85 (Richard M. Patterson ed. 2001).

139. See Radhika Rao, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Threat to the Traditional
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grounds, not wishing to pay still more out of pocket because their health
insurer had refused to cover any infertility treatments.
In the end, Dr. Guthrie relented, administering the hCG as originally
scheduled and performing the artificial insemination procedure. When it
became clear early during Wanda's pregnancy that several embryos had
implanted, her obstetrician (not a party to this litigation 4 ° ) recommended
selective reduction, but Wanda again refused to entertain the idea. She
carried a septuplet pregnancy and delivered twelve weeks prematurely.
One of her children died during birth, and another one died a few weeks
later, while the other five children survived with developmental problems
of varying degrees of severity.
Barry McNally, now age four, suffers from serious mental retardation
as well as permanent respiratory deficits. Barry's parents have divorced,
and Jim McNally has filed a lawsuit on behalf oftheir son against BOJ and
Dr. Guthrie. This hypothetical lawsuit raises several significant and
interrelated questions. Do the defendants owe the unconceived child a duty
of care? If they do, what standard of care must they satisfy? If they have
breached such a standard, will the mother's choices affect the child's
opportunity to recover damages? Alternatively, rather than struggle with
a malpractice claim sounding in negligence, might courts entertain a strict
liability claim in such circumstances? These and related questions are
taken up in turn below.
A. Viability of PreconceptionTort Claims
Do the defendants in this hypothetical case owe any duty of care to the
plaintiff?.Does their undoubted duty to Wanda as patient (or client) extend
to her not-yet-conceived son Barry? The courts have struggled with
preconception torts in other contexts.' 4 ' During pregnancy, of course,
physicians may face tort liability for causing fetal injuries.'42 A few

Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 951, 958-59 & n.25 (1996) (describing the objections of the Catholic
Church); Vatican Callsfor Ban on Human Cloning, WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1997, at A28 ("The
Roman Catholic Church opposes all forms of artificial human conception, including test-tube
fertilization and surrogate motherhood.").
140. If her obstetrician had failed to diagnose amultifetal pregnancy and, as a result, failed to
recommend treatments (such as extended bed rest) designed to minimize the risk of a premature
delivery, a patient could pursue a malpractice claim for resulting injuries to her newborn children.
See Ehlinger v. Sipes, 454 N.W.2d 754 (Wis. 1990).
141. See generallyJulie A. Greenberg, ReconceptualizingPreconception Torts, 64 TENN. L.
REV. 315 (1997).
142. See, e.g., Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal, 453 A.2d 1198, 1206-07 (Md. 1983)
(allowing a wrongful death claim against a physician whose negligent failure to treat the patient's
incompetent cervix early in pregnancy caused an extremely premature birth); Hogle v. Hall, 916
P.2d 814 (Nev. 1996) (sustaining ajury verdict for achild who suffered severe birth defects against
a physician who negligently had prescribed Accutane during the mother's pregnancy); David B.
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jurisdictions have declined to recognize any preconception duty, worried
that tortfeasors will get no repose or that the fear of liability running to

future generations will create a conflict of interest in treating their current
patients. 43 A number of other courts have, however, rejected this no-duty
rule, at least in certain circumstances.'" Because the defendants clearly can
foresee the victims in a case of this sort, 4 5 courts may well conclude that

Brushwood, Drug Induced Birth Defects: Difcult Decisions and Shared Responsibilities, 91 W.
VA. L. REV. 51, 75-78 (1988).
143. See, e.g., Albala v. City of New York, 429 N.E.2d 786 (N.Y. 1981) (no duty where a
negligently performed abortion caused aperforated uterus, which four years later led to the delivery
of child with brain damage); see also Enright v. Eli Lilly & Co., 570 N.E.2d 198 (N.Y. 1991)
(holding that a DES manufacturer owed no duty to the patient's grandchildren for injuries from
premature birth); Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 591 N.E.2d 696 (Ohio 1992) (same). So-called
"maternal-fetal" conflicts may arise in a number of situations during pregnancy and childbirth. See
Helene M. Cole, Legal Interventions During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and
Legal Penalties for Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2663-65
(1990); Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors' Orders: Unmasking the Doctor's Fiduciary Role
in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 451,451-55,471-87 (2000) (arguing that maternal
interests and preferences generally should prevail); Jeffrey P. Phelan, The Maternal Abdominal
Wall: A Fortress Against Fetal Health Care?, 65 S. CAL L. REV. 461, 490 (1991) ("Ifmedical
probability indicates that the fetus will die or become permanently brain damaged because of the
maternal refusal of treatment, the state's interests.. . are sufficiently compelling to remove the
maternal abdominal wall as a barrier to fetal health care.").
144. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1251, 1254-56 (I11. 1977)
(plurality opinion) (recognizing a duty to a prematurely delivered child in a case where the
physician had negligently transfused Rh positive blood to the plaintiff's Rh negative mother eight
years earlier, when she was only thirteen years old, and then failed to warn her of the risks of
sensitization if she became pregnant as an adult); Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591, 592-95 (Ind.
1992) (allowing subsequent children to sue physician for malpractice in failing to diagnose mother
as Rh negative and falling to provide treatment with RhoGAM during a previous pregnancy with
an Rh positive child); Martin v. St. John Hosp. & Med. Ctr. Corp., 517 N.W.2d 787,789-90 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994) (negligent cesarean section during a previous delivery caused uterus to rupture);
Lough v. Rolla Women's Clinic, Inc., 866 S.W.2d 851,853-54 (Mo. 1993) (Rh sensitization during
previous pregnancy); Lynch v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113, 120-22, 126-27 (N.J. 2000) (same); see
also Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Labs., Inc., 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973) (allowing plaintiffs
to pursue strict products liability claims against the manufacturer of oral contraceptives for
allegedly causing preconception injuries).
145. See Hegyes v. Unjian Enter., Inc., 286 Cal. Rptr. 85, 93, 98 (Ct. App. 1991) ("As the
wrongful conduct [in Munusko v. Postle, 437 N.W.2d 367, 370 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989),] occurred
while the defendant doctors were treating the mother specifically in preparation for conception and
undertaking to render prenatal care, that conduct resulted in a duty owed to the subsequently
conceived fetus."). In contrast, where a patient sought medical advice for the limited purpose of
selecting among contraceptive options, acourt concluded that the physician could not have foreseen
that she would give birth. See McNulty v. McDowell, 613 N.E.2d 904, 906-07 (Mass. 1993). But
cf Didato v. Strehler, 554 S.E.2d 42,46-47 (Va. 2001) (holding that a pediatrician owed parents
a duty to inform them that one of their children carried the sickle cell trait because this could affect
their decision to have another child).
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fertility doctors and clinics have a duty of care running to the class of
intended offspring.
A variation of this question arises in cases characterized as claims for
"wrongful life." Although parents may succeed in asserting "wrongful
birth" claims to recover as damages some ofthe costs associated with child
rearing,146 only a handful ofjurisdictions allow children to bring tort claims
on the theory that they should never have been born. 47 Most courts refuse
to entertain wrongful life claims. 4 '
In the typical wrongful birth or wrongful life claim, the physician did
not cause the fetal abnormality but, instead, negligently failed to prevent
conception or diagnose the abnormality in time for an abortion. In contrast,
tort claims arising out of ARTs would amount to a direct fetal injury, even
if the physician's alleged negligence occurred prior to conception. 49 In the
McNally hypothetical, for instance, Barry would allege, in effect, that one
or more of his future siblings should not have been conceived or carried to
term-this would differentiate his claim from one for wrongful life, as

146. See. e.g., Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022 (Ala. 1993); Thibeault v. Larson, 666 A.2d
112 (Me. 1995); Reed v. Campagnolo, 630 A.2d 1145, 1147-52 (Md. 1993); Greco v. United
States, 893 P.2d 345,348-51 (Nev. 1995); Emerson v. Magendantz, 689 A.2d 409, 414 (R.I. 1997);
Michael A. Berenson, Comment, The Wrongful Life Claim-The Legal Dilemma of Existence
Versus Nonexistence: "To Be or Not to Be," 64 TUL. L. REv. 895, 901-12, 917-18 (1990); see also

Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212, 1216-20 (Ind. 2000) (recognizing this malpractice claim, but
declining to label it as one for "wrongful birth"); Mark Strasser, Misconceptions and Wrongful
Births: A Call for a Principled Jurisprudence, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 161 (1999) (arguing that courts

should not distinguish among wrongful conception, wrongful pregnancy, and wrongful birth claims
even though damages recoverable usually differ among these types of cases). But see Etkind v.
Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. 1999) (declining to recognize wrongful birth claims); Taylor v.
Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670, 684-91 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (same).
147. See Galvez v. Frields, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 50, 57-59 (Ct. App. 2001); Moscatello v. Univ.
of Med. & Dentistry, 776 A.2d 874, 878-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); Harbeson v. ParkeDavis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 494-97 (Wash. 1983); see also Michael B. Laudor, In Defense of
Wrongful Life: Bringing Political Theory to the Defense of a Tort, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1675
(1994); Philip G. Peters, Jr., Rethinking Wrongful Life: Bridgingthe BoundaryBetween Tort and
Family Law, 67 TUL. L. REV. 397 (1992); Mark Strasser, WrongfulLife, Wrongful Birth, Wrongful
Death, and the Right to Refuse Treatment: Can Reasonable JurisdictionsRecognize All but One?,

64 Mo. L. REv. 29, 29-33, 43-76 (1999) (arguing in favor of recognition).
148. See, e.g., Kassama v. Magat, 792 A.2d 1102, 1115-23 (Md. 2002); id. at 1116-17 (noting
that currently twenty-eight other states reject wrongful life claims while only three allow limited
recovery insuch cases); Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1166-68 (Ohio 2000); see also Julie
F. Kowitz, Note, Not Your Garden Variety Tort Reform: Statutes Barring Claims for Wrongful Life
and Wrongful Birth Are Unconstitutional Under the Purpose Prong of Planned Parenthood v.

Casey, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 235, 256 & n.104 (1995) (noting that legislation in nine states bars
wrongful birth and/or wrongful life claims). See generally Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Tort
Liabilityfor Wrongfully CausingOne to Be Born, 83 A.L.R.3d 15 (1978 & Supp. 2002).
149. See Matthew Browne, Note, PreconceptionTort Law in an Era ofAssistedReproduction:

Applying a Nexus Test for Duty, 69 FoRDHAM L. REv. 2555, 2591-92, 2607-08 (2001).
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noted in Morgan v. Christman,'5 ° though courts may well find it equally
distasteful when framed in these terms.' 5 '
B. ForgivingStandards of Care
Assuming that the defendants owe some duty to children conceived
with the assistance of ARTs, the next difficulty involves defining their
standard of care. If framed as a medical malpractice claim, it would hinge
on the relevant custom among fertility specialists.'52 In some instances,
courts have allowed juries to conclude that adherence to a widespread
medical practice did not represent reasonable care under the particular
circumstances,'53 but most courts continue to defer to custom among health
care professionals.'54 Moreover, under the "respectable minority" rule,
physicians need not fear tort liability if they followed a different school of
thought.'55 Thus, even if professional organizations recommended, for
example, limiting the transfer of numerous embryos after IVF, 5 6 a
physician who disregarded this suggestion would not necessarily have
committed malpractice.
In the field of fertility treatments, as in a number of other specialties,
157
customs evolve rapidly. In part this occurs with advances in technology,
150. 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12179, at *6-8 (D. Kan. 1990).
151. Cf Moscatello, 776 A.2d at 882-83 & n.4; Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 322 S.E.2d 567, 57879 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting a wrongful birth claim asserted by older siblings who alleged
that they would suffer reduced financial and emotional support from their parents because of the
birth of a severely handicapped child), aff'd in relevant part, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985);
Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life"Actions, 42 HASTINGSL.J. 505,578-82
(1991) (objecting to a recovery by siblings mainly because it would amount to a double recovery
in light of the parent's wrongful birth claim).
152. See generally Symposium, Empirical Approaches to Proving the Standard ofCare in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 663 (2002).
153. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at
the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 188 (2000).
154. See Noah, Medicine's Epistemology, supra note 63, at 456-58.
155. See Roberts v. Tardif, 417 A.2d 444, 448-49 (Me. 1980) (vaginal delivery rather than
cesarean section); Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d 1137, 1141-42 (Pa. 1993) (applying "two schools
of thought" doctrine to the use of forceps in delivery).
156. See, e.g., Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med., Guidelines on Number ofEmbryos Transferred
(1999), available at http://www.asrm.org/Media/Practice/NoEmbryosTransferred.pdf (last visited
Oct. 29, 2002) (recommending a sliding-scale based on patient characteristics, ranging from no
more than two good quality embryos for those patients with the most favorable prognosis to no
more than five for patients with a below average prognosis); see also Int'l Fed'n of Fertility
Societies, International Consensus on Assisted Procreation (1995), available at http://www.mnet.
fr/iffs/aartbis.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2002) (calling for the transfer of no more than two
embryos).
157. See Martin J. Hatlie, Editorial, Climbing "The Learning Curve": New Technologies,
Emerging Obligations, 270 JAMA 1364, 1365 (1993); James A. Henderson, Jr. & John A.
Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in Determining Medical
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but it also reflects revised assessments of the relative risks and benefits of
particular interventions. r' The previously mentioned controversy over how
many embryos to transfer after IVF' 59 offers just one illustration of the
difficulty courts would encounter in resolving malpractice claims of this
sort. In connection with the McNally hypothetical, the questions would
focus on the selection of appropriate drugs (e.g., Pergonal vs. Clomid) and
dosages, or on the use of ovarian stimulation followed by artificial
insemination rather than by the more precise use of IVF with limited
embryo transfer, questions for which no real guidelines exist. 6 °
In addition, the McNallys could assert claims based on a failure to
secure informed consent insofar as Dr. Guthrie did not fully discuss the
risks and alternatives before initiating ovarian stimulation. 6' Once she
identified a large number of maturing follicles, Dr. Guthrie belatedly
discussed several alternatives with the couple, but she still may not have
satisfied her informed consent duties if there was any failure to describe
the material risks associated with multifetal pregnancies. In light of
research finding that infertile couples consistently discount such risk
information, 62 fertility specialists may have a particular responsibility to
ensure that their patients fully comprehend the consequences of their
choices. Even though more alarming information about the hazards of a

Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1389-91 (1994).

158. See Steinberg et al., supra note 13, at 621,623 ("[There is a striking absence of practice
guidelines related to management of infertility, in general, as well as to specific ART techniques.").
159. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text; see also Alison P. Murdoch, How Many
Embryos Should Be Transferred?, 13 HuM. REPROD. 2666, 2666-67 (1998).

160. See supra Pt. II.D.2; see also Howard W. Jones, Jr. & John A. Schnorr, Multiple
11 (2001) ("It is of significance that
no official or unofficial body has offered any regulations or guidelines to avoid high-order multiple
pregnancies due to ovulation induction."); Michael R. Soules et al., Multiple Pregnancies: Action
Is Taking Place, 75 FERTILITY & STERILIrY 15, 15 (2001) ("Until there is a proven protocol or
information similar to that used to develop the SART/ASRM guidelines on the number of embryos
to transfer, we will be unable to effectively deal with high-order multiples in relation to controlled
ovarian hyperstimulation."). Even if courts admitted FDA-approved labeling as evidence of the
standard of care in medical malpractice litigation, the labeling for fertility drugs simply encourages
the disclosure of the risk of multiple births to patients. See infra note 203.
161. See Harbeson v. Parke Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 523-25 (9th Cir. 1984) (affirming
judgment for plaintiffs on an informed consent claim where physicians failed to advise epilepsy
patient of the teratogenicity of Dilantin after she specifically had inquired about such risks in order
to decide whether to attempt to conceive); cf.Provenzano v. Integrated Genetics, 22 F. Supp. 2d
406,408-10,416-18 (D.N.J. 1998) (allowing a claim to proceed where a misread amniocentesis test
denied the parents an opportunity to choose selective reduction of a seriously malformed fetus
during a twin pregnancy). See generally Harrison v. United States, 284 F.3d 293, 301 & n.7 (1st
Cir. 2002); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Malpractice: Physician's Duty, Under Informed Consent
Pregnancies: A Callfor Action, 75 FERTILITY& STERILITY 11,

Doctrine, to Obtain Patient's Consent to Treatment in Pregnancy or Childbirth Cases, 89

A.L.R.4th 799 (1991 & Supp. 2002).
162. See supra note 102.
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multifetal pregnancy may not have altered Wanda's objection to selective
reduction, the McNallys may have opted for one of the other, more
conservative treatment options if better informed of the risks.'63
Although the McNallys ultimately rejected all of the recommended
alternatives and insisted on proceeding as originally planned, Dr. Guthrie
still may face a malpractice claim if this course of action created a risk of
injury to her patient or foreseeable offspring and reasonable physicians
would have refused the request. In effect, a court would have to decide
whether a patient can consent to medical care that deviates from customary
practice and the physician's better judgment. A negative answer seems
excessively paternalistic and unfairly threatens to impose tort liability on
physicians for performing nonessential procedures even if they have fully
disclosed all of the associated risks," but, especially if a duty runs to the
foreseeable offspring, courts presumably would hesitate to allow a
physician to escape responsibility for abiding by a patient's foolish wishes.
If nothing else, as explained in the next section, express assumption of risk
by a patient probably would not bar a claim brought on behalf of a child.
C. Avoidable Consequences and Other Defenses
Assuming that Barry could assert that Dr. Guthrie and the fertility clinic
breached some duty of care running to him, and that the uterine crowding
and premature delivery associated with this breach of duty-rather than
some genetic condition or unrelated malpractice during delivery--caused
his injuries, none of the usual affirmative defenses would seem to present
an obstacle to recovery. Any assumption of risk or comparative negligence

163. Cf. Shorter v. Drwy, 695 P.2d 116, 118 (Wash. 1985) (reviewing assumption of risk
defense in a wrongful death case where a physician's negligence grew in part from selecting the one
out of three available procedures for removing a dead fetus from the patient's uterus that created
the greatest risk of accidental hemorrhaging even though he knew that the patient would refuse a
blood transfusion on religious grounds); id. at 125 (Pearson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing this
point).
164. See Tracy Dobson, Medical Malpractice in the Birthplace: Resolving the PhysicianPatientConflict Through Informed Consent, Standard of Care, and Assumption of Risk, 65 NEB.
L. REV. 655, 678-82 (1986); id. at 684 ("Physicians who relinquish or share decisionmaking
authority with pregnant.., patients must be protected by the assumption of the risk defense from
claims alleging ...failure to follow a standard of care from which the patient specifically requested
that the physician deviate."); see also Kathy Seward Northern, ProcreativeTorts: Enhancing the
Common-Law ProtectionforReproductive Autonomy, 1998 U. ILL L. REV. 489, 532 (arguing that
the use of a professional standard of disclosure "would allow doctors to maintain a narrow,
paternalistic view of procreative decision making"). Some commentators have suggested imposing
a heightened duty of informed consent in the case of elective treatment, see Peter H. Schuck,
Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 955 (1994), but courts have declined to draw
such a distinction, see Pauscher v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 408 N.W.2d 355, 359-61 (Iowa
1987).
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by Wanda, even if valid defenses in routine medical malpractice cases,'
typically would not be imputed to her son.'" If Wanda had brought a
malpractice claim on her own behalf, the refusal to undergo selective
reduction as recommended by her obstetrician might bar her from

recovering for maternal injuries associated with a multifetal pregnancy.
Plaintiffs normally have an obligation to mitigate avoidable damages by

agreeing to undergo reasonable medical procedures, 67 though courts have
hesitated when mitigation would have required undergoing an abortion. 6"
Religious objections alone would not, however, necessarily excuse a

165. See Boyle v. Revici, 961 F.2d 1060, 1063 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that "a patient may
expressly assume the risk of malpractice and dissolve the physician's duty to treat a patient
according to the medical community's accepted standards," and that this defense would not
necessarily require asigned informed consent form); Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987,993-96 (2d
Cir. 1987) (holding that an informed consent form did not unambiguously waive the right to sue
a physician for malpractice after treating a breast cancer patient noninvasively with selenium
supplements, but allowing express assumption ofrisk defense); id.at 995 ("[W]e see no reason why
a patient should not be allowed to make an informed decision to go outside currently approved
medical methods in search of an unconventional treatment.... [A]n informed decision to avoid
surgery and conventional chemotherapy is within the patient's right .... "); Hartsell v. Fort Sanders
Reg'l Med. Ctr., 905 S.W.2d 944, 947 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a signed consent form
only defeated a battery claim); Brown v. Dibbell, 595 N.W.2d 358, 367-70 (Wis. 1999) (holding
that comparative negligence would rarely serve as a defense to an informed consent claim). See
generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Annotation, Contributory Negligence or Comparative Negligence
Based on Failure ofPatient to Follow Instructions as Defense in Action Against Physician or
Surgeon for Medical Malpractice, 84 A.L.R.Sth 619 (2000 & Supp. 2002); Caroll J. Miller,
Annotation, Patient's Failure to Reveal Medical History to Physician as Contributory Negligence
or Assumption of Risk in Defense ofMalpractice Action, 33 A.L.R.4th 790 (1984 & Supp. 2002).

Courts generally refuse to enforce waivers of liability in the health care context. See Tunki v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441,447 (Cal. 1963); Emory Univ. v. Porubiansky, 282
S.E.2d 903, 905 (Ga. 1981); Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891, 895-96 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1994); Ash v. New York Univ. Dental Ctr., 564 N.Y.S.2d 308, 310-13 (App. Div. 1990);
see also Maxwell J.Mehlman, Fiduciary Contracting: Limitations on Bargaining Between Patients
and Health Care Providers, 51 U. PIr. L. REv. 365, 401-06 (1990).
166. See, e.g., Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342,348-49 & n.30 (Okla. 1993). But cf Lynch
v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113, 125-26, 129-31 (N.J. 2000) (allowing such apportionment in a
preconception tort case).
167. See generally W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Duty oflnjuredPerson to Submit to Surgery to
Minimize Tort Damages, 62 A.L.R.3d 9 (1975 & Supp. 2002).
168. See, e.g., Smith v. Gore, 728 S.W.2d 738,751-52 (Tenn. 1987); Marciniak v. Lundborg,
450 N.W.2d 243,247 (Wis. 1990). But cf Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471,479 n.23 (7th Cir.
1981) (explaining that, insofar as the parents of a healthy child chose not to abort, they could not
recover their child rearing expenses from a physician for negligently performing a sterilization
procedure); Sorkin v. Lee, 434 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301-03 (App. Div. 1980) (same); Jeff L. Milsteen,
Comment, Recovery ofChildbearingExpenses in Wrongful Birth Cases: A MotivationalAnalysis,
32 EMORY L.J. 1167, 1188 (1983) ("Since abortions have become relatively commonplace in our
society, it seems unjust to impose a rule that, as a matter of law, this form of mitigation is
unreasonable in all cases.").
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plaintiffs decision to decline a medical intervention, 169 and one might
view selective reduction as a necessary adjunct to ARTs that may result in
the implantation of multiple embryos. 7 ° Even so, Wanda's failure to
undergo selective reduction would not amount to a superseding cause of
Barry's injuries because the defendants had advance knowledge that she
would decline this procedure in the event of a multifetal pregnancy."'
169. See Munn v. Algee, 924 F.2d 568, 573-75 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the plaintiff had
a duty to mitigate by blood transfusion even if she had a religious objection); Shorter v. Drury, 695
P.2d 116, 121-24 (Wash. 1985) (holding that a patient assumed the risk of death when she
underwent a dilation and curettage procedure but, after internal bleeding occurred, refused to allow
a blood transfusion on religious grounds); Kenneth W. Simons, The Puzzling Doctrine of
Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1730 (1995) ("[A]lthough the decedent's
decision to honor her religious beliefs is not unreasonable, defendant has no duty to subsidize her
choice to sacrifice her life in the name of religion."). But cf Norman M. Block, Note, Wrongful
Birth: The Avoidance ofConsequences Doctrine in Mitigation ofDamages, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
1107, 1114-22 (1985) (arguing that ajury should decide whether a plaintiffs decision to decline
an abortion was reasonable given her sincere religious beliefs); Jeremy Pomeroy, Note, Reason,
Religion, and Avoidable Consequences: When Faith and the Duty to Mitigate Collide, 67 N.Y.U.
L. REv. II1,1118-21, 1133-56 (1992) (criticizingMunn). See generally Gary Knapp, Annotation,
Refusal of Medical Treatment on Religious Grounds as Affecting Right to Recover for Personal
Injury or Death, 3 A.L.R.5th 721 (1992 & Supp. 2002).
170. See Mary V. Rorty & JoAnn V. Pinkerton, Elective Fetal Reduction: The Ultimate
Elective Surgery, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 53, 60 (1996) ("[l~t seems appropriate to
consider pregnancy reduction in connection with fertility treatments not as a separate procedure,
but as an unfortunate and sometimes necessary part of the fertility treatment."); cf.I.R. Hill,
Liability and In-Vitro Fertilization, 25 MED. Sc. & L. 270, 273 (1985) ("Enforcement of such a
condition [i.e., an agreement to undergo fetal genetic screening] would be technically difficult and
ethically unjustifiable, but failure to comply would surely transfer responsibility for any adverse
consequences to the patient, so absolving the doctor."). Along similar lines, some courts only
require informed consent for the entire procedure rather than for each element. See Wachter v.
United States, 689 F. Supp. 1420, 1423-24 (D. Md. 1988), aff'd, 877 F.2d 257, 260-61 (4th Cir.
1989); Van Iperen v. Van Bramer, 392 N.W.2d 480,484 (Iowa 1986); Sinclair v. Block, 633 A.2d
1137, 1140 (Pa. 1993); Cary v. Arrowsmith, 777 S.W.2d 8, 21 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). Imagine that
a patient consents to cosmetic surgery involving two distinct procedures: the insertion of skin
expanders, followed several weeks later by skin grafts. Because the patient experienced extreme
pain during the first stage, which allegedly resulted from negligence by the physician, she refuses
to return for the second stage, and a serious infection develops. Presumably, the physician would
not face liability for the subsequent avoidable injuries. See Newell v. Corres, 466 N.E.2d 1085,
1094-95 (I1. App. Ct. 1984); cf.Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 26, 31 (Wis. 1999)
("We reject the notion that the onset of a procedure categorically forecloses apatient's withdrawal
of consent. To be sure, at some point in virtually every medical procedure a patient reaches a point
from which there is no return."). See generally James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Medical
Malpractice: Patient's Failure to Return, as Directed, for Examination or Treatment as
Contributory Negligence, 100 A.L.R.3d 723 (1980 & Supp. 2002).
171. Cf Walker v. Rinck, 604 N.E.2d 591,596 (Ind. 1992) ("It was foreseeable at the time of
...
Dr. Rinck's alleged negligence in failing to give RhoGAM that Mrs. Walker may become
pregnant again and deliver additional children."); Lynch v. Scheininger, 744 A.2d 113, 128 (N.J.

2000) ("[Tlhe Lynches' decision to conceive additional children was entirely foreseeable in the
absence of information or a warning that a subsequent pregnancy involved risks of such magnitude
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The defendants might seek contribution from Wanda, arguing that her
own unreasonable decision to continue with the procedure against Dr.
Guthrie's recommendation-and then to refuse selective reduction after
multiple embryos implanted--caused Barry's injuries. In several
jurisdictions, intrafamily immunities remain in place, though courts have
recognized a variety of exceptions."' By extension, these immunities also
would defeat such a third-party claim for contribution." Even in states
that allow children to sue their parents, only a handful of cases have
involved claims against mothers for negligent prenatal care. 74 Even if such
a lawsuit could proceed in the face of the parents' religious faith,'" a child
surely could not assert a wrongful life claim against his or her parents,'76
that a high likelihood existed that the child either would not survive or would be born with serious
disabilities."). In cases where a patient fully appreciates the risks to a fetus arising from some
antecedent act of negligence but decides to conceive and pursue a pregnancy, a few courts have
expressed awillingness to limit the liability of physicians under rules ofproximate causation insofar
as the mother's decision amounted to a superseding cause of injury to the child. See Curlender v.
Bio-Science Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Ct. App. 1980), overruled in part on other grounds,
Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Graham v. Keuchel, 847 P.2d 342, 348, 353-55 (Okla.
1993).
172. See generally Sandra L. Haley, Comment, The Parental Tort Immunity Doctrine: Is It a
Defensible Defense?, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 575 (1996); Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Liability
of Parent for Injury to UnemancipatedChild Caused by Parent'sNegligence-Modern Cases, 6
A.L.R.4th 1066 (1981 & Supp. 2002).
173. See generally Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation, Right of Tortfeasor to Contribution from
Joint Torfeasor Who Is Spouse or Otherwisein Close Familial Relationship to InjuredParty, 25
A.L.R.4th 1120, § 5 (1983 & Supp. 2002).
174. See Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (allowing a child with
damaged teeth to pursue negligence claim against mother for ingesting tetracycline while pregnant);
Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464,466 (N.H. 1992); Ron Beal, "Can ISue Mommy? " An Analysis of
a Woman's Tort LiabilityforPrenatalInjuriesto Her ChildBornAlive, 21 SAN DIEGOL. REV. 325,
357-70 (1984). See generally Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Right ofChild to Action Against
Motherfor Infliction ofPrenatal Injuries, 78 A.L.R.4th 1082 (1990 & Supp. 2002). Although the
Michigan courts have not explicitly overruled Grodin, evidently they no longer follow the holding
in that case. See Ellis v. Target Stores, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 965, 970 (W.D. Mich. 1993).
175. See Lundman v. McKown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 821-23, 828 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(rejecting defendants' arguments that they simply followed the preference of the decedent's mother
for faith healing); cf James G. Dwyer, Parents'Religion and Children's Welfare: Debunking the
Doctrine ofParents'Rights, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1371, 1396-405 (1994) (criticizing the tendency of
courts to defer to parental choices in medical care for children when the state attempts to intervene).
But cf April L. Cherry, The Free Exercise Rights of Pregnant Women Who Refuse Medical
Treatment, 69 TENN. L. REV. 563, 593-622 (2002) (arguing that courts should show more respect
for women's religious claims against state attempts to protect a viable fetus).
176. See Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) ("Ifher parents had decided to
conceive, despite knowledge of probable congenital defects, the law would recognize no action on
Christy's behalf against them."); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954,959 (Cal. 1982) (explaining that
a new state statute prevented the assertion of such claims, whether directly by a child or indirectly
by a third party); Hester v. Dwivedi, 733 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ohio 2000); Alan J. Belsky, Injury
as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REv. 185,
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which also would prevent a third-party claim by a fertility specialist against
the parents seeking contribution in such a case.
D. Imposing Strict Liabilityfor Medical Services?
The plaintiff also might attempt to assert a strict tort liability claim.
Historically, courts have refused to impose strict liability against providers
of professional medical services.'" In the case of elective-and perhaps
aggressively promoted-health care services such as fertility treatments,
however, courts may rethink this traditional reluctance.""8
To the extent that the prices charged for ARTs fail to reflect the full
costs of the associated injuries, a rule of strict liability might help to ensure
that the procedures are neither oversupplied nor overconsumed. 7 9 At least
one commentator has recommended subjecting IVF providers to strict

241 (1993) ("Permitting children to maintain actions against their parents for wrongful life is
unsound.").
177. See, e.g., Hoven v. Kelble, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391-93 (Wis. 1977). See generally David
B. Harrison, Annotation, Application of Rule of Strict Liability in Tort to Person or Entity
Rendering Medical Services, 100 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1980 & Supp. 2002).
178. A few courts have applied negligence doctrines in malpractice cases in a way that
approaches a rule of strict liability. See Clark v. Gibbons, 426 P.2d 525, 536-40 (Cal. 1967)
(Tobriner, J., concurring) (res ipsa loquitur); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981,984-85 (Wash. 1974)
(Utter, J., concurring) (arguing for the imposition of strict liability instead of rejectingcustom as
the standard of care); see also Harris v. Groth, 663 P.2d 113, 115-18 (Wash. 1983) (abiding by the
holding in Hellingthat adherence to the customary standard of care is not conclusive); Alan Meisel,
The Expansion of Liabilityfor Medical Accidents: From Negligence to StrictLiability by Way of
Informed Consent, 56 NEB. L. REv. 51, 123-32, 151-52 (1977) (arguing that changes in the
informed consent doctrine have made medical malpractice a de facto rule of strict liability). In
addition, fraud or misrepresentation claims brought against health care professionals also approach
a rule of strict liability. See Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 242-43 (Tex. 1994); Wright v.
Jeckle, 16 P.3d 1268, 1270-71 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Lee Ann Bundren, Commentary, State
Consumer FraudLegislationApplied to the Health Care Industry: Are HealthCare Professionals
Being "Consumed"?, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 133, 144-48 (1995); William A. Krais, Docs Who
ExaggerateFaceClaims Beyond Malpractice,NAT'L L.J., June 18,2001, atB9. An infertile couple
successfully brought such a claim under a state consumer protection statute against a fertility clinic.
See Karlin v. IVF Am., Inc., 712 N.E.2d 662, 664-65, 667-68 (N.Y. 1999).
179. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1980)
("[B]ecause sellers have to pay for accident losses, they will decide to take appropriate care and will
sell the product at a price reflecting accident losses. Thus customers will face the socially correct
price and will purchase the correct amount."); see also Frank J. Vandall, Applying Strict Liability
to Professionals:Economic and LegalAnalysis, 59 IND. L.J. 25, 33-39, 54-57 (1984) (arguing in
favor of applying strict liability to providers of medical services). Of course, if health insurers
simply absorbed the increased costs without attempting to reduce patient demand, any efforts to
expand the tort liability of physicians for purposes of cost internalization would not promote level
of activity deterrence. See Glen 0. Robinson, Rethinking the Allocation of Medical Malpractice
Risks Between Patients and Providers,LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 173, 178. As
long as most patients pay for ARTs out of pocket, this should not present a problem.
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liability for any injuries to the resulting offspring." 0 Conversely, a couple
of state statutes explicitly immunize IVF providers from any such tort
claims.'
The possibility that courts might impose strict liability becomes
somewhat stronger in hybrid sales-service transactions,' 82 but, in the case
of ARTs, "blood shield" statutes in many jurisdictions would exempt
transfers of human tissue from a "sales" characterization. 8 3 Apart from the
administration of fertility drugs, therefore, it would be difficult to treat the

relationship between patients and fertility clinics as anything other than
pure service transactions."M More plausibly, the plaintiff might include

180. See Mark E. Cohen, Note, The "Brave New Baby" and the Law: Fashioning Remedies
for the Victims ofIn Vitro Fertilization,4 AM. J.L. & MED. 319,332-35 (1978) (focusing, however,
on the then still experimental rather than commercial nature of the procedure); see also Anita M.
Hodgson, Note, The Warranty of Sperm: A Modest Proposalto Increase the Accountability of
Sperm Banks andPhysiciansin the PerformanceofArtijcialInseminationProcedures,26 IND. L.
REV. 357,379,383-86 (1993); Megan D. McIntyre, Comment, The PotentialforProductsLiability
Actions When Artificial Inseminationby an Anonymous DonorProduces Childrenwith Genetic
Defects, 98 DICK. L. REV. 519, 533-44 (1994).
181. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:132 (West 2000) (abrogating "[s]trict liability or liability
of any kind" for claims brought on behalf of a preembryo against IVF providers who acted in good
faith); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:29 to -B:30 (200 1) (immunizing health care providers from
liability for non-negligent actions in the provision of ARTs).
182. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Sharing Accountabilityfor Breast Implants: Strict Products
Liability and Medical Professionals Engaged in Hybrid Sales/Service Cosmetic Products
Transactions,21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 873, 889-99 (1994) (arguing that the rationales against
imposing strict liability on physicians do not apply in the context of cosmetic surgeons who implant
nontherapeutic products that prove to be defective and cause injury); Laura Pleicones, Note,
Passingthe Essence Test: Health Care ProvidersEscape Strict Liabilityfor MedicalDevices, 50
S.C. L. REV. 463, 472-87 (1999). But see Carmichael v. Reitz, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381, 391-93 (Ct. App.
1971) (declining to impose strict liability on a physician for an injury caused by a drug that he had
prescribed to treat endometriosis); Budding v. SSM Healthcare Sys., 19 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Mo.
2000). See generally Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Medical Practitioner
Under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, or Breach of Warranty,for Harm Caused by Drug,
MedicalInstrument, or Similar Device Used in TreatingPatient,65 A.L.R.5th 357 (1999).
183. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19(c) & cmt. c (1998). See
generally Patricia Kussman, Annotation, Validity, Construction,and Application ofBlood Shield
Statutes, 75 A.L.R.5th 229 (2000).
184. In a related vein, some commentators have argued that fertility specialists should not get
singled out for heightened regulation as compared to other health care professionals. See Robertson,
supra note 128, at 921 ("[I]t is hard to argue for a special regulatory system for IVF and assisted
reproduction when procedures that present a much greater threat of harm to patients, such as
laparoscopic cholecystectomy, radial keratotomy, and autologous bone marrow transplant, go
unregulated."). Although Professor Daar noted that fertility specialists legitimately could object to
government efforts to single out their practices for oversight and regulation, see Daar,supra note
128, at 638, she also recognized that ARTs fundamentally differ from most other medical
procedures: "Because of the unique product and services offered by the fertility industry, the
relationship between providers and consumers, i.e., doctors and patients, takes on characteristics
unknown to other areas of medicine." Id. at 616; see also id. at 656 n.259 ('Fertility specialists do
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strict products liability claims against manufacturers of fertility drugs,
perhaps arguing that their labeling should have provided better dosing
information or should have indicated use only in conjunction with IVF. In
addition, the plaintiff might argue that-in light of the current state of the
art-the older fertility drugs are defectively designed insofar as the risk of
multifetal pregnancy now outweighs their limited benefits when compared
with alternative, safer ARTs.
IV. HATCHING A PLAN TO REGULATE ARTs
A few commentators have called for enhanced federal regulation of the
fertility industry.'85 As explained previously, the states have not shown any
real interest in exercising greater supervision of the field, the threat of tort
liability evidently has failed to deter the aggressive and perhaps even
irresponsible use of ARTs, and professional self-regulation has failed to
stem the tide of artificially-induced multiple births." Although a couple
of other federal regulatory agencies have begun to play a limited role in the
area, the Food and Drug Administration seems the most likely candidate
for taking charge of the issue."' It could do so in one of two ways. First,
the FDA could try to extend its authority over biological products to reach
the use of human reproductive tissues, which it already has begun to do in
a limited fashion. Second, the agency could exercise its undoubted
jurisdiction over fertility drugs and reconsider their continuing safety and
effectiveness. Although any attempt to restrict or withdraw products
previously approved for the treatment of infertility would trigger vocal
constitutional objections, such an initiative may offer the best hope for
reducing the serious and growing health risks associated with the otherwise
unregulated use of ARTs.

A. Stop Trying to Fool Mother Nature
Until recently, the FDA had not asserted regulatory jurisdiction over
IVF or other fertility procedures. Indeed, scholars who wrote about the

perform a service unique in the health care field-they make babies.").
185. See, e.g., George J.Annas, The Shadowlands-Secrets, Lies,andAssistedReproduction,
339 NEW ENG. J.MED. 935, 937 (1998) ("The assisted-reproduction industry caters to the wishes
of adults, and their wishes consistently trump the interests of children."); id.
at 938 ("[T]o the extent
that assisted reproduction has become big business and to the extent that it is more accurately
characterized as a commercial enterprise than as a medical... enterprise, federal regulation of at
least its interstate commercial aspects deserves consideration.").
186. See Jones & Schnorr, supra note 160, at 12, 13 ("[V]oluntary guidelines as they now exist
have failed to control the multiple-pregnancy problems in IVF in the United States.").
187. See generally LARS NOAH & BARBARA A. NOAH, LAW, MEDICINE, AND MEDICAL

TECHNOLOGY: CASES AND MATERIALS (2002).
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regulation of ARTs had paid no attention to the agency,' 8 and, when
Congress passed the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of

1992,189 it suggested no role for the FDA. Instead, it directed the CDC to
collect information and to develop a model program (designed for states
to implement) to inspect laboratories that work with human embryos. 9o It
took several years before the reporting mechanism became fully
operative,1 91 and the CDC did not release a model state program until
1999.192 In addition, under its general authority to sanction false and

misleading advertising, the FTC has undertaken investigations into claims

made by IVF providers. 9 3 As contrasted with this largely patchwork and
minimalist approach to regulation in the United States, England created the

Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority to operate as a national
agency that focuses on ARTs.194

188. See, e.g., Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A
ProposedRegulatory Frameworkfor the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REV.
625, 683-86 (1991) (summarizing the different sources of federal regulation without ever
mentioning the FDA); id. at 709 ("[T]he advanced reproduction industry has developed virtually
unfettered by regulatory directives. While the medical profession has attempted to self-regulate the
new technologies, opportunities for patient exploitation and substandard quality of care persist.");
Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raisedby In Vitro Fertilization,67 GEO.
Dennis M. Flannery et al.,
L.J. 1295, 1296 n.10 (1979) (making only a passing reference to the FDA's possible role).
189. Pub. L. No. 102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7
(2000)).
190. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-l(a), 263a-2(a)(1), 263a-3(a), 263a-5 (2000); see also Elizabeth
C. Price, Does the FDA Have Authority to Regulate Human Cloning?, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619,
631 n.58 (1998) ("[lIt was never once suggested during these hearings (leading up to passage of
the 1992 statute] that the FDA had existing authority to regulate fertility clinics or the process of
in vitro fertilization itself."); cf. SEN. REP. No. 102-452, at 4 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2564,2567 ("It is not the intent of the Committee that pharmaceuticals indicated for
induction of ovulation, by themselves, to be regarded as [ARTs] falling within the scope of this
legislation."). Other units of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) exercise
authority over certain aspects of fertility clinics, such as preimplantation diagnostic screening of
embryos, under the Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA). See
Adamson, supra note 53, at 932-35; see also 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2000); 42 C.F.R. pt. 493 (2002);
Consumer Fed'n of Am. v. HHS, 83 F.3d 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (reviewing challenges to a pair of
CLIA regulations).
191. See 65 Fed. Reg. 53,310 (2000); see also Amy Dockser Marcus, Key Report on Fertility
ClinicsIs UnderFire:DoctorsSay Success Rates in CDC Survey Are Unreliable,WALLST. J., Dec.
11,2002, at D1 ("It's not unlike the controversy over college rankings, in which some people have
complained that the data fuel competition and can sometimes be misleading.").
192. See 64 Fed. Reg. 39,374, 39,382-91 (1999); see also 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5452 (2001)
("No State has yet adopted CDC's model certification program.").
193. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
194. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, ch. 37, § 8 (Eng.); Human
Fertilisation & Embryology Authority, Tenth Annual Report and Accounts (2001), availableat
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/Downloads/AnnualReport/HFEAAnnual%20Report200l.pdf (last visited
Oct. 30,2002); Robert L. Stenger, The Law andAssisted Reproduction in the United Kingdom and
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Nonetheless, in 1998, the FDA announced, and subsequently reiterated,
that its proposed rule governing cellular and tissue-based products would
apply to ARTs as well:
Most aspects of cellular and tissue product manufacturing in
the reproductive tissue industry would become newly
regulated under the proposed CGTP [current good tissue
practices] rule. The affected establishments within this
industry include sperm banks and ART facilities. Reports of
the sensitivity of product quality to variations in tissue
collection, technician skill, processing methods,
environmental conditions, and other factors, indicate that the
risk of communicable disease transmission would be reduced
by improving the proposed overall product quality, and
economic benefits would be seen through improved patient
outcomes from facility compliance with the proposed CGTP
requirements ....
Despite the increasing effectiveness of
infertility treatment through ART, problems can occur in
tissue processing. Adverse outcomes owing to problems with
product quality can result from contamination that produces
infection (e.g., HIV transmission) in the infertility patient.
Problems with ART facility processing of sperm or oocytes
can also lead to reduced rates of fertilization ....

United States,9 J.L. &HEALTH 135, 145-59 (1994) (discussing the UK's approach, and contrasting
it with the lack of legislative attention in the United States); id.at 149 n. 107 (noting, however, that
the British government "wanted to avoid regulating the superovulatory drugs themselves"); see also
Robertson, supra note 128, at 920 ("I am skeptical about the need for a British-style regulatory
agency for IVF or for assisted reproduction generally.... In any event, ...

the tight budget

prevailing in Washington make[s] the creation of a new federal agency to regulate IVF extremely
unlikely."). For the approaches of other countries, see Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent
Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical and Social Issues, 17 AM. J.L. & MED.

329 (1991) (focusing on the reports issued by special committees convened in several countries,
identifying a set of widely shared principles, and calling for their codification in an international
agreement); Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Process of Regulating Assisted Reproductive
Technologies: What We Can Learn from Our Neighbors-What Translates and What Does Not,

45 Loy. L. REv. 247, 256-57 (1999) (explaining that "extensive record-keeping and informed
consent documentation is commonly mandated" in other nations); id. at 261 ("Differences abound
[among countries] on the question of how many eggs to fertilize within one given cycle....");
Elizabeth Ann Pitrolo, Comment, The Birds, the Bees, and the Deep Freeze: Is There International
Consensus in the Debate over Assisted Reproductive Technologies?, 19 Hous. J.INT'L L. 147, 173-

97(1996).
195. 66 Fed. Reg. 1508, 1542-43 (2001); see also 63 Fed. Reg. 26,744,26,744 (1998) ("The

term 'human cellular and tissue-based products' encompasses an array of medical products derived
from the human body and used for replacement, reproductive, or therapeutic purposes.... Semen,
ova, and embryos are transferred for reproductive purposes."); id. at 26,745 ("Even today, FDA's
human tissue regulations do not address the infectious disease risk of donating, processing, and
storing reproductive cells and tissue."). One year earlier, it had promulgated rules governing tissue
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A number of commentators have drawn attention to the need to assert
greater supervision over the sperm banking industry," and the FDA's
initiative fits well within its statutory authority to address problems with
communicable diseases under the Public Health Service Act, 9 ' but it will
do nothing to combat some of the more serious intrinsic risks associated
with fertility treatments.
More controversially, however, the FDA also asserted jurisdiction over
other aspects of ARTs, claiming that it had the authority to subject human
reproductive tissues to premarket review-and to demand proof of their
safety and effectiveness-in the event that they had undergone more than
minimal manipulation. 98 After the publication of its proposed CGTP rule,
the agency sent warning letters to several fertility clinics ordering them to
cease using techniques that entail any kind of alteration of human genetic
material, including cloning, genetic engineering, and ooplasmic transfer
1' The FDA's claim of statutory power over efforts at
(a.k.a. IVONT). 99
transplants that explicitly had excluded reproductive tissues. See 62 Fed. Reg. 40,429, 40,440,
40,444 (1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1270.3(j)(5) (1998)).
196. See Mary E. Guinan, Editorial, Artificial Inseminationby Donor: Safety and Secrecy, 273
JAMA 890 (1995); Karen M. Ginsberg, Note, FDA Approved? A Critique of the Artificial
Insemination Industry in the United States, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 823 (1997); Kathleen M.
Peterson, Comment, Federal Regulation ofArtificial Insemination Donor Screening Practices: An
Opportunityfor Law to Co-Evolve with Medicine, 96 DICK. L. REV. 59 (1991).
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2000). See generally Marc O. Williams, The Regulation of Human
Tissue in the United States: A Regulatory and Legislative Analysis,. 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 409

(1997).
198. See Rick Weiss, Human Clone Research Will Be Regulated: FDA Asserts It Has Statutory
Authority to Regulate Attempts at Human Cloning, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 1998, at Al. In

announcing its proposed rule for establishment registration and listing, the agency distinguished
between minimally and extensively processed tissues, explaining that it would require premarket
approval only for the latter category. See 63 Fed. Reg. 26,744, 26,745-46 (1998) (adding that
"sperms, oocytes, and embryos for reproductive use" would only have to satisfy rules designed to
reduce the risks of transmitting communicable diseases and not premarket approval or licensing
requirements); id. at 26,750 ("In contrast to other tissues with a systemic effect, transfer of
reproductive tissues such as semen and ova pose less risk to the health of the recipient... [, and]
the failure of a reproductive-tissue product will generally cause lesser health risks to the individual
..... "); id. at 26,748 (explaining that cryopreservation would be considered minimal manipulation,
but offering "[e]xamples of manipulation not considered minimal, based on current scientific
knowledge, includ[ing] cell expansion, encapsulation, activation, and genetic modification").
199. See Antonio Regalado, FDA Warns Reproductive Clinics to Stop Using Fertility
Technique, WALL ST. J., July II, 2001, at B2; Rick Weiss, FDA to Regulate Certain Fertilization

Procedures, WASH. POST, July 11, 2001, at A2 (explaining that the FDA now requires physicians
performing certain experimental fertility procedures, such as IVONT, to file an IND, basing its
claim to jurisdiction on a regulation that was designed to cover gene therapy); see alsoFDA, Letter
to Sponsors/Researchers-Human Cells Used in Therapy Involving the Transfer of Genetic
Material by Means Other Than the Union of Gamete Nuclei, July 6, 2001, available at

http:llwww.fda.gov/cber/ltr/cytotransO7O6Ol.htm (last visited Oct. 30,2002). The agency's earlier
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human cloning remains dubious,2" but, for purposes of this discussion, it
implies that the agency also could try to pursue direct regulation of equally
novel but less controversial fertility procedures.2"' For instance, if ICSI
accounts for the observed increases in birth defects following IVF, the
FDA might intervene to prevent the routine use of this particular ART
procedure pending further research.
B. Don't Put All of Your Eggs in One Basket
The FDA could attack these problems in a different way. The agency
enjoys clear authority to regulate fertility drugs, notwithstanding questions
raised in other contexts as to whether infertility qualifies as a "disease" or
whether ARTs "treat" as opposed to circumvent this condition." 2 The
approved labeling for some fertility drugs encourages physicians to advise
their patients ofthe risks of multiple births.2 3 In regulating other drugs that

notice asserting jurisdiction over somatic cell and gene therapy had not, however, explicitly
encompassed any sorts of reproductive applications. See 58 Fed. Reg. 53,248, 53,250-51 (1993).
200. See Richard A. Merrill & Bryan J. Rose, FDA Regulation ofHuman Cloning: Usurpation
or Statesmanship?, 15 HARV.J.L.&TECH. 85,97-124 (2001); Gregory J.Rokosz, Human Cloning:
Is the Reach ofFDA Authority Too Far a Stretch?, 30 SETON HALL L. REv. 464, 495-515 (2000);
see also Lars Noah, Interpreting Agency Enabling Acts: Misplaced Metaphors in Administrative
Law, 41 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1463, 1488 (2000). Like other statutes, the Fertility Clinic Success
Rate and Certification Act cautioned against interference with the practice of medicine. See 42
U.S.C. § 263a-2(i)(1) (2000) ("In developing the [embryo laboratory] certification program, the
Secretary [of HHS] may not establish any regulation, standard, or requirement which has the effect
of exercising supervision or control over the practice of medicine in assisted reproductive
technology programs."). When the FDA finalized its establishment registration and listing rule, the
agency rejected objections that it was "proposing to regulate the practice of medicine, especially
with respect to reproductive tissue." 66 Fed. Reg. 5447, 5452 (2001); see also id. (responding to
"[s]everal comments [that] questioned the need for the regulation of reproductive cells and tissues,
citing current oversight from professional organizations, other Federal agencies, and States").
201. See Lori B. Andrews, Is There a Right to Clone? Constitutional Challenges to Bans on
Human Cloning, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 643, 658 n.102 (1998) ("For example, if the FDA can

regulate cloning, why hasn't it used the same authority to monitor" ICSI?).
202. See Donald Evans, Editorial, Infertility and the NHS, 311 BRIT. MED. J. 1586 (1995);
Elizabeth Heitman, Social and Ethical Aspects of In Vitro Fertilization, 15 INT'L J. TECH.
ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 22, 23-25 (1999); Lars Noah, Pigeonholing Illness: Medical
Diagnosisasa Legal Construct, 50 HASTINGsL.J. 241,258 & n.62 (1999); cf E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. v. Bowen, 870 F.2d 678,683 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("[Ajrticles to prevent pregnancy, thus affecting
the reproductive function of the human body, fall within [the statute's drug] definition."); United
States v. Article of Drug ... Ova II, 414 F. Supp. 660, 664 (D.N.J. 1975) (concluding that
pregnancy does not qualify as a "disease"), afd mem., 535 F.2d 1248 (3d Cir. 1976).
203. See PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 3224 (56th ed. 2002) ("The patient and her husband
should be advised of the frequency and potential hazards of multiple gestation before starting
[Pergonal] treatment."); id. at 1349 ("The patient and her partner should be advised of the potential
risk of multiple births before starting [Repronex] treatment."); id. at 736 (same for Clomid).
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pose fetal risks, the FDA has required harsher labeling statements.2 4 In a
few recent instances, it also imposed more stringent controls on their
distribution and use-namely, Accutane ® (isotretinoin), 2° Thalomid"
(thalidomide),2° and Mifeprex® (mifepristone). °7 For instance, patients
seeking access to Accutane or Thalomid must undergo regular pregnancy
testing and agree to use two forms of contraception while taking the drug.
The FDA certainly could strengthen the cautionary statements that

accompany fertility drugs. Traditionally, however, the agency has tried to
avoid the use of product labeling to communicate statements that have
more to do with good professional practice than the intrinsic risks and
benefits of a drug when used as intended. '° Perhaps some other federal
agency, such as the CDC or the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (AHRQ), should undertake the difficult and perhaps controversial

204. A "Pregnancy category" designation, accompanied by a specified explanation and any
additional information concerning the risk of birth defects, must appear in the Precautions section
of most package inserts, depending on the available evidence of a drug's potential teratogenicity.
For instance, if evidence from use in humans or animals discloses a risk of birth defects that clearly
outweighs any possible benefit of using the drug during pregnancy, Pregnancy category X is
appropriate, along with a cross-reference to the Contraindications section of the label. See 21
C.F.R. § 201.57(f)(6)(i) (2002); see also Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Ending Guesswork on Drugs in
Pregnancy, WASH. POST, Feb. 26,2002, at FI (reporting that the FDA may soon revamp this rating
system).
205. See Joan H. Krause, Accutane: Has Drug Regulation in the United States Reached Its
Limits?, 6 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 19-20 (199 1); Diane Knich, Acne Drug Safeguards, WASH. POST, Apr.
9, 2002, at F! (noting that over the last two decades, in spite of label warnings, more than 2000
women became pregnant while taking the drug, which prompted the FDA to impose stringent
distribution restrictions and informed consent requirements). For the current version of the package
insert, see http://www.rocheusa.com/products/accutane/pi.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
206. See Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for Some but Not Others: The FDA
Experience.and Alternativesfor Products Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REv. 927, 943-44 (1999); Rita
Rubin, Thalidomide Could Guide Use ofDrugs That Risk Birth Defects, USA TODAY, July 22,
1998, at 7D; Jamie Talan, Thalidomide's Legacy, WASH. POST, Jan. 4,2000, at ZI 0 (reporting that
physicians who prescribe the drug receive from the manufacturer an "education kit, including a
consent form to be signed by both doctor and patient"). For the current version of the drug's
package insert, see http://www.celgene.com/images/pdf/$FILE/ThalomidPI.pdf(last visited Aug.
12, 2002).
207. See Lars Noah, A Miscarriage in the DrugApproval Process? Mifepristone Embroils the
FDA in Abortion Politics, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 571, 585-86 (2001); Gina Kolata, US.
Approves Abortion Pill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2000, at Al ("A woman will be given written
instructions .... and her doctor must sign a statement saying they have read the instructions and
will comply with them exactly."). For the current version of the drug's package insert, see
http://www.earlyoptionpill.com/hcp_labeling.php3 (last visited Aug. 12, 2002).
208. See Noah, Medicine's Epistemology, supra note 63, at 436-38 (adding that the agency
has begun to deviate from this policy and also may use other channels in an effort to influence
medical practice). In addition, the FDA gradually has begun to appreciate the limited impact of
labeling revisions directed to health care professionals. See id. at 438-42.
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task of developing and disseminating clinical practice guidelines that
address the appropriate use of fertility drugs and other ARTs. °9
Although it usually relies on labeling to ensure safe use of drugs after
approval, the FDA has begun to consider intermediate risk-management
strategies.21 As reflected by the above-mentioned teratogens as well as the
recent market reintroduction of Lotronex ® (alosetron),211 these strategies
might include distribution restricted to specialists (e.g., reproductive
endocrinologists), special patient informed consent requirements,
structured post-market surveillance, and mandatory concomitant therapy.
As a last resort, the agency may revisit its risk-benefit judgments and
withdraw approval of drugs if patterns of misuse pose an excessive health
hazard.2 2
Apart from the newly acquired risk information, several things have
changed since the FDA first approved drugs for the treatment of infertility,
and these developments may point in conflicting directions. The
introduction and refinement of IVF techniques gave fertility drugs an
additional application, but these techniques also now offer an alternative
treatment that, if used responsibly, carries a reduced risk of multifetal
pregnancy. Improvements in neonatology now allow infants to survive
extreme prematurity but not without serious lasting consequences in many
cases. These advances also may make patients and providers more willing
to take their chances now that high-order multiples no longer doom the
entire pregnancy. Moreover, the introduction of selective reduction offers

209. Cf.id. at 427-29 (summarizing CDC and AHRQ efforts to issue guidelines related to
other health conditions). As explained previously, see supranotes 158-60 and accompanying text,
professional organizations have not yet really done so.
210. See Naomi Aoki, FDA Walks FineLine on Drug Approvals, BOSTON GLOBE, June 26,
2002, at C 1; Francesca Lunzer Kritz, FDA to Weigh New Controlson ProblematicDrugs, WASH.
POST, Apr. 16, 2002, at Fl.
211. See Marc Kaufman, FDA Reapproves Bowel Drug After Pulling It for Safety, WASH.
POST, June 8, 2002, at A4; Marc Kaufman, PanelSuggests Irritable-BowelDrug Be Sold Again,
WASH. POST, Apr. 24, 2002, at A7.
212. See Peter Honig et al., Letter, How ManyDeathsAreDue to MedicalErrors?,284 JAMA
2187,2188 (2000) ("The FDA's risk assessment must evaluate both a drug's intrinsic safety profile
as well as the ability of the health care system to adequately manage known toxicities. Unless
effective risk management strategies and methods are brought to bear, additional effective drugs are
likely to be withdrawn, and some drugs may never become available in the first place."); Raymond
L. Woosley, Drug Labeling Revisions-Guaranteedto Fail?, 284 JAMA 3047, 3047 (2000)
("[Rielatively safe drugs have been removed from the market because of the way that they were
used in practice."); Lauran Neergaard, FDA Tells Doctors to Heed Warningson New Medicine,
Hous. CHRON., Dec. 13, 2000, at 29; Banned Medicines Riskier to Women, HouS. CHRON., Feb.
9,200 1, at 3 ("[l]ncreasingly frustrated FDA scientists say the main problem is that doctors ignored
or never read warning labels that could have prevented deaths."). Among other potential obstacles,
the agency would have to abide by a variety of procedural requirements before withdrawing the
license for an approved drug product. See Noah, supra note 207, at 592-95.
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an apparent fix for high-order multifetal pregnancies, which in turn may
encourage patients and providers to gamble with more aggressive and risky
interventions.2" 3
In short, the technological milieu has changed dramatically in the four
decades since the first fertility drugs became available. In effect, a more
primitive first-generation technology, though not yet rendered obsolete
because it continues to facilitate use of the newer techniques, competes
with more refined second-generation technologies (i.e., IVF and embryo
transfer) and third-generation technologies (i.e., blastocyst culture and
micromanipulation of gametes).2" 4 The FDA needs to ask itself whether
these developments have so altered its original risk-benefit calculus that
some of its approved pharmaceutical treatments for infertility no longer
satisfy statutory requirements for safety and effectiveness." 5 Historically,
the agency avoided making risk-benefit decisions about a product in this
fashion, preferring to provide information so that health care professionals
and their patients could make comparative safety and effectiveness
judgments.2" 6 It has, however, begun taking a broader view of the sort
213. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text; see also Evans et al., supra note 119, at
97 ("Increased patient and physician awareness of the availability of the procedure appears to have
contributed to more aggressive infertility treatments and more subsequent multifetal pregnancy
reduction procedures."); Christine Overall, Selective Termination of Pregnancy and Women's
Reproductive Autonomy, HASTINGS CTR. REP., May-June 1990, at 6, 8 ("The debate over access to
selective pregnancy termination exemplifies a classic no-win situation for women, in which medical
technology generates a solution to a problem itself generated by medical technology.. . ."); id.
("[T]he technological 'solutions' to some forms of female infertility create an additional problem
of female hyperfertility--to which a further technological 'solution' of selective termination is then
offered.").
214. See Serena H. Chen & Edward E. Wallach, Five Decades ofProgressin Management of
the Infertile Couple, 62 FERTILITY & STERILITY 665, 675-81 (1994) (outlining these broad
developments); Robert G. Edwards et al., Editorial, Time to Revolutionize OvarianStimulation, I I
HuM. REPROD. 917 (1996); Michael J. Gast, Evolution ofClinical Agents for Ovulation Induction,
172 AM. J. OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 753 (1995) (describing advances made within this class of
pharmaceuticals); see also CDC Report, supra note 12, at 538 ("Strategies to reduce the risk for
multifetal gestation have important public health implications that must be integrated with patient
needs and concerns, provider practices, and rapidly changing technology.").
215. Cf H. David Banta & Stephen B. Thacker, The Casefor Reassessment of Health Care
Technology: Once Is Not Enough, 264 JAMA 235, 236-37, 239 (1990) (calling for technology
assessment to identify obsolete treatments); Lawrence S. Makow, Note, Medical Device Review at
the Food and Drug Administration: Lessonsfrom Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy and Biliary
Lithotripsy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 709, 730 (1994) (noting that advances in surgical methods (i.e.,
laparoscopy) for treating gallstones had rendered therapy with an approved drug product (i.e.,
ursodiol) obsolete, but that the FDA had failed to take this information into account). But cf Rob
Stein, Newer Heart Devices' Safety Questioned, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2002, at A20 ("The
[defibrillator] study is the latest of several to conclude that the newest, more complicated medical
treatments and technologies are not necessarily the most effective.").
216. See Einer Elhauge, The LimitedRegulatory Potential ofMedicai TechnologyAssessment,
82 VA. L. REv. 1525, 1593 (1996); Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability:
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suggested here,21 and the agency occasionally engages in retrospective
evaluations of previously approved products.2"8
If the FDA withdrew approval of fertility drugs, it would eliminate
multifetal pregnancies caused directly by ovarian stimulation or indirectly
by providing numerous oocytes for IVF and subsequent embryo transfer.219
Such a move would not entirely pull out the rug from under the fertility
industry. Physicians could continue harvesting eggs, though only one or
two at a time, and perform IVF.22° Indeed, IVF without ovarian stimulation

Examining the Strongest Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFoRM 461, 475-76 (1997); Maxwell J.
Mehlman, Health Care Cost Containment and Medical Technology: A Critique of Waste Theory,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 778, 788 (1986) (explaining that the FDA "has occasionally, albeit rarely,
denied approval to market a drug on the basis that it was less safe or less effective than an
alternative already on the market"); Robert Temple, Commentary on "The Architecture of
Government Regulation of MedicalProducts," 82 VA. L. REv. 1877, 1887-88, 1898 (1996).
217. See, e.g., Denise Grady, FDA Withdraws Drugfor Diabetics, Citing Health Risks, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 22, 2000, at AI (explaining that the agency decided to withdraw Rezulin once safer
substitutes came to market); Bruce Ingersoll, FDA Proposes to Force Seldane Off the Market,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1997, at BI (reporting that the approval of safer nonsedating antihistamines
prompted the agency's effort to withdraw its approval of Seldane). In reconsidering its approach
to nonprescription drugs, the FDA asked whether "the availability of a 'better' OTC product...
affect[s] the status of products already on the OTC market for treatment of the same condition?
Should older therapies that may provide less benefit or more risk be removed from the OTC market,
or should the labeling be revised?" 65 Fed. Reg. 24,704, 24,705 (2000).
218. See Lars Noah & Richard A. Merrill, Starting from Scratch?: Reinventing the Food
Additive Approval Process, 78 B.U. L. REV. 329, 356-57 & n.l 17 (1998) (discussing the agency's
retrospective safety review of common substances used in food, and noting parallels to the review
conducted of drugs approved before Congress added a proof of efficacy requirement in 1962).
219. One set of commentators recognized as much without, however, recommending (or
seemingly even imagining) such a drastic course of action. See Jamie Grifo et al., We Are Duefor
a Correction... and We Are Working to Achieve One, 75 FERTILITY & STERILITY 14, 14 (2001)
("[U]nless we outlaw the use of ovulation induction, we will continue to have this [multifetal

pregnancy] problem."). This analysis assumes that fertility drugs lack any other therapeutic uses.
In point of fact, some of them have such uses. See Filicori, supra note 32, at 45-53 (noting that
GnRH products may treat such conditions as endometriosis and prostate cancer). Conversely, it
assumes that, apart from the "off-label" use of Lupron for pituitary suppression, see supra note 33,
fertility specialists would not have access to products approved for other uses that might work as
substitutes, cf Eli Y. Adashi, Clomiphene Citrate: Mechanism(s) and Site(s) of Action-A
Hypothesis Revisited, 42 FERTILITY & STERILITY 331, 332 (1984) (explaining that the anti-cancer
agent tamoxifen may induce ovulation in much the same way as clomiphene).
220. See Una M. Fahy et al., In- Vitro Fertilization in Completely Natural Cycles, 10 HuM.
REPROD. 572, 574-75 (1995); Jennings et al., supra note 28, at 336 (noting that "natural cycle IVF

offers several distinct advantages over superovulation protocols," including a reduced risk of
multiple births, but adding that the odds of a successful pregnancy decline as well); Frangois
Olivennes& Rend Frydman, FriendlylVF: The Way ofthe Future?, 13 HuM. REPROD. 1121, 112223 (1998) (advocating the use of spontaneous ("drug-free") ovulatory cycles for IVF); Richard J.
Paulson et al., Factors Affecting Pregnancy Success of Human In-Vitro Fertilization in
Unstimulated Cycles, 9 HuM. REPROD. 1571, 1573-74 (1994) (reporting higher fertilization rate
using hCG alone); Machelle M. Seibel et al., Parameters that Predict Successfor Natural Cycle
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may carry an offsetting benefit: the hormones that induce ovulation have
a negative effect on the endometrium (the lining of the uterus), which
reduces the chances of successful embryo implantation after transfer.22 '
Although it might require more cycles to achieve a pregnancy, eliminating
fertility drugs will reduce some of the costs per cycle.222 Moreover,
physicians and patients who remain concerned about reduced pregnancy
rates without ovarian stimulation might opt for "embryo splitting"
(blastomere separation) after fertilization to create a limited number of
genetically identical embryos for transfer, 223 assuming that this technique

In Vitro Fertilization--Embryo Transfer, 63 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1251, 1253 (1995).
221. See Fabienne Devreker et al., The Long-Acting Gonadotropin-Releasing Hormone
Analogues Impaired the Implantation Rate, 65 FERTILITY& STERILITY 122, 125-26(1996); Robert
M.L. Winston & Alan H. Handyside, New Challenges in Human In Vitro Fertilization, 260
SCIENCE 932, 932-33 (1993) (adding that superovulation results in the harvesting of less mature
oocytes). This is one of the supposed advantages of embryo cryopreservation and transfer during
a subsequent cycle. See John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 407, 408 (1990).
222. See Salim Daya et al., Natural Cycles for In-Vitro Fertilization: Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis andFactors Influencing Outcome, 10 HuM. REPROD. 1719, 1721-24 (1995); Herve Foulot
et al., In Vitro Fertilization Without Ovarian Stimulation: A Simplified Protocol Applied in 80
Cycles, 52 FERTILITY& STERILITY 617, 620 (1989); see also Callahan et al., supra note 68, at 248
("[T]he cost for these additional cycles, though they are by no means inexpensive, may well be a
tolerable trade-off for lowering the medical and economic costs of multiple-gestation
pregnancies."). Conversely, a second full round of egg retrieval costs far more than, for example,
thawing and transferring a cryopreserved embryo saved from an earlier cycle using ovarian
stimulation. See Judy Licht, Frozen in Time: Storing of Embryos Boosts the Chances of
Pregnancy-and Raises Ethical Questions, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at ZI0 (reporting a price
differential between these two procedures of $8,000, though based partly on avoiding the need for
a second cycle of drug treatments). In addition, repeated harvesting will cause the patient
inconvenience and pain, though, in a related context, some commentators have argued that the
greater ease of pharmaceutical substitutes for surgical interventions may cause women to become
too cavalier about their reproductive choices. See Ruth Macklin, Antiprogestin Drugs: Ethical
Issues, 20 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 215, 216-18 (1992) (describing but rejecting this position).
223. See Andrea L. Bonnicksen, Creating a Clone in Ninety Days: In Search of a Cloning
Policy, 38 JuRIMETIcs J. 23, 28,30 (1997); Rebecca Kolberg, Human Embryo Cloning Reported,
262 SCIENCE 652, 652 (1993); Rebecca Voelker, A Clone by Any Other Name Is Still an Ethical
Concern, 271 JAMA 331, 332 (1994) (describing this "research as a potential alternative for
infertile couples who prefer not to use medications"); Mona S. Amer, Comment, Breaking the
Mold: Human Embryo Cloning and Its Implications for a Right to Individuality,43 UCLA L. REV.
1659, 1662-65, 1688 (1996). But see Howard W. Jones, Jr. et al., On Attempts at Cloning in the
Human, 61 FERTILITY & STERILITY 423, 425 (1994) (doubting that this technique would help to
increase pregnancy rates). Even though it would not entail somatic cell nuclear transfer, this
technique (also known as "extended twinning") carries its own set of ethical quandaries. See Am.
Soc'y for Reprod. Med. Ethics Comm., Embryo Splittingfor Infertility Treatment, 67 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 4S (Supp. No. 1, 1997); Andrea L. Bonnicksen, Procreation by Cloning: Crafting
Anticipatory Guidelines, 25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 273-75 (1997). It would not, however, carry
a risk of multifetal pregnancy because blastomere separation only can give rise to a limited number
of(i.e., four to six) separate embryos. See Amer, supra, at 1683 n.133.
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would not run afoul of any future prohibitions against efforts at human
cloning.224
In some infertile women, however, hormonal products may offer the
only mechanism for triggering ovulation.225 The withdrawal of fertility
drugs would deny them access to relatively safe and effective treatments
for which no good substitutes exist at the present time. If the FDA chose
to pursue this strategy, it might decide to retain one product-such as
clomiphene citrate-as an option for anovulatory patients,226 though some
women suffering from this condition may respond less well to clomiphene
and benefit from having access to a broader range of pharmaceutical
choices. 7 For this reason, the FDA normally would allow the continued
marketing of a product that benefits some class of patients even if misused
by or for another class of individuals." Alternatively, the agency could try

224. See Henry T. Greely, Banning "Human Cloning": A Study in the Difficulties ofDefining
Science, 8 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 131 (1998); Rick Weiss, An Uncertain Year for Cloning Laws:
Ban on Embryo Research Seen as Unlikely, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002, at Al (assessing the odds
that Congress will enact legislation to restrict human cloning).
225. See David Lindsay Healy et al., Female Infertility: Causes and Treatment, 343 LANCET
1539, 1539-40, 1542 (1994); Am. College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Managing the
Anovulatory State: Medical Induction of Ovulation, 47 INT'L J.GYNEcOL. & OBSTET. 305 (1994);
European Soc'y for Hum. Reprod. & Embryology, Infertility Revisited: The State of the Art Today
and Tomorrow, 11 HUM. REPROD. 1779, 1782-84 (1996). Physicians also have tried these same
drugs to treat infertility in men, but no research has demonstrated any effectiveness for this use. See
Stuart S. Howards, Treatment of Male Infertility, 332 NEw ENG. J.MED. 312, 314-15 (1995).
226. See Collins & Hughes, supra note 26, at 484 ("Clomifene is the medication of choice for
ovulation induction in women who have infertility associated with disorders of ovulation."); id. at
486 ("The high acquisition cost and serious adverse effects ofmenotropins... argue against its use
as a first-line treatment for the majority of women with anovulatory infertility."); Jean Lien &
Jeffrey B. Russell, High-Tech Reproduction: Advances in Reproductive Technology, 61 DEL. MED.
J. 211 (1989) (explaining that Clomid is the first-line therapy because it carries a lower but still
substantial risk of multifetal pregnancy (and is less expensive than) Pergonal).
227. See JOHNA. ROBERTSON, CHILDRENOF CHOICE: FREEDOM ANDTHENEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 206 (1994) ("A restriction on the use of Pergonal to prevent the need for selective
reduction would deprive 20,000 women a year of the drug of choice for their infertility."); Howard
W. Jones, Jr. & James P. Toner, The Infertile Couple, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1712 (1993)
(explaining that 20% of anovulatory women fail to respond to clomiphene citrate alone); see also
Lars Noah, The Coming Pharmacogenomics Revolution: Tailoring Drugs to Fit Patients'Genetic
Profiles, 43 JURIMETRICS J. 1, 2, 4-7 (2002).
228. See LarsNoah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation ofPain Management Technologies,
31 J.L. MED. & ETHics (forthcoming Apr. 2003); see also Swayze v. McNeil Labs., Inc., 807 F.2d
464, 468, 471-72 (5th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that, if the manufacturer could not
reduce the risk that health care professionals would act negligently and administer excessive doses
of fentanyl, it should have withdrawn the drug from the market); cf Forsham v. Califano, 442 F.
Supp. 203, 205, 210 (D.D.C. 1977) (upholding the FDA's decision to withdraw phenformin
notwithstanding its concession that, for a small class of patients, the drug offered a greater
therapeutic benefit than any alternative treatments); David A. Kessler, Regulating the Prescribing
of Human Drugs for Nonapproved Uses Under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 15 HARV. J.ON
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to restrict distribution of all fertility drugs for use only in anovulatory
patients so that they would not be used as a routine adjunct or alternative
to IVF.22 9

C. Stillborn ConstitutionalObjections
Any restrictions on the availability or use of ARTs undoubtedly would
trigger constitutional objections.23 Starting from the proposition that the
courts would extend existing protections of procreative choices involving
contraception and abortion, the government could regulate ARTs only to
serve a compelling state interest and then only by the least restrictive
means available. John Robertson has developed this line of argument most
forcefully, and he has taken the position that safeguarding unconceived
offspring from the risk of fetal injuries would not qualify as a compelling
interest because children born with unavoidable birth defects are still better
off alive.23 ' In particular, he doubts that any prohibitions on the use of

LEGIs. 693, 737 (1978) ("Withdrawal of a drug that has value to a certain patient population
because the drug may be misused by a larger population in effect imposes an unfair hardship on
those patients who could use the drug safely and profitably.").
229. For instance, the agency could accomplish this end by returning fertility drugs to
investigational new drug (IND) status. See Am. Pharm. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 377 F. Supp. 824,830
(D.D.C. 1974) ("When an IND exemption is approved, the Commissioner may, of course, severely
restrict the distribution of the exempted drug to bona fide researchers and clinicians."), aff'd, 530
F.2d 1054 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Chris Adams, FDA Weighs Requests to Return Lotronex to Consumer
Apr. 19, 2001, at BI0 (proposing to do just that with Lotronex).
Market, WALL ST. J.,
230. See Larry I. Palmer, In-Vitro Fertilization as a Social Experiment, 12 HUM. REPROD.
1617, 1618 (1997) ("[L]imitations on the number of embryos thataphysician may transplant [are]
probably unconstitutional."); Dena Beth Langley, Comment, In Vitro Fertilization: Eliminating the
Current State of Limbo Between Pre-Embryonic Rights and the Fundamental Right to Procreate,
26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1217, 1237 (1991) ("[Rlestricting the number of eggs that can be
fertilized will interfere with the infertile couple's right to procreate by preventing fertilization of
the optimal number of eggs to achieve pregnancy. Arguably, if the right to procreate is fundamental,
then every available manner ofprocreation should also be protected." (footnotes omitted)); see also
Cameron v. Bd. of Educ., 795 F. Supp. 228, 237 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("[A] woman possesses the
[constitutional] right to become pregnant by artificial insemination."); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F.
Supp. 1361, 1376-77 (N.D. Il.), affd mem., 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
231. See John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure
ofthe New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939,987-93 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos,
Families, and Procreative Liberty] (arguing that the state lacks a sufficiently compelling interest
in protecting the health of offspring against the risk of unavoidable birth defects and other fetal
injuries to justify restrictions on ARTs because the offspring are still better off alive); id. at 990
("Regulation to reduce the risk of avoidable harm is proper and desirable, but a total ban on the
technique would interfere with procreative choice without benefit to offspring who would not be
conceived at all if the ban existed."); John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 435 (1983) ("The interest in the
child's welfare, however, would not justify regulations limiting the number of eggs that can be
removed or fertilized ....These techniques do not cause a child to be born defective that would
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fertility drugs could pass muster under existing constitutional doctrine.232
Curiously, in discussing the premature human use of cloning technologies,
Professor Robertson appeared to equivocate on his more general point.233
Professor Robertson has conceded the power ofthe argument that harm
to potential offspring may exist from a class as opposed to individual
perspective, but he insisted that this only works if the number of offspring
otherwise have been born healthy; to prohibit them would interfere significantly with reproductive
choice."); id. at 435 n.88 ("Prohibitions on the number of eggs removed may prevent a successful
implant[ation], forcing the physician to perform another laparoscopy or to give up the project.");
John A. Robertson, Liberty, Identity, andHuman Cloning,76 TEX. L. REv. 1371, 1405-08 (1998)
[hereinafter Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning] (elaborating on this argument in
connection with cloning); see also Jan C. Heller, Religious Perspectives on Human Cloning:
Revisiting Safety as a MoralConstraint,32 VAL. U. L. REv. 661,663-69,676-77 (1998) (referring
to this paradox as the problem of the "contingent future person"); Michael H. Shapiro, How (Not)
to Think About Surrogacy and Other Reproductive Innovations,28 U.S.F. L. REV. 647, 672-73
(1994) ("It is up to us to explain to persons wishing.., to resort to in vitro fertilization, and so on,
just why reproduction under the particular circumstances is undesirable.... Among the unsound
reasons are claims that the child-from his or her viewpoint-should not be born because of the
risks.., to the child.").
232. See John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of EarlyEmbryos, 76 VA. L.
REv. 437, 486 n.125 (1990) ("A ban on actions that increase the likelihood of multifetal
pregnancies [e.g., the use of fertility drugs or the transfer of numerous embryos], in order to avoid
selective reduction, would not be valid if Roe remains intact."); id. at 491 ("However, [without
Roe,] the state could choose to prevent the need for selective reduction by limiting the number of
embryos created or placed in the uterus. A ban on use of fertility drugs or the number of embryos
inseminated or placed in a woman would serve this goal."); id. at 493 n.145, 499-501 & n.165
(adding that, even if the Court reverses Roe v. Wade, it still might recognize a fundamental right
to procreate which would limit the power of states to restrict or burden noncoital means of
reproduction).
233. See Robertson, Liberty, Identity, and Human Cloning,supra note 231, at 1411 n.143
("Although resulting children would not be harmed, because they have no other way to be born, it
is less plausible to think that a couple seeking to clone is validly involved in the reproductive
endeavor... when the procedure has not been shown to be safe and effective."). In any event, he
expressed confidence that neither patients nor physicians would seek to use cloning until its safety
and effectiveness had been established. See id. at 1435-36; id. at 1388 n.84 ("Given this desire [to
have healthy children], it is unlikely that legislation to ban cloning until it is shown to be safe and
effective is necessary."); id. at 1437-38 (criticizing the National Bioethics Advisory Commission
for "assum[ing] that doctors and patients would be so driven by the desire to clone and to profit
from doing so that they would ignore the lack of evidence showing safety and efficacy"). Apart
from seeming a bit naive, one must remember that harms to offspring would not necessarily make
the technique unsafe in Professor Robertson's mind. Elsewhere he apparently welcomed a role for
the FDA in regulating cloning as obviating the need for an outright prohibition, see id. at 1411, but
that fails to appreciate the agency's likely approach to risk-benefit and burden of proof issues in
deciding whether to provide access to the technology. Instead, he imagines little more than a risk
disclosure function. See id. at 1445, 1449 ("Regulations to ensure that couples considering cloning
are fully aware of the medical risks of the DNA transfer procedure itself, including likely success
rates, are clearly desirable and justified."); id. at 1452-53 & n.285 (conceding that the issues related
to human cloning might justify the creation of a permanent federal oversight agency to supplement
existing forms of professional self-regulation and threats of tort liability).
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remain constant--otherwise, any decrease in the aggregate number of
offspring to avoid a risk of harm to an individual would suffer from the
same alleged fallacy of preferring nonexistence for some.234 First, it is not
obvious why the number would have to remain exactly the same. Indeed,
in an earlier article, Professor Robertson noted that regulations that might
discourage the full use of ARTs-such as rules against tissue donor
anonymity-would not cause any harm to the unconceived.235 Second, one
can imagine reasons why the aggregate number of offspring under a
regulatory regime that severely restricted access to ARTs for reasons of
safety to the unborn might increase rather than decrease-for instance,
women might be less likely to defer childbearing if they could not (often
unrealistically) hope to use ARTs to accommodate their declining fertility
later in life.236 Although admittedly speculative, these and other impacts
could mean that more and healthier children will be born if ARTs become
harder to use successfully.237
Even if viewed only from an individual perspective, the argument for
disregarding any potential health risks to the unconceived is difficult to
defend. Although accurately reflecting the prevailing judicial hostility to
the recognition of wrongful life claims in tort litigation, Professor
Robertson's arguments do not translate into compelling objections against
governmental intervention to protect future generations. 238 Moreover, to

234. See id. at 1406-07 ("[T]he notion of harm to a class, rather than to an individual, can be
sustained only if the number of the members of the class is kept constant-for example, when a
member of the class of all children born, who has a defect... ,can be replaced with another child
without that defect.").
235. See Robertson, Embryos, Families, and ProcreativeLiberty, supra note 231, at 1018
("The state may prefer to satisfy the need of existing persons to know their genetic roots, rather than
increase the number of children born of donors and surrogates, even if the latter would find an
anomic life preferable to none at all.").
236. Cf id. at 1030 ("A remedy for infertility is implicitly supportive of the behaviors [such
as postponed childbearing] that cause infertility.").
237. Professor Robertson made vaguely similar points in criticizing commentators who had
forecast heavy demand for human cloning that then could result in negative consequences if
permitted for reproductive purposes. See John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27
HOFSTRA L. REv. 609, 626-27 (1999).
238. See Dan W. Brock, Procreative Liberty, 74 TEx. L. REv. 187, 202-05 (1995) (book
review) (criticizing Professor Robertson's claim that any harm done to children born through ARTs
would not justify state interference); Cynthia B. Cohen, "Give Me Childrenor I ShallDie!": New
Reproductive Technologies and Harm to Children, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Mar.-Apr. 1996, at 19;
Coleman, supra note I 11,at 48-56; id. at 48 ("From the preconceptionperspective, the question
is whether it makes sense to bring a person into the world with a particular set of benefits and
burdens, not whether aspecific child, once born, would prefer to have her existence taken away.");
Ronald M. Green, ParentalAutonomy and the ObligationNot to Harm One's Child Genetically,
25 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 5, 10 (1997) ("It is th[e] reasonably expected health condition and the level
of life prospects of others in the child's birth cohort, not the state of nonexistence, that is the
appropriate benchmark for assessing harm in reproductive decision making."); Peters, supra note
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the extent that restrictions aim to decrease the opportunities for multifetal
pregnancies, they would protect women and some of the fetuses from
entirely avoidable injuries, so the argument based on wrongful life would
not apply in any event.239 Professor Robertson has recognized that
externalities such as the costs of medical care imposed on society as a
result of the birth of handicapped offspring, even if not a harm to those
children, could justify restrictions on the use of ARTs,240 and he embraces
government initiatives to mandate the full disclosure of risks.24 '
The FDA routinely regulates pharmaceutical products in ways designed
to minimize the risks of fetal injuries and malformations.242 In fact, the
agency has done so even if it thereby reduces the chances of a successful
delivery. For instance, in 1971 the FDA essentially withdrew approval of
diethylstilbestrol (DES) for the prevention of miscarriage because of risks
to offspring that might not otherwise have made it to term.243 Professor

10, at 508-19, 524, 546-48; id. at 487 ("The nonexistence comparison is most vulnerable to
criticism whenever injuries associated with a reproductive practice could be avoided by modifying
that practice in a way that results in the birth of a different (healthy) child.").
239. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
240. See Robertson, Embryos, Families, and ProcreativeLiberty, supra note 23 1, at 990-91
("[Banning noncoital techniques to prevent financial or rearing burdens to others could be
justified."); id. at 989 ("Even if the child is not harmed, the harm to other people deserves
consideration.... [T]he state would have no obligation to subsidize reproduction indirectly by
allowing procreative behavior that imposes substantial costs on others."); id.at 993 ("If couples are
willing to risk a handicapped birth with a new technique in order to procreate, they could be
required to cover the costs that might be entailed. Their procreative liberty would not extend to
imposing rearing costs on others, even if the offspring were not wronged ....
");id. at 990 n. 175
("Ifthe couple were willing to pay the full costs of rearing the handicapped child, they would injure
no one in undertaking the unavoidable risk of damage.").
241. See ROBERTSON, supra note 227, at 114-16, 136-38; see also ROBERT BLANK & JANNA
C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS 227-28
(1995); PHILIP G. PETERS, JR., HOW SAFE IsSAFE ENOUGH? (Oxford Univ. Press forthcoming 2003).
242. See Peters, supra note 10, at 488, 537-38 (explaining that the FDA applies a more
stringent standard for measuring risks and benefits of drugs that may affect the unborn); id. at 54445 ("[W]e can regulate fertility drugs, AID and [IVF] effectively without the invasive measures
required to control natural conception and birth by high-risk couples. Drug disapproval is certainly
a lesser violation of parental privacy and bodily integrity than forced sterilization or abortion.");
id. at 546 ("[T]here is always the possibility that the lives of children whose injuries are serious will
somehow be devalued by the idea that they would have been better off unborn.... Some regulatory
contexts, perhaps... pharmaceuticals, may pose less risk of eroding our concern and care for the
living than others.").
243. See 36 Fed. Reg. 21,537, 21,537-38 (1971) (requiring that its use in pregnancy be
contraindicated in labeling); Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337, 339-42 (S.D. Tex. 1978)
(rejecting an FTCA claim against the FDA for originally having approved DES for use during
pregnancy without warning of its risks); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y.
1989); cf Payton v. Abbott Labs., 437 N.E.2d 171, 182 (Mass. 1982) ("[W]e hold that if the trier
of fact finds that a preponderance of the credible evidence supports the conclusion that a particular
plaintiff would not have been born except for her mother's ingestion of DES, the plaintiff is barred
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Philip Peters made this same basic point more than a decade ago,244 at a
time when the risk to children born through IVF remained uncertain. He
explained that, although the agency recognized the risk of multiple births
and prematurity associated with fertility drugs, it did not view these harms
as excessive at the time of approval. 245 As this Article has suggested, new
information may justify revisiting that judgment. In any event, the FDA
clearly-even if some would say unreflectively-views harms to the
unborn as relevant hazards of an intervention.
Moreover, the constitutional arguments have been cobbled together
from a bygone era of expansive liberalism on the Court. The wellestablished right to avoid procreation by choosing from among safe and
effective methods of contraception or abortion does not translate
automatically into a right to procreate by any means that someone may
desire.246 Taken to their logical extreme, these arguments somewhat
implausibly would lead to the invalidation of existing state prohibitions on
consanguineous marriage.247

from recovery."). Although real doubts about the drug's effectiveness existed as well, the agency
predicated its decision on growing concerns about safety to the offspring.
244. See Peters, supra note 10, at 519 ("Is there any doubt that the [FDA] would disapprove
a fertility drug that produced birth defects similar to those associated with thalidomide even if the
alternative for the affected children was nonexistence?").
245. See id. at 537 n.260 ("In the FDA's view, that risk does not warrant disapproval.... [A]I!
fetal risks are considered by the FDA and they must be 'very small' for approval to be obtained.");
id. ("Unfortunately, it is not clear whether the FDA's risk-benefit analysis of these fertility drugs
segregated the risks and benefits for the affected children from the benefits afforded to the parents
of the healthy children whose lives are made possible by these infertility drugs .... "); id. ("[This]
makes it impossible to tease out the agency's assumptions about the net impact of prematurity on
the affected children or the extent to which that adverse impact was discounted for infrequency of
occurrence.").
246. See Marsha Garrison, Law Makingfor Baby Making: An InterpretiveApproach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 835, 854-59 (2000); Radhika Rao,
ConstitutionalMisconceptions, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1473, 1484-89 (1995) (book review); Laura
Shanner, The Right to Procreate:When Rights Claims Have Gone Wrong, 40 McGILL L.J. 823,
839-43 (1995) (conceding that all reproductive contexts involve both positive and negative rights,
but distinguishing claims for a right of access to ARTs from decisions involving abortion and
contraception); Andre P. Rose, Note, Reproductive Misconception: Why Cloning Is Not Just
Another Assisted Reproductive Technology, 48 DUKE L.J. 1133, 1146-48 (1999) (explaining that
further extensions are unlikely); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)
(explaining the current Court's reluctance to expand the class of rights accorded constitutional
protection); Note, Human Cloning and Substantive Due Process, I II HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2354
(1998) ("Despite the Court's occasional references to a broader principle of reproductive freedom,
the Court has not truly tested a right to procreate." (footnote omitted)).
247. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 399 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (noting that
states have long prohibited incest and bigamy); id.at 404 (Stevens, J., concurring); Potter v. Murray
City, 760 F.2d 1065, 1070 (10th Cir. 1985) ("We find no authority for extending the constitutional
right of privacy so far that it would protect polygamous marriages."); see also Carolyn S. Bratt,
Incest Statutes and the Fundamental Right ofMarriage: Is Oedipus Free to Marry?, 18 FAM. L.Q.
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Even in the context of abortion, where the right to privacy and the
protection ofliberty interests continue to erect a barrier against government
intrusion absent compelling justifications unattainable by other means, the
Supreme Court has not gone so far as to deregulate the choice of
methods.248 Indeed, given the Court's clear recognition ofa right to privacy
in the context of contraception, one has to wonder about FDA distribution
restrictions that require patients to use two methods of birth control as a
condition of access to the teratogens Accutane and Thalomid.249 After all,
the would-be father has no right to insist that a pregnant woman undergo
an abortion or, conversely, prevent her from doing So.250
In short, constitutional regard for procreative liberties should not stand
as an obstacle to the withdrawal of fertility drugs if the FDA decides that
they no longer represent safe and effective products, just as it would not
prevent the agency from denying a marketing application for a new fertility
drug that failed to satisfy normal criteria for approval. Insofar as multifetal
257, 272-76, 296-97 (1984) (crafting such an argument, in part because the existing prohibitions
are both over- and under-inclusive responses to the small increase in risk of genetic diseases in
offspring); id. at 278 ("Incest statutes impair procreationa choice based on at most a 0.125 risk of
defective offspring."); cf Robertson, Embryos, Families, andProcreativeLiberty,supra note 231,

at 959 n.62 (noting that "the state may place age, gender, and quantity restrictions on marriage,"
and citing a nineteenth century decision upholding a prohibition against polygamy assailed as
interfering with the free exercise of religion); id. at 1006 n.222 ("[Ilt may be that the state's control
of families through marriage and incest laws would allow it to restrict intrafamilial gamete
donations. However, a showing of actual harm to offspring or the parties would probably have to
be established, rather than mere disapproval of biologically intermingled families.").
248. See Noah, supra note 207, at 602; Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a ConstitutionalRight to

Clone?, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 1002 (2002) ("[T]he FDA is not required to justify its decisions in
the terms of strict scrutiny ....

[N]othing in Roe v. Wade supports the right to choose medical

treatments."); id. at 994 ("[W]henever the government imposes barriers on the use of some
medicine or medical technology, there is a disproportionate burden on those who believe that they
need it. By itself that burden is not enough to create a serious constitutional issue.... If numerous
channels [for bearing a child] remain open, perhaps the government need not face the strongest
possible burden when it merely closes off one.").
249. Cf.John A. Robertson, Liberalism andthe Limits ofProcreativeLiberty: A Response to

My Critics, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 233, 259 n.95 (1995) ("In very extreme circumstances of
compelling interest, forced abortion or contraception might be appropriate, but such cases will be
extremely rare."); John A. Robertson, ProcreativeLiberty and Human Genetics, 39 EMORY L.J.

697, 716 (1990) (doubting that the government could mandate genetic screening).
250. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,896 (1992) (plurality opinion); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976). In one reported case, the biological parents
unsuccessfully sought to insist that their surrogate comply with a contractual provision for selective
reduction when she developed a twin pregnancy. See New ParentsFoundfor Surrogate'sTwins,

L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 14, 2001, at B7. Note that these sorts of marketing restrictions, though imposed
by the government, would represent a type of precommitment strategy that Professor Robertson has
endorsed in connection with the disposition of frozen embryos. See Robertson, supra note 4, at
1046; cf. id. at 1022-23, 1041 (recognizing that precommitments requiring bodily intrusions at a
future time might be difficult to enforce).
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pregnancies continue to occur-posing serious risks to both mothers and
children-and more refined fertility treatments now exist that do not
present such risks when undertaken without the use of fertility drugs, the
agency should revisit its original decisions to approve these products for
marketing. If some of the newer ARTs such as ICSI pose a heightened risk
of birth defects, the FDA might address these concerns by trying to extend
its recently asserted jurisdiction over more-than-minimally-manipulated
reproductive tissues.
V. CONCLUSION

ARTs, like other medical technologies, do not exist in a vacuum, and
legal institutions cannot assess their risks and benefits without reference
to the ways that physicians and patients use these technologies in practice.
The apparent rush to embrace the latest assisted reproductive technologies,
and the countervailing preoccupation with the collateral challenges that
they present, has left some fundamental questions about their safety
underappreciated. As research continues to confirm older concerns about
multifetal pregnancies and uncover other types of risks, and in light of the
incentives shared by physicians and infertility patients, legal institutions
need to reevaluate the appropriate uses of these technologies. Because
neither industry self-regulation nor state legislation has responded fully to
the problem, and because the prospect of tort liability alone will not
encourage fertility specialists and clinics to exercise the necessary caution,
a federal regulatory response seems to be in order. Although the FDA has
begun to explore the idea of extending its jurisdiction to control certain
medical procedures involving human reproductive tissues, an effort to
further restrict or entirely prohibit the continued marketing of fertility
drugs may offer a simpler and more effective (though no less controversial)
approach to the problem of multifetal pregnancies.
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